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ABSTRACT 
Uncertainty Communication and Consideration in EA Practice: Lessons from a Mega Transportation 
Project in Canada 
Samia Tabarah 
 
Environmental Assessment (EA) is a tool that informs decision making of the potential adverse impacts 
of proposed development projects. Since EAs deal with future events, uncertainties are unavoidable. It 
has been found that there are different types and sources of uncertainties in EA and decision making, 
however; uncertainties are not always being communicated or considered. It is understood that there is a 
need for more explicit disclosure of uncertainties, yet there is no consensus regarding how uncertainties 
are perceived, communicated, and considered by those involved in, or affected by, EA, and much less is 
known about the contextual dynamics of uncertainty disclosure and consideration. This study attempts to 
better understand the relationship between context and uncertainty practice by exploring uncertainties in a 
Canadian transport mega project EA, the 407 East Extension in southern Ontario.  
 
Transport mega projects are driven by a number of contextual factors, are characterized by high 
uncertainty, are spatially situated, inherently displacing, and highly visible. This study investigated how 
elements of the context hindered, supported, or influenced the way uncertainty was communicated and 
considered by those involved in the EA. In particular, twenty-two (22) semi-structured interviews were 
performed with key project informants such as project proponents, practitioners, regulators, First Nation 
representatives, and affected interests. Results demonstrate that uncertainties in the EA are the result of 
both process and context. In the process, uncertainties were significant in the preliminary and detailed 
assessment stages. Elements of the environmental and socio-political context were found to contribute to 
uncertainty as well. In particular, results indicate that location, lack of baseline data, perception, and 
broader politics, organizational, and regulatory factors worked to influence the way uncertainties were 
either communicated or considered during the EA. In our study, information about uncertainty was not 
disclosed in the EA. Uncertainties were minimized or strategically avoided. In order to address these 
limitations and better inform decision making in EA, we offer a number of recommendations. These are: 
the development of an uncertainty typology; guidance for uncertainty reporting; stakeholder identification 
and transparency in trade-offs; uncertainty management commitments; and, more attention on the context 
within which EA is embedded within and attempting to interact with.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Background 
 
Around the world, there has been a sharp increase in the proposal and development of transportation 
megaprojects, such as highways, tunnels, and railways (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003; van 
Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008). These projects are colossal in size, extremely resource 
demanding, costly, and involve numerous stakeholders; megaprojects are “a different breed” (Flyvbjerg, 
2014). With high stakes and irreversible commitments, megaprojects rapidly transform landscapes in 
profoundly visible ways, and due to their sheer size, costs, and impacts on the community and 
environment, they attract high degrees of public and political attention (Kardes, Ozturk, Cavusgil, & 
Cavusgil, 2013; van Marrewijk et al., 2008). Faced with such an important task, decision-makers should 
have an appropriate understanding of the potential impacts associated with a development project.  
 
Ideally, the Environmental Assessment (EA) process should provide decision-makers and stakeholders 
with the best information about the potential impacts and feasible alternatives. However, EAs routinely 
carried out for large-scale megaprojects have been observed to be unreliable, narrow in their scope, and 
inconsistent (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Similarly the information is prone to psychological biases and 
political steering that seek to minimize uncertainties, overestimate benefits, and underestimate 
environmental impacts (Flyvbjerg, 2005). The extensive rate at which construction of megaprojects are 
being proposed and developed throughout the world, within highly complex and uncertain conditions 
(Salet, Bertolini, & Giezen, 2013), urges the need to understand the factors that contribute or impede 
uncertainty communication and consideration in EA and decision-making. Given the potential effect of 
uncertainties on megaprojects’ implementation and performance, and the rate at which such projects are 
being proposed and developed, there is a greater urgency for EA as an effective decision-making tool.  
1.2 Research Problem 
 
Environmental Assessment (EA) is a process-oriented tool for identifying, predicting, and evaluating the 
potential environmental impacts of development proposals prior to a decision being made as to whether or 
not a proposal should be granted approval to proceed (Sadler, 1996). It is intended to provide decision-
makers and stakeholders with all the necessary analysis and knowledge of a proposed project, including 
its potential impacts, as well as recommended strategies or alternatives to effectively manage those likely 
impacts  (Matthew Cashmore, 2004; Sadler, 1996). However, recent empirical studies have shown that 
predictions in EAs are often wrong, that the information passed on to decision-makers by practitioners is 
incomplete, and that uncertainties are not being communicated nor addressed (Morrison-Saunders, 
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Annandale, & Cappelluti, 2001; Sigel, Klauer, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010; Tennøy, Kværner, & Gjerstad, 2006; 
Wood, Dipper, & Jones, 2000).  
 
Since EA deals with future events, uncertainties are unavoidable (Glasson, Therivel, & Chadwick, 2005). 
In fact, uncertainties have been observed in all of the activities, stages, and related decisions involved 
during an EA process (De Jong, 1988; Lawrence, 2003). For example, post-audit studies showing that the 
real impacts of a project are often different from those predicted have confirmed the inherent nature of 
uncertainty in predictions (Buckley, 1991; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; C. Wood, Dipper, & Jones, 2000). 
Complex and dynamic characteristics of the natural system, the project, and the context also contribute to 
uncertainty (Ascough II, Maier, Ravalico, & Strudley, 2008; Maier & Ii, 2006). It has been argued that 
current EA practice and its multiplicity of actors involved create ‘uncertainty blindspots’ that work to 
diminish transparent communication of uncertainty (Duncan, 2008). The appearance of certainty has also 
been observed in EA reports (Tennøy et al., 2006), making proposals more politically acceptable and 
increasing the likelihood of approval (Duncan, 2008).  
 
Informing decision-makers of the potential uncertainties has been viewed as a means to an end (Sadler, 
1996) and as a result, uncertainties can be deliberately avoided and strategically manipulated to serve a 
political agenda or motive (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Hellström & Jacob, 1996; 
van der Sluijs, 2007). Empirical evidence has shown that there is a successive loss of uncertainty 
information being disclosed in the supporting documents as the EA process progresses (Tennøy et al., 
2006). Not surprisingly, many development projects are characterized by high stakes which could 
reinforce uncertainty avoidance behaviours in light of economical and time constraints (Maier et al., 
2008). In particular, Duncan (2008) argues that proponents, practitioners and decision-makers may have a 
vested interest in making EAs politically appealing and defensible, thereby systematically minimizing 
uncertainty disclosure. When uncertainty is not revealed to the decision-makers or others, it may not be 
possible to arrive at suitable decisions regarding approvals, mitigation, or follow-up measures (Wood, 
2008). Therefore, there is a need to understand the context within which EA and decision-making takes 
place so that the reasons for communicating, or not communicating uncertainties can be revealed. This 
thesis explores such conditions.  
 
The reasons for uncertainty in EA are multiple and complex (Tennøy et al. 2006). This is particularly 
relevant for transportation megaprojects that are embedded within the economic, social, cultural, political, 
and environmental fabric of many societies, and where the EAs routinely carried out have often been 
questioned and denounced (Vidal & Marle, 2008). The emergent nature of the projects under 
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consideration (Salet et al., 2013) or the influence of the dynamics of technologies, economics, politics, 
and other contextual factors on the EA process are uncertainties that can shape the EA processes and 
affect the project trajectory (Tennøy, 2008). Transportation megaprojects are spatially situated and 
inherently displacing (Gellert & Lynch, 2003). The growth and popularity of these projects necessitates 
an urgent need to address the problem of uncertainty communication and consideration (Vidal & Marle, 
2008) and requires an understanding of the full range of different forms of uncertainty without attempting 
to reduce, ignore, or deny them (Wynne, 1992). EA cannot be a rational decision-making tool if 
procedural systems continue to neglect its initial objective; encouraging the view that EA is merely a 
perfunctory step in obtaining project implementation approval (Brown & Hill, 1995). As such, there is 
universal agreement that uncertainty exists in EA, particularly in impact prediction (de Jongh, 1988), that 
uncertainty remains a key source of decision difficulty (Retief et al., 2013) and that it needs to be 
managed in some way, but no consensus exists on how to do this (Leung et al. 2014). 
1.2.1 Purpose and Objectives  
 
An increasing number of researchers have urged that complexity and uncertainty need to be considered as 
an integral part of the decision-making process (Giezen, Salet, & Bertolini, 2015; Groenleer, Jiang, de 
Jong, & de Bruijn, 2012; Salet et al., 2013). In particular, these researches urge megaproject planners to 
refrain from adopting the conventional ‘closed’ approach that tries to keep uncertainty and complexity out 
of planning and decision-making. According to Samset and Volden (2016), project proponents often are 
not comfortable working with uncertainty in an open manner. Yet, it has been suggested that more open 
and transparent EA processes that identify, expose, and disclose information about uncertainty through 
participatory approaches will improve EA effectiveness by bringing uncertainty information to the 
forefront (Wynne 2005). However, there are few studies providing empirical evidence that this will 
improve substantive objectives. International studies have gathered evidence to show how emergent 
dynamics (i.e. changes in the project, legislation, politics, etc.) can influence the treatment of uncertainties 
during decision-making (Dimitriou, 2014; Dimitriou, Ward, & Wright, 2013a). According to Dimitriou et 
al., (2013), megaproject stakeholders rarely identify contextual influences and often view projects as 
‘closed’ systems. Therefore, it is important to understanding how contextual factors influence the 
treatment of uncertainty in EA and decision-making for the appraisal of mega projects.  
 
Policy making structures and EAs are unique and embedded in context-specific dimensions of legal, 
administrative, and procedural circumstances (Gazzola, Jha-Thakur, Kidd, Peel, & Fischer, 2011a). 
Understanding the institutional and organizational structures, as well as the conventions, roles, attitudes, 
and values of the contextual framework and assessment process can promote the betterment of EA 
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effectiveness as a decision-making tool since these characteristics underline, guide, and define the 
development of sound practice (Hildén, Furman, & Kaljonen, 2004). 
 
Through an investigation of the interrelated political, social, technological, environmental and physical 
realities surrounding a large infrastructure development project in Canada, this thesis seeks to determine 
how uncertainties are communicated, handled, considered and potentially influenced by the same 
contextual realities. More specifically, the research seeks to examine the EA process and identify key 
insights into the communicative practices and consideration of the uncertainties associated with a 
Canadian megaproject. Furthermore, the research will gather evidence of the degree to which uncertainty 
communication and consideration has been compromised, or influenced, by context-specific factors and 
emergent issues (i.e. institutional framework, regulatory systems; deadlines, budgets, etc.) surrounding 
the process, including requirements (i.e. public consultation). This will provide insight into how context 
affects the perception and treatment of uncertainty to offer an understanding of whether current EA 
practice is suited to manage uncertainties and integrate these in decision-making.  
 
The findings of the research will help identify the ways in which practitioners, proponents, regulators, 
stakeholders, and other interests’ involved in EA perceive and interpret uncertainty such that uncertainty 
can be better communicated throughout the process. Understanding the pathways of uncertainty 
communication will facilitate an investigation into disclosure practices, avoidance, and consideration of 
uncertainty in EA and decision-making and provide insight about how context shapes or influences the 
former. And the lessons formulated will provide practitioners and decision-makers with guidance on how 
to disclose information about uncertainty in their reports, how to communicate information about 
uncertainty amongst themselves and to the public, and provide the EA community with knowledge 
regarding the contextual dynamics that promote and/or hinder uncertainty communication and 
consideration.  
 
The objectives of the research are:  
 
I.  To identify key uncertainties present during the 407 East EA as perceived by individual actors     
involved in the process; 
II. To determine how contextual factors influenced the way uncertainties were communicated, handled, 
and considered throughout the EA process; and, 
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III. To develop recommendations and practical guidance to the EA community (i.e. practitioner, 
proponents, public, etc.) on uncertainty communication and consideration in EA and decision-
making.  
1.2.2 Case Study Context  
 
Highway 407 is the world’s first electronically operated tolled highway (Ibrahim & Gorys, 2008). 
Planning for Highway 407 began in the early 1950s, at the time when the metropolitan area plans called 
for another east-west alternative to ease traffic congestion on Highway 401, the second most congested 
highway in North America (Miller, 2002). Preliminary planning and route selection took place during the 
1970s and 1980s (Ibrahim & Gorys, 2008). Initial construction began in 1987 and the project was 
completed in 1997 (Ibrahim & Gorys, 2008; Miller, 2002). The highway currently extends 108 kilometres 
and is composed of three main sections: Highway 407 Central (completed in June 1997), Highway 407 
West Extension (completed in July 2001), and Highway 407 East Partial Extension (completed in August 
2001) (Ibrahim & Gorys, 2008).  
 
Recently, the Ministry of Transportation Ontario (MTO) has proposed a 70km easterly extension of the 
existing 407 highway at its current terminus at Brock Road in Pickering to Highway 35/115 in Clarington, 
as well as two north-south links connecting Highway 401 to the proposed 407 East extension; one in 
Whitby and one in Clarington. The 407 East Transportation Project is a large-scale infrastructure project 
that involved a variety of authorities, stakeholders, practitioners, and affected interests. The Ministry of 
Transport Ontario (MTO) initiated a provincial EA process in January 2005. However, a Supreme Court 
of Canada ruling in January 2010 required the project to undergo a federal Comprehensive Study which 
was commenced in July 2010 (CEAA, 2011). Also, in January 2009, the province announced that the 
extension would be tolled but owned by the province. Hence, the 407 East Transportation Corridor is not 
part of the 407 ETR’s concession agreement.  
 
The extension is considered a mega project (Holmes, 2010) and will be used as a case to critically address 
the research objectives. The setting of the environmental assessment process for the mega project offers 
valuable insight into Canada’s largest sub-national region by population, and second largest by area: 
Ontario (Savan & Gore, 2014). The temporal and physical implications of this project, complexity, and 
uncertainties in terms of scale, scope, and potential for adverse impacts mean that the contextual realities 
(i.e. physical, social, political, ecological, technological) will provide for a rich investigation and 
understanding of uncertainty communication, handling, and consideration in Canadian EA practice. 
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1.3 Anticipated Research Contributions  
 
Conceptually, this research aims to fill a research gap that has been identified in the international 
literature and specifically, in the Canadian context, on the understandings of the contextual drivers of 
uncertainty communication and consideration for environmental assessment practice, planning, and 
decision-making (Leung, Noble, Gunn, & Jaeger, 2015). Justification for this research is also pragmatic in 
seeking to provide practical guidance and suggestions for integrating and facilitating the uncertainty 
discourse for future projects. We hope that the findings can be applied, to some extent, to other contexts 
or encourage a discussion regarding the importance of transparent and open EA processes and decision-
outcomes. Lessons and potential contributions on a regional and local scale can be expected. Results can 
provide valuable insight about existing and potential contributions for innovative, integrated, and 
transparent land use planning and infrastructure development. The contextual contribution can help EA 
practitioners and decision-makers gain a better understanding about the way in which they are, or could 
be, influenced by the context and in turn, how they may have an influence on the context.  
1.4  Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis adopts a manuscript-based thesis structure. This chapter is followed by a literature review 
(Chapter 2), which will explore the current state of knowledge relating to the nature, communication, and 
consideration of uncertainty in EA and decision-making. The review of relevant literature will also justify 
the present research by elucidating gaps in the knowledge. Chapter 3 will involve a secondary 
introduction, explain the study design, present the results of the research, and discuss the relevant 
findings.  Lastly, concluding remarks, including recommendations for practice and suggestions for future 
research will be presented in Chapter 5
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Environmental Assessment Practice and Uncertainty  
 
This section begins by explaining the purpose and rational for Environmental Assessment (EA). After 
framing the EA process, we discuss the inherent uncertainties in EA and decision-making and highlight 
major themes and classifications of uncertainty from the literature.  
2.1.1 EA Practice  
 
Environmental Assessment (EA), the earliest and most institutionalized form of Impact Assessment (IA) 
(Lawrence, 2013). Since the 1970s, EA has spread internationally in response to rapid development— 
especially over the past two decades— and it is currently being applied in over 100 countries under the 
auspices of various legal, action-forcing, and institutional arrangements (Matthew Cashmore, 2004; 
Lawrence, 2003; R. Morgan, 2012; Sadler, 1996). In Canada, the federal and provincial governments 
share the responsibility of conducting EAs; provinces adopt different EA regulations for projects in their 
own jurisdictions (i.e. Ontario Environmental Assessment Act OEAA) while the federal process applies 
to those projects for which the Government of Canada is a required decision-making authority under the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act administered by the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency (CEAA) (Glasson et al., 2005; Noble, 2010).  
 
EA is commonly referred to as a process or a tool for identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating 
the potential effects of a development prior to major decisions or commitments being taken (Barker & 
Wood, 1999; Glasson et al., 2005). The process varies from country to country and may be refined by 
elements of the context (e.g. type of proposal, environmental conditions, types of anticipated impacts, 
etc.) (Glasson, Therivel, & Chadwick, 2005; Lawrence, 2013). The process establishes the approach to 
practice as well (e.g. formal procedures, decision-making points, or technical activities) (Lawrence, 
2013). The process can be divided into three major stages that involve different and important activities 
(Hellström & Jacob, 1996; Noble, 2010; Sadler, 1996). The first stage is the Preliminary Assessment and 
it includes the description of the project, screening, scoping, and identification of alternatives. The second 
stage is the Detailed Assessment which covers impact prediction, determination of impact significance, 
mitigation, reporting, review, and decision making. Finally, the third stage is Follow-up and it involves 
monitoring, impact management, and auditing (Hellström & Jacob, 1996; Noble, 2010; Sadler, 1996).  
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The precise purpose of EA has been interpreted in a number of ways and has created a plurality of 
judgments about effectiveness (Matthew Cashmore, Gwilliam, Morgan, Cobb, & Bond, 2004). However, 
it is generally accepted that the intent of EA is both procedural and substantive. According to both Sadler 
(1996) and Lawrence (2013), procedural effectiveness addresses the extent to which EA conforms to the 
established standards and procedures (e.g., the extent to which opportunities for public participation was 
provided), and substantive effectiveness being whether the EA process achieves expected objectives (i.e., 
informing decision-making, the explicit consideration of environmental factors in decision-making, 
avoiding environmental impacts, etc.). 
 
2.1.2 Inherent Uncertainty in EA 
 
EAs for contemporary plans, policies, and development projects are subject to complexity and uncertainty 
because socio-ecological problems are characteristically dynamic and difficult to predict (Ascough II et 
al., 2008; Maier & Ii, 2006). Practitioners and proponents use assumptions, models, and other forecasting 
methods to gain a better understanding of complex systems and to predict future outcomes (Walker, 
Harremoës, et al., 2003). Yet, complexity, natural variability, and measurement errors are some of the 
reasons why predictive models contain unavoidable uncertainties (Maier et al., 2008; Walker, Harremoës, 
et al., 2003). Still, EA often operates under the illusion that current and future conditions can be easily 
and accurately measured (Lawrence, 2013). For example, a study involving 22 Norweigian EAs by 
Tennoy et al. (2006) confirmed that predictions in decision documents often appear much more certain 
than they should. It was further concluded that for the 12 transportation projects in particular, only 24% of 
the predictions were found to be accurate, 41% nearly accurate, and 35% inaccurate. In a politically 
charged arena like EA, the appearance of confident predictions and the misuse or misinterpretation of 
numbers can have detrimental consequences (Duncan, 2008).  
 
The screening, impact significance evaluation, and follow-up stages have been identified as areas where 
practical improvements are needed (Bank, 2005; Greig & Duinker, 2011; Sadler, 1996; Tennøy et al., 
2006). However, uncertainties have been found to manifest in all stages including screening (Duncan, 
2008; Geneletti, Beinat, Chung, Fabbri, & Scholten, 2003), scoping (Geneletti et al., 2003), impact 
predictions (Hellström & Jacob, 1996; Rowe, 1994; Söderman, 2005; Tennøy et al., 2006; Wood et al., 
2000), evaluation (Wood, 2008), and management and mitigation (Söderman, 2005).  The literature has 
pushed towards the betterment of practice by providing empirical evidence about the importance of 
identifying, communicating, and considering uncertainties in the predictions. Prediction uncertainties 
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have been discussed in the works of De Jongh (1988), Geneletti et al. (2003), Tennoy et al. (2006), Wood 
et al. (2000), Wood (2008), and a number of others.  
 
During the preliminary stages of the assessment, baseline studies have been identified as a source of 
uncertainty because they often consist of incomplete information (Sigel et al., 2010; Wood, 2008). 
Baseline studies establish both the current and future state of the environment in the absence of the 
project, and thus, require a lot of reliable data (e.g. geology, traffic flow, species abundances, landscape 
quality, etc.). This stage forms the basis and credibility for the next steps in the assessment—thus, is it 
important that the information collected and gathered for the baseline case is relatively accurate (Duncan, 
2008) because unreliable baseline data can reduce the potential effectiveness of proposed mitigation 
measures (Geneletti, 2003). According to Wood (2008), uncertainties in predictions can arise from 
measurement errors in baseline data, errors in future baseline estimates, and the accuracy of predictive 
methods.  
 
2.1.3 Uncertainty Classification  
 
The concept of “uncertainty” is closely related to the concept of “risk”. Many scholars refer to economist 
Frank Knight’s (1921) distinction of risk and uncertainty suggesting that uncertainty is when we have no 
information about the possible event outcome and their probabilities, and risk implies a partial knowledge 
of the probabilities (Spiegelhalter & Riesch, 2011; van Asselt, 2000). Walker et al. (2003) define 
uncertainty as any departure from the unachievable ideal of complete determinism (p.8). According to 
this definition, uncertainty is more than just the absence of knowledge. For example, uncertainties can 
arise in situations with a lot of information available because the information may reduce uncertainty but 
it can also reveal the presence of uncertainties that were previously unknown (Harremoës, 2003; Walker, 
Harremoës, et al., 2003). On the other hand, Brugnach et al. (2008) introduce a relational definition of 
uncertainty from the perspective of multi-actor decision-making processes. They define uncertainty as the 
situation in which there is not a unique and complete understanding of the system to be managed (p.4), 
and argue that the interaction between the diverse actors and their interpretive frames is a key component 
to understanding knowledge and uncertainty (Brugnach et al. 2008).There are different ways of defining 
uncertainty but in order to encompass all the dimensions of uncertainty related to EA practice and 
decision-making, the definitions by Walker et al. (2003) and Brugnach et al. (2008) are most appropriate.  
 
There exists a number of uncertainty classifications in the literature to help overcome understandings, 
identification, and handling of uncertainty in various fields of decision support, including EA. These 
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classifications are useful, but they can be confusing and insufficient (Larsen, Kørnøv, & Driscoll, 2013). 
They often overlap, or build upon other previously published classifications (Refsgaard, van der Sluijs, 
Højberg, & Vanrolleghem, 2007) (see Table 2.1). Often times, uncertainty is broken down according to 
their location, or source, type, and level but there is no mutually agreed upon typology or classification 
for handling uncertainty in EA (Kloprogge, Sluijs, & Wardekker, 2007; Walker et al., 2003; Wardekker, 
van der Sluijs, & Janssen, 2008a). Due to the nature of our study, purely statistical uncertainties will not 
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Type of uncertainty Level of uncertainty 
Funtowicz and Ravetz 
(1990) 
Science for 
policy   
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Table 1.1: Uncertainty typologies found in the literature 
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The location of uncertainty reflects where the uncertainty manifests itself (Walker et al., 2003). In Walker 
et al. (2003) and others (see Table 2), they characterize the location of uncertainty within the system. The 
classification by Brugnach et al. (2008) and Van der Keur et al. (2008) enables a wider applicability as it 
reformulates location to reflect the context and activities of policy development independent of models.  
 
The level of uncertainty characterizes uncertainty on a gradual spectrum of imperfect knowledge. 
According to Walker et al. (2003) the level of uncertainty ranges from determinism via scenario 
uncertainty, statistical uncertainty, scenario uncertainty, recognized ignorance, and total ignorance. 
Determinism is the situation in which we know everything with absolute certainty. Statistical uncertainty 
is when the uncertainty can be defined in statistical terms, and when it cannot then it is referred to as 
scenario uncertainty. And when there is simply an awareness of a lack of knowledge it falls into 
recognized ignorance while total ignorance is a state of complete lack of awareness of even having a lack 
of knowledge (Walker et al., 2003). Refsgaard et al. (2007) and Van der Sluijs (2006) argue that such 
deterministic distinctions of uncertainty do not consider the qualitative dimensions. The authors include 
qualitative uncertainty in their classifications for situations when uncertainty cannot be characterized 
probabilistically and that not all outcomes are known.  
 
Epistemic and variability uncertainty are well recognized in the literature and reflect the origin or the 
nature of uncertainty (see van Asselt, 2000; Walker et al., 2003):  Epistemic uncertainty is due to 
incomplete knowledge of the system, and variability uncertainty is due to inherent randomness and 
unpredictability of the system. Epistemic uncertainty is concerned with what we do not know but might 
know eventually and in some cases, it can be reduced (Walker et al., 2003). On the other hand, variability 
uncertainty is caused by the random or chaotic system behaviour, such as natural processes, or social 
dynamics and thus, it cannot be reduced by more research because this uncertainty involves things that we 
cannot know (Walker et al., 2003). Interestingly, recent changes in the conception of uncertainty have 
incorporated ambiguity as another nature dimension of uncertainty (Brugnach et al., 2008; Maxim & van 
der Sluijs, 2011; Raadgever, Dieperink, Driessen, Smit, & van Rijswick, 2011). Ambiguity is another 
type of uncertainty that is due to the different and multiple interpretations or framing of the system and 
we find ambiguity uncertainty in situations where there may be more than one valid way of framing 
knowledge.  This type of uncertainty is likely to emerge when decision making processes involves 
multiple actors with diverse background, judgements, and values (Brugnach et al., 2008). EA processes 
are likely to encounter several instances where ambiguity type uncertainties are present.  
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The source of uncertainty, according to Sigel et al. (2008), refers to the point of reference or knowledge 
or specific issue that the uncertainty is related to (also called ‘location’ or ‘causes’ by other authors). 
Sources are context-specific and relate to the system or project characteristics. For example, sources 
include commercial and competitive pressures, technological surprises, financial constraints, institutional 
reform, value diversity, or other dynamics in the system (van Asselt & Rotmans, 2001). For the integrated 
water resource management process of the Rhine river basin in Germany, Van der Keur et al. (2008) 
classified the following sources of uncertainty: data uncertainty; model uncertainty (incomplete 
understanding or description of the system); multiple frames uncertainty; and, system conditions 
uncertainty (uncertainty about future conditions and external factors). Similarly, Koppenjan and Klijn 
(2004) examined the strategic behaviours of actors in situations of uncertainty based on network theory 
and identified the following types of uncertainty: strategic uncertainty, institutional uncertainty, and 
substantive uncertainty. Each type has different sources, for example strategic uncertainty can arise from 
unexpected and conflicting strategic actions of stakeholders, institutional uncertainty can come about 
from the dynamics of policy development and, substantive uncertainty is due to knowledge and variations 
in the interpretations and handling of knowledge.  
 
According to Brugnach et al. (2008) all sources of uncertainty can be considered in the context of natural, 
technical, or social systems (Table 2.2). The natural system includes ecological and biological system 
components (i.e., climate impacts, water quality, wildlife, etc.), the technical system includes 
artifacts/elements that are utilized during the development of the infrastructure (i.e. highways, stormwater 
management, fencing, etc.), and the social system includes the economic, legal, political, administrative, 
and internal dynamics of the project development. Variability, epistemic, and ambiguity can exist in each 
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Recognizing the various ways in which uncertainty pervades EA can be helpful. Attempts to manage 
uncertainty in this way are often based on the assumption that uncertainties are identifiable, quantifiable, 
as well as easily communicable (Duncan, 2012) and that the disclosure of uncertainty will lead to better, 
more informed decisions and uncertainties will be better integrated and considered in decision-making 
(Tennøy, Kværner, & Gjerstad, 2006). The following section will go over some of the key arguments and 
findings in the literature about uncertainty communication and consideration.  
2.2 Uncertainty Communication and Consideration in EA and Decision-Making 
 
There is much criticism in terms of how uncertainties are communicated and considered in EA (Bond, 
Morrison-Saunders, Gunn, Pope, & Retief, 2015; Duncan, 2008; Larsen, Kørnøv, & Driscoll, 2013; 
Tennøy et al., 2006). Communication and interaction among the actors engaged in EA can facilitate new 
knowledge generation (Zhang, Kornov, & Christensen, 2013) as well as contribute to the effectiveness of 
the EA (Morrison-Saunders & Bailey, 2000). Therefore, it is important that practitioners translate their 
findings into non-technical language that is meaningful to the public and decision-makers—including 
uncertainties (van Asselt, 2000). However, much of the control rests with the project proponents who 
decide what information will or will not be passed on to the decision-makers (Wood, 2008), and 
disclosing information about uncertainties has been viewed as a means to an end for proponents who may 
have a vested interest in making their projects politically palatable (Cashmore, Bond, & Cobb, 2007).  
 
It is understood that there is a need to improve uncertainty communication (Budescu, Por, & Broomell, 






















Variability Epistemic Ambiguity 
Unpredictable 
behaviour of the 
natural system 
Incomplete knowledge about 
the natural system 
Multiple knowledge frames 
about the natural system 
   
Unpredictable behavior 
of the technical system 
Incomplete knowledge about 
the technical system 
Multiple knowledge frames 
about the technical system 
   
Unpredictable 
behaviour of the social 
system 
Incomplete knowledge about 
the social system 
Multiple knowledge frames 
about the social system 
Table 2.2: Brugnach et al.'s (2008) uncertainty classification 
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uncertainty is understood and information about uncertainty is treated before this can happen. In this 
section, the relationship between uncertainty communication and perception will be outlined. This will be 
followed by a discussion of applicable theoretical perspectives and current treatments of uncertainty.  
 
2.2.1 Perception    
 
When evaluating uncertainty communication and consideration in EA, it is important to identify how 
different actors perceive uncertainty. There will often be differences in the way problems are framed, 
uncertainties understood, and addressed between the scientific and non-scientific communities involved 
(Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990; Hellström & Jacob, 1996; Walker, 
Harremoës, et al., 2003; Wardekker, van der Sluijs, & Janssen, 2008). According to Leung et al. (2016) 
the relationship between uncertainty information and communication of uncertainties is where 
perceptions play an important role in shaping the flow of information. The authors argue that there is a 
need to better understand how uncertainties are viewed in order to improve uncertainty consideration.  
 
By definition, perceptual relativity denotes the situation when actors or stakeholders have different 
perceptions of reality based on their unique frames of reference, backgrounds, and world-views (Walker 
et al. 2003). In many stages of EA, subjective and value-laden assumptions are made (e.g. choice of 
parameters, impact significance, methods, etc.) (van der Sluijs 2004), and in the political arena, the 
experts, scientists, and consultants involved are pulled together and required to transform the information, 
the predictions, the assumptions, the complexities, and the uncertainties in a simplified, policy-relevant 
manner (van der Sluijis 1997; Wardekker et al. 2008). Similarly, the progressive transfer of knowledge 
about uncertainties throughout the stages of the EA will reflect the individual knowledge producers’ 
perception about the information. In other words, the perspectives present among the diversity of actors 
involved suggests that each actor might treat uncertainty differently (Rowe, 1994) creating a gap between 
the authors’ intentions and readers’ understanding (Budescu et al., 2011). According to Brugnach et al. 
(2011), collective decision-making can give rise to ambiguity which is an indication that there may be 
more than one valid way of framing the knowledge.  
 
Effective communication of uncertainty information is necessary, but it is equally important that decision-
makers readily consider the uncertainty for responsible decision-making. Wardekker et al. (2008) looked 
at uncertainty perception, presentation, and communication in the Dutch science-policy interface and 
showed that policymakers and scientists held mismatching perceptions of uncertainty. From an economic 
perspective, proponents and developers of major or controversial projects may view uncertainty as an 
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imminent threat for project approval and choose to strategically avoid communicating uncertainties (Bond 
& Pope 2012; Wood 2008). This was documented in the Norwegian study by Tennøy et al. (2006) who 
found that, while uncertainty was identified in most prediction documents, uncertainty was indicated in 
only 59% of the Environmental Impact Statements (EISs), and 58% for decision-documents suggesting 
that decision makers are only given limited information. However, studies have shown that 
communicating uncertainty can impair negotiations, weaken policy proposals, delay action, and even 
cause confusion (Wardekker et al., 2008b). Van der Sluijs et al. (2008) argue that managing and 
communicating uncertainties involves more than just reporting, stating that “scientific uncertainty should 
be jointly established in a dialogue with all stakeholders” (p7). Government agencies are increasingly 
recognizing that uncertainties can no longer be suppressed or minimized (Van der Sluijs et al., 2008) and 
recommend better, more systematic treatment of uncertainties, improved communication and 
transparency, and better consideration.  
 
Uncertainty cannot be eliminated in science, but better uncertainty disclosure can improve its integration 
into decision outcomes. According to Tennøy et al. (2006), when decision-makers were made aware of 
the uncertainties in the Grualia-Bruvolle road tunnel project, responsible mitigation and monitoring 
programs made it possible to detect several problems and improve the ability to deal with the 
uncertainties. Similarly, a study evaluating the quality of EISs and performance of EA, in terms of its 
effect and influence on project modifications, in 8 European countries, Barker and Wood (1999) reported 
that the EA process brought about modifications to several projects that were being assessed. This would 
suggest that decision-makers are making use of the knowledge in the EA reports provided to them. 
However, the following factors have been identified as having an influence on the quality of the 
information: legal and regulatory requirements; the experience of the proponent, consultants, and 
competent authority; the nature and size of the project; scoping; the length of the report; and, time needed 
to collect, analyze, and disseminate the information (Barker & Wood, 1999; Caldwell, 1991; Wood et al., 
2000); in other words, the contextual elements of the EA. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Perspectives 
 
There is germane research on uncertainty outside the EA literature that attempts to explain human 
behaviors in regards to uncertainty, uncertainty communication, uncertainty avoidance, and decision-
making in the face of uncertainty (see for e.g.: Leung et al., 2015). Several theories and ideas have been 
tested, including actor-network theory (Groenleer et al., 2012; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2002; Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004; Latour, 1987), prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and the certainty trough 
(Duncan, 2008; Mackenzie, 1990). 
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Mega projects can be characterized as networks of people and agencies that work together to address a 
complex problem. The recent concept known as actor-network theory can be used for exploring 
uncertainty perception, the pathways of uncertainty information, and trajectory of communication in the 
EA context. Developed by French sociologists, Bruno Latour and Michel Callon, actor-network theory 
provides a theoretical and normative concept for analyzing and mapping dynamic processes of decision-
making in network settings (Latour, 1987), making it easier to evaluate how perceptions, interactions, and 
institutions play a role in decision-making (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).  
 
First, actor-network theory argues that society is made up of human and non-human components (i.e. 
legislation, economics, scale, etc.)(Latour, 1987). Actors are entities that are mutually dependent on one 
another, and the interaction patterns and processes that emerge establish the context for which actors 
articulate, evaluate, and address complex issues (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Actor-network theory 
considered uncertainty as an inherent characteristic of actor interactions, resulting from the diverse 
interests, roles, and preferences underlying the behaviours of actors involved (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; 
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). At the same time power can be used to influence problem framing to the 
advantage of some actors. For example, Latour (1987) relates actor-network theory to the way in which 
scientist create facts by closeting controversies, and ‘black-boxing’ uncertainties and assumptions to 
avoid scrutiny—similar to the criticisms found in the EA literature where it is widely recognized that 
decision-making processes do not occur in a vacuum, but are actually influenced by context and power 
(Cashmore & Richardson, 2013; Lee & George, 2000; Wynne, 1992). Inspired by actor-network theory, 
Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) developed an uncertainty classification on the basis of actor networks where 
they describe substantive uncertainty (the absence of or interpretations of knowledge), strategic 
uncertainty (the unpredictable actions of actors relative to perception, motive, or behaviour), and 
institutional uncertainty (the complexity as a result of actors’ different organizations and policy arenas 
interacting) (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012). Because uncertainty in EA is broadly understood as 
encompassing both the absence of knowledge and shared understanding of the knowledge, introducing a 
network can expose strategic and institutional uncertainties in the process.  
 
Furthermore, there is a vast body of literature in cognitive sciences and behavioural decision theory that is 
dedicated to research concerned with the inconsistencies underlying choices and judgments. Among the 
most prevalent theories in the literature is prospect theory, first formulated by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1979). This theory is designed to explain a common pattern of choice for when individuals choose 
among alternatives with probabilistic or uncertain outcomes by exploring the framing and evaluation 
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stages of decision-making. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1979) argue that individuals tend to be 
risk-averse when stakes of losses are high, and risk-seeking if the stakes of losses are low. The theory 
attempts to show how individuals may make choices irrationally due to the psychological effects and 
heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). First, prospect theory introduced a phenomenon called 
the certainty effect which describes the tendency to overweigh certain outcomes relative to outcomes that 
are merely ‘possible’. If we extend the bias to EA for example, it suggests that decision-makers prefer a 
situation with less uncertainty. Alternatively, in prospect theory framing refers to a decision-maker’s 
conception of acts, outcomes, and implications associated with a particular choice. The frame adopted by 
a decision maker is controlled by past experiences, by availability of information, and partly by the 
norms, values, and personal characteristics of the decision-maker (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Empirical research shows that the perception of a situation is affected by the way it has 
been framed, such as the order of the information or presentation of consequences (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). With regard to EA, a framing effect can occur when different, but equally logical words or phrases 
can alter an individual’s preference. For example, decision-makers might reject a proposal that focuses on 
the negative consequences of a proposal but give approval consent to one where impacts are framed 
positively. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that decisions which are more uncertain are more 
risky, and introduce an heuristic called ‘loss aversion’ which stipulates that losses are experienced more 
intensely than gains. This effect can contribute to discrepancies between how individuals value what they 
currently possess more than comparable things that they do not have. Alternatively, actors may accept 
risks in order to avoid receiving a reputation for inaction. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) also introduce 
the ‘availability effect’ for when decisions are based on information that is most readily accessible. For 
example, individuals will likely perceive air travel as being more dangerous than car travel because of the 
dramatic nature of aircraft calamities and the lasting impression that these incidents have.  
 
Other relevant heuristics are found in the uncertainty guidance developed by Kloprogge et al. (2007) such 
as ‘confirmation bias’, and the ‘overconfidence effect’. The former is when initial impressions structure 
the way subsequent information is made to fit within the decision and interpreted for the purpose of 
action. Confirmation bias can have implications for decision-making because contrary information that is 
not consistent with the initial understanding can be viewed as unreliable and disregarded entirely 
(Kloprogge et al., 2007). The overconfidence effect occurs when individuals place unwarranted certainty 
on their own personal work or judgments (Kloprogge et al., 2007). 
 
Finally, the ‘certainty trough’ introduced by MacKenzie (1990), takes a social constructivist position in 
understanding how social distance shapes the perception of scientific knowledge. The concept suggests 
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that those directly involved in the production of knowledge and those further alienated from it will have 
relatively high levels of uncertainty, while those who are knowledge users, at medium distance, will 
attribute lower levels of uncertainty to the knowledge. The idea has been specifically discussed and 
applied in the context of environmental decision-making (Duncan, 2008; Shackley & Wynne, 1995). 
Shackley and Wynne (1995) confirmed that climate change practitioners attributed higher certainty to 
knowledge from another speciality than practitioners in the first speciality would attribute to it 
themselves. And Duncan (2008) reports how distance from the location of knowledge production can 
actually make knowledge claims appear more reliable than warranted. According to Duncan (2008), the 
assessment isolated actors in the process and created distances between knowledge producers and 
knowledge users, and this served to diminish uncertainty disclosure.  
2.2.3 Responding to Uncertainty   
 
There is improved theoretical understanding of the need to incorporate and manage uncertainties for 
decision-making, but the practitioner community continues to face criticisms in terms of not properly 
communicating uncertainties (Tennøy et al., 2006) because incomplete uncertainty communication can 
result in inadequate EA performance and questions regarding the legitimacy of appraisal outcomes 
(Duncan, 2008). In many cases, EA has little influence on the authorization decisions for development 
proposals (Wood, 2008) and others have argued that even if the uncertainties are explicitly disclosed in 
the reports, that the information will not necessarily reach decision-makers (Tennøy et al., 2006; Wood, 
2008). Decision-makers should be given information about uncertainties that are present throughout the 
assessment to determine the best decision outcome (Geneletti et al., 2003). The lack of communication 
and consideration is generally associated with limited access to information (data and assumptions), errors 
in baseline data, model errors, uncertainties in impacts predictions, and uncertainties in impact 
significance and many others identified in the literature (Buckley, 1991; Duncan, 2008; Walker et al., 
2003; Wardekker et al., 2008b; Wood et al., 2000). The responsibility for providing appropriate 
environmental information used in the process rests with the project proponents, who take control over 
the information and quality of the EA passed on to the decision-makers (Wood, 2008).  
 
EA approaches are difficult to define as a result of the diversity of policies, practitioners, and professional 
cultures that exist in practice (Morgan et al., 2012). Because of this, the sections in an EA report (i.e. 
different impact areas) use different language, different criteria, and adopt a number of methodologies 
which can be difficult and even confusing for the reader (Wood et al., 2000). The challenges in EA can be 
remedied by adopting consistent and systematic communication approaches that better identify and 
manage uncertainties. In a review of the current literature, Leung et al. (2015) argue that practitioners 
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have limited guidance on uncertainty communication, disclosure and consideration for decision-makers 
and as a result, should not be criticized. They propose further research necessary to develop practical 
guidance about how practitioners should identify, interpret, and communicate uncertainty information. 
Typologies can also help practitioners and decision-makers understand the types of uncertainties that they 
are faced with and can prevent miscommunication or interpretational problems (Morgan et al., 2012; 
Walker et al., 2003; Wardekker et al., 2008). 
 
Uncertainty cannot be detached from environmental decision-making and tools to better identify and 
manage uncertainties have been reported in the literature. At the same time, new developments in 
integrated management frameworks for EA have emerged which embrace the notion that complex 
environmental problems are inherently uncertain (Harremoës, 2003). Harremoës (2003) argues that post-
modernism encourages new directions in terms of uncertainty handling which necessitates better 
participatory approaches, the adoption of the precautionary principle, and adaptive management. 
 
Post-normal science 
Post-normal science is a reflective approach introduced by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) which implies 
that normal science, aiming to consolidate policy with measurable, valid, and reliable information, has 
been impractical for issues driven by environmental risks (e.g. GMOs, anthropogenic climate change) 
(van der Sluijs 2007). Post-normal science seeks to establish a methodology of inquiry appropriate for 
issues with political pressures, disputes, high decision-making stakes, and uncertainty (van der Sluijs 
2007). EA exhibits many conditions requiring a post-normal approach. Harremoës (2003) argues that 
deterministic science can be used to strategically hide uncertainty while Funtowics and Ravetz (1992) 
acknowledge the limits of scientific research and state that “..in the face of such uncertainties, they 
[experts] too are amateurs”. According to Harremoës (2003), in cases where predictive scientific 
approaches fail or suffer from uncertainties, the precautionary principle is an approach to avoid and 
minimize the effects of scientific surprises (p. 24).  
 
Precautionary Principle 
Sustainability and precaution are key characteristics of post-normal science (van der Sluijs 2012). In the 
absence of scientific certainty, the precautionary principle is a strategy that incites anticipatory action to 
better cope with uncertainty. The Wingspread definition of the precautionary principle states: “When an 
activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be 
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the 
proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof” (Wingspread Conference 
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on the Precautionary Principle, 1998). Alternatively, the precautionary principle is an appeal to prudence 
which encourages proactive decision-making under situations characterized by high risk or uncertainty 
(van der Sluijs, 2012). In Canada, the precautionary principle is embedded in federal environmental laws, 
including the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). The Canadian government’s approach to 
the precautionary principle asserts: “The absence of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing decisions where there is a risk or serious irreversible harm” (Privy Council Office of 
Canada, 2003). However, although the recent changes in the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
2012 reiterates the commitment to the precautionary principle, no mention is made regarding the means or 
adaptive capacity needed to effectively respond to a possible risk (Gibson 2012).  
 
Adopting post-normal scientific approaches, or increasing reliance on the precautionary principle does not 
guarantee uncertainty communication in EA, yet, it may improve the inclusion of uncertainty in decision-
making and provide for better accountability, credibility, and impact mitigation (van der Sluijs 2012). 
However, in the case of great uncertainties, it has been suggested that adaptive management measures 
should take precedence (Harremoës, 2003). 
 
Adaptive Management  
Adaptive management (AM) is an approach that presses for management strategies that are flexible, 
allowing adjustments to dynamic contextual factors, decision, events, or circumstances. AM encourages 
EA practitioners, planners, and decision-makers to conceptualize and design management plans that 
respond to change and are modified with increasing knowledge (Noble, 2000). Noble (2000) reports that 
traditional EA reflects a blueprint planning approach that seeks to eliminate uncertainty rather than 
manage it. AM is a more suitable approach to EA and inherent uncertainties because it also incorporates 
participatory approaches and stakeholder engagement to determine robust solutions. The isolation of the 
actors engaged in EA processes has been identified as a factor diminishing EA effectiveness by reducing 
disclosure of uncertainty information (Duncan 2008) and AM approaches could provide suitable grounds 
for more open and flexible decision-making.  
 
2.3 The Importance of Context 
 
The structure of an EA process has been understood as being dictated largely by the issues it is attempting 
to address, by the regulatory and legislative requirements within which it operates, by the socio-political 
and geographical context, and by the dynamic relationships and configurations of the projects actors and 
stakeholders (Leung et al., 2015; Tennøy et al., 2006; Wardekker et al., 2008a; Wood, 2008). The 
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literature has suggested that the substantive effectiveness of EA is context specific (Cashmore, 
Richardson, Hilding-Ryedvik, & Emmelin, 2010; Gazzola, Jha-Thakur, Kidd, Peel, & Fischer, 2011b; 
Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007). 
 
The following section begins by describing the important relationship between context and EA 
effectiveness. Since the current research involves a transportation mega-project in Ontario, Canada, a 
brief discussion about the related environmental impacts, uncertainties, and current practical limitations 
will conclude this section of the literature review.  
 
2.3.1 Contextual Considerations in EA 
 
Projects are unique and reflect a context-specific socio-political arrangement, or sets of legal, 
administrative, economical, and political circumstances, or even environmental settings (Jones et al., 
2005). Moreover, it is widely recognized that decision-making processes, including EA, do not occur in a 
vacuum but are significantly influenced by context (Lee & George, 2000; Wynne, 1992). For example, 
the decision-making context according to Lee and George (2000) is influenced by two broad contextual 
factors: (1) who is involved in taking the decisions and their motivations, and (2) the social, political and 
economic circumstances as well as the regulatory, procedural and institutional constraints within which 
the decisions are taken. In particular, an EA process is directed by institutional arrangements which 
involve various interconnections among decision making authorities (i.e. proponents, governments, 
departments, regions, etc) wherein the information, or the connection, is filtered through an intricate set of 
legal, political, administrative, formal, and informal arrangements (Lawrence, 2013). Similarly, Arts et al. 
(2012) suggest that the effectiveness of EA will be influenced by context in the form of the procedures, 
the decision-making context, the involvement of actors, and the interests of the actors involved in the 
decision-making process.  
 
According to Ascough et al. (2008), decision-making can be influenced by uncertainties from variability 
in the EA that stems from human behaviour or contextual dynamics (i.e. social, economic, institutional, 
etc.). Therefore, the context can introduce a number of factors shaping EA processes and performance as 
well. For example, Wood (2003) suggests that the more committed a particular institution is to addressing 
environmental concerns and incorporating them into decision-making, the more influence the information 
may have on decision outcomes. Similarly, a study by Lorenz et al. (2013) found that the extent to which 
uncertainty was disclosed in the reporting documents was dependant on the policy style and national 
context.  
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Contextual factors surrounding EA processes can be socio-economic, political, environmental, cultural, or 
other. Institutional and organizational arrangements can also pose a major structural challenge to the 
effectiveness of EA practice (Kolhoff, Runhaar, & Driessen, 2009) and includes both formal institutions, 
like administrative units, and informal institutions, such as cultural and social norms. At any given time, 
these institutions reflect the values of a society (Gazzola et al., 2011a). However, the political system is 
one of the most influential factors (Kolhoff, Driessen, & Runhaar, 2013). Authors like Kornov and 
Thissen (2000) have placed emphasis on the complexity in decision-making contexts and the relative 
significance of political powers. Hilden et al. (2004) point to the significance of legal and administrative 
factors for procedural aspects of environmental decision-making and argue that effectiveness is a product 
of the degree to which the assessment is tailored to the decision-making context. Further, Gazzola et al. 
(2011) argue that understanding the elements within an organization’s context may improve the 
effectiveness of environmental appraisals. However, there is limited guidance currently available that 
would address the uncertainties arising as a result of a particular socio-political, environmental, or broader 
development context (Leung et al., 2015). 
 
Kolhoff et al. (2009) studied the contextual factors constraining the effectiveness of EA in developing 
countries and developed a conceptual model (see Figure 1) to determine the contextual factors that 
influence the performance of an EA process. The EA system consists of the regulatory framework, 
informal rules in practice, and the capacities of the actors involved in the process. The context includes 
such factors that influence the components in the EA system, that thereby shape the overall performance 
output. These are the political system, the socio-economic situation, the institutional and legal framework, 
and the environmental situation. According to the authors, each contextual factor can influence the 
development and performance of the regulatory framework and the development and performance of 
capacities differently. 
 
In a more recent article, Kolhoff et al. (2013) attempt to characterize and explain the development of EA 
legislation and provide a framework to better understand constraining contextual factors. They apply the 
framework to three developing countries on the basis that each country has unique contextual dynamics 
that can constrain or better EA performance. They found that there are two dominant actors influencing 
EA ambitions: the environmental authority, defending the environment and supporting EA, and the sector 
ministries, strongly defending the interests of their project development. For example, in Yemen sector 
ministries with strong political influences attempted to delay and avoid mandatory EA requirements. 
Kohloff et al. (2013) maintain that heightened environmental awareness can work to reduce such political 
  24 
influences. Furthermore, results from their study showed that decision-making is influenced by the 
capacity (i.e. knowledge, experience) of the EA authority and also by the level of democracy of the 
political system.  
2.3.2 The Transport “Megaproject” Context  
 
Transportation infrastructure projects are among the biggest drivers of biodiversity loss globally 
(Trombulak & Frissell, 2000; van der Ree, Jaeger, van der Grift, & Clevenger, 2011). Some of the most 
cited ecological effects of roads include habitat loss, wildlife-mortality due to collisions with vehicles, 
edge effects, population subdivision and isolation, reduced population viability, barrier effects, resource 
inaccessibility, and increased human access (Forman & Alexander, 1998; Jaeger et al., 2005; Lenore 
Fahrig, 2009; Spellerberg, 1998; Trombulak & Frissell, 2000; van der Ree, Jaeger, van der Grift, & 
Clevenger, 2011). There are many direct (i.e. wildlife and vehicle collisions), indirect (i.e. isolation), as 
well as cumulative impacts associated with transportation infrastructure. Cumulative effects arise from 
the combination of many, varied projects, or from repetitive impacts of a single source (Treweek, 1999). 
A project can, by itself, have few impacts but collectively, with other disturbances or projects nearby, can 
result in detrimental consequences on both species and ecosystems at the local and landscape-scale 
(Byron, Treweek, Sheate, & Thompson, 2000; Geneletti, 2003; Jaeger, 2015; Treweek, 1996; 1999). 
However, landscape-scale effects of roads and road networks are difficult to quantify, and also poorly 
addressed in EAs (Jaeger, 2015). In a review of road-related EAs, Treweek et al. (1993) identified the 
following shortcomings: failure to identify the actual size of the proposed development (e.g. land take), 
lack of data, failure to commit in ecological surveys or reports, lack of quantifiable predictions and a 
reliance on ambiguous or vague descriptions, lack of baseline data, failure to commit to follow-up 
monitoring, evaluations of impacts limited in scale (e.g. local, regional, national), inadequate mitigation 
measures, and ill-supported mitigation prescriptions. Similarly, Byron et al. (2010) reviewed 40 UK 
ecological assessments of road development Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) and found that 
despite some improvements from their earlier reviews, the EISs still failed to address and predict the full 
range of ecological impacts: “the EISs gave the impression that some form of impact was likely, but were 
extremely vague about what type of impact might occur”. Moreover, the study showed that predictions 
were hardly quantified, and cumulative effects were mentioned in only one EIS. This demonstrates that 
road-related EAs are facing a number of shortcomings and currently do not provide reliable predictions 
because the spatial scale is often inadequate, the resources and methods for predictions are seemingly 
flawed, investments in the provision of early, reliable ecological information is lacking, and cumulative 
effects are not sufficiently considered (Jaeger, 2015). 
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On the other hand, transportation projects are increasingly being built as mega projects (Gellert & Lynch, 
2003). Mega-projects are characterized in the literature as having the following qualities (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003; Vidal & Marle, 2008): high degree of complexity; large-scale; embedded in a dynamic social and 
political context; widespread impacts; novel and innovative technologies and legislation; involvement of 
many diverse actors; many uncertainties; politically desirable; subject to resistance and opposition; 
lengthy planning and implementation time frames; and, are composed of a mixture of joint organizations 
and legally separate organizations.  
 
Research over the last decade has shown that mega projects exhibit numerous environmental uncertainties 
which have profound lasting implications (Decision-Making on Mega-Projects: Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Planning and Innovation, 2008). Citing their tendency to bring about landscape, aesthetic, and social 
change, Gellert and Lynch (2003) describe megaprojects as “creative destruction” by landscape 
transformation that is rapid, intentional, and profound (p.15). Besides their functional purpose, 
transportation megaprojects are physically extraordinary engineering feats that can instill national pride 
and gain international prestige. However, mega project EAs have also been criticized for being too 
narrow in their scope and inconsistent in their approach (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). The impacts associated 
with transportation mega-projects are not temporally confined, implying that the decisions being made in 
the initial project formulation stages, and EA process, are very important (van Wee et al., 2005). The 
management of mega-projects and the determination of alternatives are critical because of the high stakes 
and resources needed. Therefore, careful assessments and considerations for the social, economic, and 
environmental impacts are needed to inform policy (Flyvbjerg, 2014).  
 
The stress of a mega transportation project on the environment can be detrimental and uncertainties 
arising from the nature of the development are unique and ever more challenging (Vidal & Marle, 2008). 
Many transport projects have been linked to the underestimation of environmental impacts and lack of 
uncertainty disclosure (Thorne et al., 2014; Lobos & Partidario, 2014; Wood et al., 2000). However, 
urban development has become an important component of economic growth in major Canadian cities 
(Boudreau et al. 2009) and mega projects are seen as the solution (Priemus & van Wee, 2013). According 
to Dimitriou et al. (2013), mega projects are key drivers of change and have the potential to transform the 
context of the places, economies, and societies within which they operate. Findings from Dimitriou et al. 
(2013) study revealed that mega projects are often treated as ‘closed’ systems and do underestimate the 
influence of context on project development. The contextual factors influencing uncertainty 
communication and consideration could potentially correspond to mega-project components, comprising 
issues surrounding scale, social values, ecological sensitivity, economic situations, institutional 
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arrangements, political systems, capacity, and others (Vidal & Marle, 2008; Wood, 2008). Understanding 
the potential contextual influences of uncertainty on the communication and consideration could be 
beneficial and relevant on a national scale as it can, perhaps hopefully, lead to better decision making in 
the face of unavoidable uncertainties. 
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Chapter 3: Uncertainty Communication and Consideration in a Canadian Transport 
Mega-Project  
3.1 Uncertainties in Transport Mega-Projects 
 
Mega-projects are large-scale, multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects, usually commissioned by 
governments, and delivered through public-private partnerships (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). These project 
tend to attract high levels of public attention and political interest as a result of their high costs, 
technological novelty, and substantial direct and indirect impacts on the environment and society (van 
Marrewijk et al., 2008). Cost-benefit analyses and environmental assessments (EA) are typically at the 
core of documentation and decision making processes for mega projects (Flyvbjerg, 2009). However, 
their one-of-a-kind nature, complex causal interdependencies, and heightened degree of political, 
scientific, and institutional uncertainties make transport mega-projects particularly difficult to manage 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007). Moreover, complexities increase because of the long-term nature and geographic 
extent of transportation mega projects; the long timespan between EA and implementation, the more 
jurisdictions, players, and interests involved, the more social, political, environmental, and economical 
hurdles there are (Priemus, 2010). As such, the success of any given mega-project depends not just on the 
quality of design and construction, but also on the quality of information provided to the decision makers, 
stakeholder, and the public—including information about uncertainties (Fischhendler, Cohen-
Blankshtain, Shuali, & Boykoff, 2013).  
 
EA has been successfully established worldwide and has been considered an important decision-making 
tool (Cashmore, 2004), but there is growing criticism related to the treatment of uncertainties in current 
practice (Duncan, 2008). Uncertainties occur throughout the process (Wood et al., 2000), stemming from 
various sources (i.e. models, input data, assumptions, values, methods, etc.) (Maier & Ii, 2006; Sigel et 
al., 2010; Tennøy et al., 2006; Walker et al., 2003; Wardekker et al., 2008b), and yet despite the growing 
recognition of uncertainty, empirical evidence has shown that there is a lack of transparency in the EA 
prediction process and uncertainties are not adequately disclosed (Tennøy et al., 2006; G. Wood, 2008). 
To be effective, EA should support and inform decisions, but information passed on to decision-makers 
by practitioners is often fragmented and poorly systemized (Sigel, Klauer, & Pahl-Wostl, 2010), and 
decision-makers and stakeholders are often provided with partial or incomplete information about the 
potential impacts of a proposed project (De Jong, 1988; Duncan, 2008; Tennøy et al., 2006; C. Wood et 
al., 2000). Also, it has been suggested that EA has been reduced to a perfunctory formality that results in 
a cumbersome report, read by few and with little effect on decision-making (Tennøy et al., 2006). For 
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example, Vaessen (2003; p. 124) concludes: “by far not all information in a report is read, and also 
important information on uncertainties that is needed to assess the strength of the conclusions is often not 
read”. Although the potential implications of non-disclosure are well documented (see Duncan, 2012; 
Tennøy et al., 2006; Wardekker et al., 2008), communicating uncertainties does not mean that such 
knowledge is used to inform decisions. Therefore, it is beneficial to reflect upon EA as a dynamic process  
wherein uncertainties are perceived, identified, and communicated by a range of actors which are 
themselves influenced by personal judgments, beliefs, and also by the broader social, cultural, and 
political context. 
 
Transportation mega-projects are unique in that they are embedded within the context of past and future 
institutional pressures as well as the current political, social, and economic setting that is driven by local, 
regional, and national forces; essentially pulling together a diverse and competing group of interests, 
values, and resulting in considerable uncertainty (van Marrewijk et al., 2008). This situation can result in 
ambiguity; a type of uncertainty that arises from the presence of multiple valid, and sometimes conflicting 
ways of framing an issue (Brugnach, Dewulf, Henriksen, & van der Keur, 2011). On the other hand, the 
process remains vulnerable and malleable; that is, powerful players can shape how the project is assessed 
and defined in order to achieve personal goals (e.g., approval consent). Practitioners hired by project 
proponents have been observed to exhibit a tendency that positively reinforces a particular alternative, or 
project outcome that is most favorable to their clients (Mostert, 1996); or as Wachs (1989) put it ‘lying 
with numbers’. Project proponents delegate much of the EA process as well as oversee the information 
that goes into the final EA report before it is passed on to authorities, decision-makers, and the public (G. 
Wood, 2008). Thus, the substance of an EA is prone to intentional bias because proponents may 
selectively or strategically include findings while downplaying, or even excluding (Owens, 2005; Tennøy, 
Hansson, Lissandrello, & Næss, 2015) other results or uncertainties. Problems may also be framed in 
ways that simplify or reduce uncertainties, and this can mislead decision-makers or others by making 
predictions appear more certain than they actually are (Tennøy et al., 2006). In order to improve the 
quality and effectiveness of EA, several scholars have expressed the need for more explicit uncertainty 
disclosure and transparency (Bond, Morrison-Saunders, Gunn, Pope, & Retief, 2015; Kloprogge, van der 
Sluijs, Wardekker, & Department of Science, 2007; Tennøy et al., 2006; van der Sluijs, Petersen, Janssen, 
Risbey, & Ravetz, 2008; G. Wood, 2008).  
 
Every EA system operates within a political, legal, administrative, and cultural context, and there is much 
literature discussing how context influences EA effectiveness (Bina, Jing, Brown, & Partidario, 2011; 
Bina, 2008; Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007; Runhaar & Driessen, 2007; Wang, Bai, Liu, & Xu, 
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2012). The idea is that the dynamic interactions between elements of the context influences the entire EA 
activity including; the participants involved; the approach adopted; the process; the outcomes, and; the 
decisions (Bina, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). Therefor, given the possible importance of context, (Matthew 
Cashmore, Richardson, Hilding-Rydevik, & Emmelin, 2010; Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2012) this study questions the extent to which context constrains or promotes the 
communication and consideration of uncertainties in EA. In particular, transport mega projects have a 
tendency to evolve and react to the dynamics of the social, political, and environmental context (Salet, 
Bertolini, & Giezen, 2013), are marred with uncertainties and, in the words of Silvio Funtowicz and 
Jerome Ravetz, where facts are uncertain, decision stakes are high and values are in dispute (1994), 
uncertainty and knowledge quality require explicit attention. Thus, we aim to identify the contextual 
factors that shape the way in which uncertainties are communicated, handled, and considered in EA and 
decision-making of a Canadian Transport Mega Project.  
 
Research Objectives 
This research requires extensive knowledge about the contextual factors surrounding the project and 
development of the EA. To answer our research question we need to determine the relative influence of 
context on the communication, handling, and consideration of uncertainties. The study is delimited to a 
specific case study, and only a specific subset of decision-making will be investigated, the Environmental 
Assessment (EA) process. The scope is further reduced to a specific set of variables, i.e. uncertainties, 
perception, communication practices, and the context specific factors of the project (political, social, 
economical, environmental). Context issues relevant to EA include, for example, legislative requirements 
in place, formal and informal institutional arrangements, prior decisions or plans, and the ecological, 
cultural, social, political, and economics aspects that define and shape how an assessment functions (Pope 
& Grace, 2006).  
 
The following three research objectives guide the study: 
I. To identify key uncertainties present during the 407 East EA as perceived by individual actors 
 involved in the process; 
II. To determine how contextual factors influenced the way uncertainties were communicated, handled, 
and considered throughout the EA process; and, 
III. To develop recommendations and practical guidance to the EA community (i.e. practitioner, 
proponents, public, etc.) on uncertainty communication and consideration in EA and decision-making 
3.2 Methods  
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The qualitative nature of the research encouraged the use of qualitative data generation and analysis 
techniques. Qualitative research was adopted due to its potential to explain and explore complex issues, 
and illuminate the contexts or settings for which particular dynamics, processes, or issues take place 
(Creswell, 2012). The data for the research comes from two principal sources: document analysis of the 
project’s comprehensive study report (CSR); and semi-structured interviews with project practitioners, 
proponents, and stakeholders. Importantly, a thorough literature review was performed between 
September and May 2014.  
 
This section begins with a basic overview of the case study followed by a thorough look into the specific 
methods of data generation and analysis used. The section concludes with the potential limitations and 
ethical concerns experienced during the study.  
3.2.1 Case Study: The 407 East Transportation Corridor Project 
 
Covering 31 000 square kilometres, the Greater Golden Horseshoe, in southern Ontario, is Canada’s most 
heavily urbanized and populated area. It extends from Niagara Falls to Barrie in the northwest, and 
Oshawa in the northeast (Newbold & Scott, 2014). It is considered Ontario’s economic hub and engine 
(Allen & Campsie, 2013) and, after nearly two decades of policy development, public debate, and 
planning, the Ontario Ministry of Transport (MTO) in consultation with the Region of Durham, its 
constituents and other surrounding municipalities have addressed the long-term transportation needs and 
deficiencies in the Region of Durham and Greater Golden Horseshoe Area by proposing the 407 East 
extension (Figure 3.1). Major deficiencies in the current transportation system negatively affect the 
movement of goods and services and MTO’s proposal for the publicly owned and tolled transportation 
corridor is supported by the desire to facilitate transportation and relieve congestion on Highway 401, one 
of the busiest highways in North America (CEAA, 2011). In addition, the easterly extension of the 407 
supports the transportation objectives in provincial policies, growth plans, and from an economic 
perspective, the proposal is in accordance with growing population and employment figures for the region 
(CEAA, 2011). The province estimate that 13 000 jobs will be created for Phase 1 alone (Ministry of 
Transport Ontario, 2011a). The project is a huge part of the government’s Open Ontario Plan to create 
jobs and strengthen the economy (Ministry of Transport Ontario, 2011a). 
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Figure 3.1: The 407 East Transportation Corridor Project (source: CEAA, 2011) 
 
The 407 East Transportation Corridor is being implemented in two phases by Infrastructure Ontario (IO), 
in partnership with the Province of Ontario (MTO). Phase 1 includes the following activities:  
• Highway 407 mainline (21 kilometers)(Infrastructure Ontario, 2016a): 
• Six-lane east-west extension of Highway 407 from Brock Road to Highway 412; 
• Four-lane east-west extension of Highway 407 from Highway 412 to Harmony Road; and 
• 6 interchanges  
• Highway 412 (10 kilometers): 
• Four-lane north-south freeway link connecting Highway 407 to Highway 401;  
• 5 interchanges; and 
• A 5 kilometre (km) realignment of Highway 401 to accommodate Highway 412. 
 
In all, there will be approximately 148 new lane kilometers with up to 11 interchanges, including two 
highway-to-highway links, 31 major water-crossing structures and 16 road crossings. The Province of 
Ontario has selected 407 East Development Group (407EDG) to design, build, finance, and maintain 
Phase 1 of the project for a 30-year period and the contract with the consortium was $1 billion in 2012. 
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The Province will own and control Highway 407, which includes Highway 412, and both highways will 
be tolled by the province. Scheduled completion of Phase 1 is Spring 2016.  
 
Blackbird Infrastructure 407 General Partnership was selected to design, build, finance, and maintain 
Phase 2 of the project over a 30-year period with a contract value of approximately $1.2 billion in 2015 
(Ontario, 2015). Construction began in March 2015 and is scheduled to be completed by late 2020. Phase 
2 of the project will include (Infrastructure Ontario, 2016b):   
• Highway 407 mainline (22 kilometers): 
• Four-lane east-west extension of Highway 407 from Harmony Road to Highway 35/115; and 
• 4 interchanges  
• Highway 418 (10.4 kilometers): 
• Four-lane north-south freeway link connecting Highway 407 to Highway 401; and 
• 4 interchanges;  
 
The Environmental Assessment Process for the 407 East Transportation Corridor  
Under the Ontario Environmental Assessment Act (EAA), the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MTO) 
submitted the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the proposed 407 East Extension Project to the Minister of 
Environment (MOE) in September 2004. MOE approved the ToR in January 2005 and MTO submitted 
the provincial EA in August 2009. The public was invited to comment during the preparation of the ToR 
and provincial EA. Approval for the EA was granted by MOE in June 2010 (MTO, 2009).  
 
The federal process began as screening in May 2008. However, after the ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans et al.), deliberated on 
January 21, 2010, it was found that the responsible authority (RA) does not have the authority to reduce 
the scope of an assessment to fit it within a screening assessment. The RAs have the authority to enlarge a 
project scope but do not have the power to change the type of assessment to speed up the process 
(Hopkins-Utter, 2012). For the case of the 407 East Transportation Corridor, it was determined that the 
EA is required to proceed as a comprehensive study under CEAA.  
 
The change in the EA requirements, from screening to comprehensive study, resulted in the addition of 
procedural steps such as additional opportunities for public and community involvement and participation 
prior to the EA decision by the Minister. The ruling also supports a cooperative EA by federal-provincial 
mechanisms which reduce duplication and overlap in the reports (CEAA, DFO, & TC, 2010). As such, 
the draft individual provincial EA report, the draft federal screening report, and other government or 
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public comments were used and coordinated as the basis for the comprehensive study document. The 
previous works were comprised into one body of documentation for the purposes of the CSR (CEAA, 
2011). Important milestones leading to the approval of the CSR by the government of Canada under 




Source: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (2011) 
 
Mega project highway construction involves several stages and lengthy timeframes. According to the 
Province of Ontario, a typical highway expansion project spends 3 years to produce and deliver an EA, 
2.5 years for design, 2 years for land acquisition, and then 3 years for construction (Ministry of Transport 
Ontario, 2011b).  The EA process for the 407 East extension took went on for a period of 6 years—double 
the average duration. Also, to build the 407 East extension, acquisition of approximately 700 properties 
will be needed and it took upmost 3 years to acquire 311 properties for Phase 1 only (Ministry of 
Transport Ontario, 2011b). Additional legislative requirements, such as Species at Risk Act, Ontario 
Water Resources Act, Federal Fisheries Act, and Ontario Heritage Act, have lengthened the timeframes as 
well. In addition to the legislative requirements above, the following are some other requirements that 
have been identified for Phase 2: wetland and environmental mitigation for the East Durham Link; eight 
Date Activity 
Nov 2004 Terms of Reference for the Individual EA (for the Government of 
Ontario) submitted for the 407 East transportation project 
Jan 2005 Terms of Reference for the Individual EA (for the Government of 
Ontario) approved by Minister of the Environment  
Jan 2005 Individual EA (for the Government of Ontario) initiated  
May 2008 Screening EA (for the Government of Canada) initiated  
Aug 2009 Individual EA (for the Government of Ontario) submitted to the 
Minister of the Environment 
Mar 2010 Supreme Court of Canada ruling in MiningWatch Canada v. 
Canada [Red Chris] prescribe that the project be continued as  a 
Comprehensive Study EA 
Jun 2010 Individual EA (for the Government of Ontario) approved by the 
Minister of the Environment under the Ontario Environmental 
Assessment Act (OEAA) 
Jul 2011 Comprehensive Study Report (for the government of Canada) 
approved by the Minister of the Environment under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA) 
 
Table 3.1: Timeline of the 407 East Transportation EA Process 
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significant watercourse/bridge crossings; one 300 meter wetland crossing; Utility relocations for a 
pipeline, hydro crossing and a CP Rail crossing, and; Two certificates of approval for contaminated sites 
(Ministry of Transport Ontario, 2011b). 
 
The proposed project lies entirely within the Region of Durham and involves portions of the municipality 
of Oshawa, Pickering, Whitby, and Ajax, who have adopted official plans that recognize the need for the 
project and positive economic impact that it will have. The 407 East transportation project is one of the 
largest and most recent infrastructure mega projects that the province of Ontario has undertaken (Holmes, 
2010). The environmental significance of the proposed project is enormous. The project right of way 
contains Greenbelt Lands, sensitive and protected areas, provincially significant wetlands, and habitats of 
federal and provincial species at risk. The proposed project encroaches on the Oak Ridges Moraine as 
well. The majority of the landscape affected by the proposal is comprised of active or recently retired 
prime agricultural land. The following are important considerations and natural features in the EA: The 
Oak Ridges Moraine; The Ontario Greenbelt; provincial watersheds; natural heritage; species at risk; and 
protected areas.  
 
During the consultation process, the MTO notified the following Federal agencies: Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency; Fisheries and Oceans Canada; Transport Canada; Health Canada; 
Environment Canada; Canadian Coast Guar; National Energy Board; Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada; Canadian National Railway; and Canadian Pacific Railway. The Huron-
Wendat Aboriginal community were among many to show an interest in the project, particularly in the 
study area by virtue of historic and cultural heritage issues. 
3.2.2 Document Review  
 
The Comprehensive Study Report (CSR) completed by the proponent and approved by CEAA for the 407 
East Transportation project was the primary document used for the current thesis. The CSR contained 
valuable information about the EA process, data sources, methods, and about those who had been hired to 
work on particular parts of the EA. Although the document review was not a structured content analysis, 
the review and analysis of the CSR proved fruitful as a means to supplement primary data that was 
collected during semi-structured interviews. It is flexible, applicable to various types of information, and 
may be used to enhance, corroborate, verify, or even refute the data obtained through semi-structured 
interviews.  
3.2.3 Semi-Structured Interviews  
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To capture the contextual dynamics associated with uncertainty in the 407 East case, it was necessary to 
conduct interviews with key case informants.  Semi-structured interviews are open-ended, flexible, and 
allow respondents to discuss and comment on certain events giving the researcher valuable insights 
(Bryman et al., 2015). As opposed to structured interviews, the semi-structured nature permits the 
interviewer to explore opinions, values, and beliefs in detail, and provide flexibility in the timing and 
sequence of questions (Bryman et al., 2015; Tellis, 1997). To gain an understanding of the intricacies of 
decision-making and uncertainties involved, semi-structured interviews provided the primary source of 
data for the research.  
 
Most of the participants, i.e. proponents and consultants, were identified in the CSR report. Other 
participants were identified on the project website or recruited by snowball sampling where participants 
that had already agreed or declined would refer the principal investigator to somebody else not previously 
identified (McIntyre, 2005). Interviewees were selected based on their role in the EA. In particular, we 
sought to find interviewees who had participated in producing or reviewing any part of the CSR or could 
provide input related to the research project. All participants identified were contacted via e-mail, or 
telephone, to request their participation in the research in late April and early May 2014. At this time, 
participants were given information about the research team and affiliations, the purpose and rationale for 
the research, and about the nature of their involvement either verbally or through the project fact sheet 
invitational PDF (refer to Appendix B for reproduction of introductory PDF). A copy of the consent form 
approved by the Concordia ethics committee and the interview schedule were also provided (full consent 
form is reproduced in Appendix C; interview schedule reproduced in Appendix A). 
 
A standard interview guide was created by the larger SSHRC-funded research project "Speak no evil, 
hear no evil? Uncertainty analysis and communication in Canadian environmental impact assessment 
practice and decision making" that was used across all three case studies to help guide the interviews and 
compliment the themes of the research project (Appendix A). Because it was important not to lead the 
interviewees, the guide was flexible and provided a list of issues and themes to be addressed (Bryman et 
al., 2015). Questions were asked of each interviewee in a consistent and systematic order, but the 
interviewees were given the freedom to digress. The following five themes were developed by the 
research project team and applied in all three of the case studies involved in the larger research project, 
including this one: (1) Uncertainty in the Assessment; (2) Communication of Uncertainty; (3) Perceptions 
of Uncertainty; (4) Gauging Uncertainty, and; (5) Suggestions for Improved Practice. For the purpose of 
this current research, a final theme was added, (6) Contextual Dynamics of Influence (see App. A).  
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In total, 22 interviews with practitioners, proponents, First-Nation representatives, authorities, and a 
member of the public, all of which were directly involved with the 407 East project, were completed 
between July 2nd, 2014 and September 20th 2014. Although in-person interviews were generally 
preferred, the time constraints of the research and respondents made it recognizably difficult and as a 
result, two (2) were conducted over the telephone, one (1) by e-mail correspondence, while 17 were 
conducted in person in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), Ontario, Canada and two (2) in Quebec City, 
Quebec. In the interest of the interviewees and for the sake of practicality, some participants were 
interviewed together with other members of their groups or organization. This was the preferred approach 
for the proponents (n=3), the First-Nation group (n=2), and some practitioners within the same 
organization (n=3). Grouped interviews had an average duration of 2 hours while individual interviews 
were approximately 30 to 90 minutes in length. Table 3.2 presents the distribution of interview 
participants by role.  
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3.2.4 Data Analysis  
 
The digital recordings were transcribed in October 2014 by the principal researcher onto digital Pages  
processing files on Mac. Transcripts were read several times and manually reviewed against the digital 
recordings in December 2014 to ensure completeness and accuracy. Each transcript was handled 
manually and the data was first standardized using the interview themes and questions. However, the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed interviewees to deviate away from the predetermined 
questions and it was therefore necessary to organize the data further. The qualitative software QSR-
Role Description Number of Participants 
First-Nation 
Representatives 
Representatives of First-Nation 
interests, including members and 
officials who are required to be 
consulted during the EA process 
Two official representatives who work on behalf of 
the Huron-Wendat First-Nation group in Quebec 
City, QC. 
Proponent Persons or entities identified as 
the primary developers of the 
proposed development.  
Three representatives from the Ontario Ministry of 
Transport (MTO) who were intimately involved in 
the 407 East Transportation Project EA. 
Public Members of the public and other 
local stakeholders that are 
consulted, funded, and involved 
during the EA process. 
One local resident that received participant funding 
to ensure participation in the EA. 
Practitioner Individuals under corporate 
entity, or third-party experts who 
have the capacity to advise 
proponents during the EA 
process. Responsible for the 
preparation of the EA including 
collection of data, analysis, and 
evaluation. Experts offer advice 
and perform additional analysis 
where necessary. 
Nine practitioners in total; seven practitioners who 
were selected and hired by the proponent (internal); 
three practitioners from different stakeholder 
groups, with experiences ranging from species-at-
risk, traffic modeling, and wildlife mitigation, that 
received participant funding and participated in the 
EA as experts.  
Authorities/Regulators Representatives from the 
regional, provincial, municipal, 
and federal regulatory body who 
are responsible for coordinating 
the EAs and involved in 
managing and assisting in the 
EA. 
Seven authorities in total. Three federal authorities: 
one representative from Transport Canada (TC); 
one representative from Environmental Canada 
(EC); one representative from the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). One 
provincial authority representative from the 
Ministry of Environmental (MOE). Two officials 
representing provincial conservation authorities. 




Table 3.2: Distribution of interview participants based on role 
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NVivo v.10 was used to organize, code, and analyze the data. For qualitative research, NVivo can 
increase analysis accuracy, transparency, and rigour of data analysis (Welsh, 2002).  
 
The transcripts and CSR were uploaded onto QSR-NVivo v.10. and preliminary analysis involved coding 
the data using existing interview themes, concepts, or issues relevant to the research question such as 
communication, perception, contextual factors, gauging uncertainty, suggestions, and uncertainty in the 
assessment. When new concepts emerged, inductive coding was performed. The codes were then 
organized by interview question and theme wherever possible so that cross-examination and important 
disparities in responses could be extracted and analyzed. The research made use of two functionalities of 
the software: manual thematic coding, and query searches, which allow for quick word searches through 
text documents (QSR, 2015). Codes created and used during the analysis are provided in Appendix D.  
3.2.5 Limitations of the Study  
 
Qualitative research is often criticized for lacking “scientific rigour” (Mays & Pope, 1995, p. 109). 
Despite the strengths of the qualitative approach, such as depth of exploration, descriptions, and 
understanding, there is considerable resistance in the literature. First, there are concerns over validity; that 
is the credibility, reliability, and accuracy of the research process  (Golafshani, 2003; Mays & Pope, 1995; 
Myers, 2000). Second, there are questions about subjectivity and a researcher’s bias (Mays & Pope, 1995; 
Mehra, 2002). A third issue is reproducibility, i.e. a different researcher might not necessarily come to the 
same conclusion (Mays & Pope, 1995).  
 
To give credibility to the study, the research project was structured according to a predefined set of 
themes and concepts that were gathered during the literature review, and used consistently during 
transcript analysis and content analysis. Replicability was not the primary goal of the research while 
partial generalizability is arguably still possible when applied to similar populations (Myers, 2000). To 
address potential biases, we adopted triangulation—a procedure that strengthens a study by combining 
qualitative and quantitative methods, and different data sources (Golafshani, 2003; Mays & Pope, 1995). 
The researcher used quantitative approaches by providing counts of the coding and themes that were 
created qualitatively wherever possible. Furthermore, such data came from two principal sources; 
interview transcripts and CSR analysis. Random sampling is uncommon in qualitative research 
particularly when the objective is to understand complex contextual processes (Mays & Pope, 1995; 
Creswell, 2009) and for this research, participants were identified based on their relevance to the research. 
To increase reliability (Mays & Pope, 1995), the researcher interviewed 22 participants with a wide range 
of roles, experiences, and backgrounds. The number of interviewees was based on observed saturation, 
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implying a point where no new information was forthcoming during the interview process. However, it 
was difficult to obtain an equal representation of all stakeholder groups (see Table 3.2). Members of the 
public and affected interest groups were hard to identify, while few even had the ability to comment on 
the matters pertinent to this research. This limitation will be explored further in the discussion. 
 
Ethical concerns arising from the semi-structured interview methodology related principally to issues of 
confidentiality, informed consent, and freedom to discontinue. Adhering to the ethics approved by 
Concordia University’s Behaviour Research and Ethics Board, these issues and concerns were addressed 
and all participants were made aware of their rights to remain anonymous, to discontinue from the study, 
and of the confidential nature of the information provided. To ensure compliance, the data was reported in 
aggregate forms and where quotations are used, participants are identifiable on the basis of their roles 
only so that those participants wishing to remain anonymous cannot be identified. The researcher 
carefully considered all issues related to ethics while also addressing potential methodological issues such 
as validity, subjectivity, and replicability.  
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3.3 Results  
 
The analysis of the interviews (full interview schedule in Appendix A) and the CSR review revealed a 
number of prominent themes related to the research objectives. These results are project-specific. Direct 
quotations are used to illustrate prominent majority viewpoints, and frequency tables are used to show the 
distribution of references by the interviewees in the EA process. Perspectives that reflect disparate or 
conflicting viewpoints are reported where necessary to allow for a thorough understanding. When 
appropriate, some interview results are reinforced with findings from the CSR document review.  
 
3.3.1 Uncertainties in the 407 East Transportation Project and EA Process  
 
All 22 respondents acknowledged the presence of uncertainties in EA practice. The wider understanding 
of the participants was that predicting the future is impossible, and because predictions are the 
foundational element of EA practice, “we make necessary predictions and guesses all along the process” 
(PRAC-E3), as one participant said. However, the uncertainties that were elicited by the interviewees 
were not always specified accurately or detailed. Recollecting specific sources and occurrences within the 
407 East Project proved to be difficult, and many participants were generally more comfortable 
discussing uncertainty loosely. Respondents shared unique perspectives about the perceived uncertainties 
in the process, but not all respondents were able to be specific in their examples and it was not always 
possible to discern which statements were speculations and which were well-founded.  
 
There were 30 distinct uncertainties identified during the interviews (Table 7). When interviewees made a 
reference to one or several uncertainties, the references were coded and grouped according to like themes 
or ‘systems’: e.g. the environmental system (e.g. wildlife, wetlands, cold water streams, etc.), the social 
system (socio-political, economic, public, etc.), and the technical system (infrastructure, mitigation, 
design, etc.). The third column in Table 4.1 provides the number of interviewees who made reference to 
uncertainty, and the last column displays the number of times that the uncertainty was coded during the 
analysis. For example, six interviewees reported uncertainties about coldwater streams and these were 







































System Uncertainty Number of Interviewees who 
made a reference 
Number of 
references coded 
Environmental Species at Risk (not specified) 
           - Butternut Trees 
           - Red Side Dace 
           - Blandings Turtles  











Cumulative Impacts  9 25 
Water Quality  10 13 
Wildlife 8 11 
Cold Water Streams 6 10 
Habitat Quality/Connectivity 5 6 
Wetlands 5 5 
Fish and Fish Habitat 4 5 
Air Quality 2 3 
Environmental General 5 9 
Total Uncertainty Factors 14 Total Coded References 131 
Socio-Political Enabling environment (legislation, framework, 
policies) 
12 27 
Institutional Uncertainty 8 20 
Project Implementation 8 8 
Agricultural Impacts 7 8 
Social Impact Mitigation 4 6 
Project Opposition 2 3 
Timelines and Budget 3 3 
Heritage and Cultural Impacts 2 2 
General Political  8 10 
General Social 7 11 
Total Uncertainty Factors 10 Total Coded References 98 
Technological Project Design 12 35 
Stormwater Management 7 21 
Mitigation Measures and Compensation 8 13 
Data and Methods 7 10 
Follow-up & Monitoring of Project Impacts 6 9 
General Technological 3 2 
Total Uncertainty Factors 6 Total Coded References  90 
 
Table 4.1: Uncertainties reported by interview participants regarding the 407 East EA 
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Environmental System 
There were 14 uncertainties associated with the environmental system and were collectively referenced 
131 times during the interviews. Participants identified uncertainties about species-at-risk (18), water 
quality (10), and cumulative impacts (9) most often. Analysis of the responses revealed differences and 
broad perspectives, however, not all respondents were able to specify their examples in detail. For 
example, there were three participants that openly stated that they could not elaborate because they were 
not as intimately involved or did not have the experience to detail their concern. Nevertheless, all 
participants perceived the environmental system as having the most significant uncertainties compared to 
other systems. Several (30%) mentioned that the potential impacts of the project on the environment are 
large and emphasized the importance of dealing with the uncertainties—for example, a proponent stated, 
“…with a project of this size and magnitude, the environmental side of things has the most uncertainty 
and it’s our job to make sure that we have the right experts working on the project to help manage that 
uncertainty.” (PROP-2).  
 
Uncertainty about water quality was often discussed in association with salt and sediment runoff, 
groundwater, wetlands, fish and fish habitat, coldwater streams, and stormwater management. The 
majority of authorities identified water quality as being a ‘huge’ uncertainty, and other respondents made 
references about the lengthy negotiations that took place between the Province and the proponents related 
to water quality uncertainties. In particular, interviewees reflected on the impacts of road salt and the 
unpredictable impacts that the application of salt will have on the surrounding landscape. The belief was 
that because the project is going to be implemented in a previously undisturbed system, there would be 
more uncertainty about the potential effects on environmental components. The majority of responses 
particularly focused on the sensitive ecological features neighbouring the project, such as the Oak Ridges 
Moraine, the Greenbelt, and provincially significant wetlands. This was substantiated by a governing 
authority who described how it was necessary to request additional information from the proponents 
related to the proposed salt and stormwater management policies proposed so that the assumptions laid 
out could be better supported.  
 
The large scale of the project was often linked with environmental uncertainties. Practitioners in 
particular discussed the difficulty in obtaining the necessary data to come forth with detailed and reliable 
predictions. One practitioner explained that, “ …scale is a big thing here because we are looking at 
roughly 70 kilometres of highways and it’s hard to get to such a certain level of detail…the larger the 
scale of the study, the more unknowns we have, the larger the geographical area, the more jurisdictions to 
deal with, the more actors, the more policies…” (PRAC-C6). At
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uncertainties such as those related to species-at-risk were also seen as being related to project size. One 
practitioner’s concerns were related to the lack of baseline data for species at risk. Three other 
respondents mentioned that field studies could have reduced uncertainty about species at risk, but that 
resource limitations and time were constraints. Similarly, there were three participants who expressed the 
uncertainties regarding cumulative effects. For example, one authority said, “..you’re not just building a 
highway and that’s the only impact— but how do you talk about all the development and all the industries 
that will come on that highway? And how do you account for that if you don’t really know how it’ll come 
exactly? The uncertainties with cumulative effects are huge for the project…” (RA-F1). The uncertainty 
with cumulative effects was found to be closely related with the rapid pace of development in southern 
Ontario and the GTA.  
 
Socio-Political System  
Uncertainties that were about the EAs internal organizational processes, the regulatory framework, 
economic situation, political, or social factors were referenced 98 times. Participants presented an array of 
disparate sources of uncertainty in the socio-political system, however, the most prominent references 
were associated with the assessment framework and in particular, with the enabling environment (12) (i.e 
legislation, existing policies, etc.), institutional and organizational structure (8), and implementation 
commitments (8). More ambiguous references were organized under general political (8). 
 
The enabling environment was recognized as a source of considerable uncertainty during the EA. First, 
the procedural transition from the provincial EA to the federal screening and comprehensive study was 
described by several participants as having contributed to uncertainty. The change mostly affected public 
bodies (e.g. conservation authorities), municipalities, and provincial ministries or agencies—for example, 
one municipal authority stated that during the provincial process the proponents had a duty to consult 
their expertise, but when the process began under the federal government the role of the authority 
changed and became more vaguely defined: “we were still there during the detailed design stage but we 
had no authority….they would tell us what they would be doing and our advice wasn’t required or even 
wanted” (CA-1). Regulatory changes shifted the dynamics and created confusion and uncertainty about 
procedural aspects of the EA, such as responsibilities.  
 
Proponents mentioned that the abrupt change in the Species at Risk (SARA) Act in 2009 required them to 
modify their work concerning species at risk in the EA. The discussion with proponents further suggested 
that the lack of available operational guidance about how to implement the new Act quickly and 
efficiently within the established project timelines created a lot of internal pressure: “I think we tried to do 
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the best that we could in the absence of some very clear directions…nobody is to blame because it was 
just new legislation, but it was extremely frustrating for us trying to deliver a project with a moving 
target” (PROP-1). On the other side, proponents and practitioners remarked that it was important to 
adhere to the proposed timelines because of the contractual agreements with the consortium group 
selected to design, build, and maintain the 407 East Project.  
 
Uncertainties in the institutional and organizational structure were related to the different, and sometimes 
conflicting, interests and priorities of the various actors involved throughout the process. Once again, the 
project scale was introduced as a contributing source of uncertainty because it introduced more and more 
actors to the process than smaller proposals. Participants expressed that the large-scale made the EA 
process less predictable because decision-making depended on interactions and negotiations among a 
larger number of actors. There was an overarching belief that there was a lack of practical institutional 
mechanisms for managing the diverse parties at the beginning of the EA process and, after transitioning 
over to the federal process, public participation grew even more and federal agencies became more 
involved.  
 
Uncertainties that were raised about the implementation stage of the project were commonly associated 
with a concern about the transfer of knowledge and accountability. For example, a practitioner stated, 
“..seeing the next phase through is most often done by an entirely new team…so you’ve lost that 
knowledge base” (PRAC-C4). In contrast, another practitioner suggested that uncertainties can be reduced 
through strategies and policies that commit actors to subsequent follow-up and implementation plans. 
This was not the majority view, however.  
 
Technological System  
Interviewees collectively referenced uncertainties associated with the technological system 90 times. 
Most of these were about the project design (12) and proposed structures for mitigation (8).  
 
The location of the proposed highway and the phased implementation approach were heavily conflicted 
aspects of the 407 project during planning and decision-making. Most of the concerns were related to 
Highway 418 (formerly known as the East Durham Link of the 407 East). The East link received the most 
criticism during the route selection phase from opposition groups, communities, land owners, provincial 
authorities, and other affected interest groups. According to three interviewees who remained opposed to 
the decision of implementing the East link stated that the authorities and proponents did not reliably 
justify the Eastern section. In regards to the traffic models, it was said that,  “…the province had done 
  45 
demand modelling four to five years earlier and we pointed out that they were actually using very old 
assumptions” (PRAC-E3) and explained that they provided proponents and CEAA with a traffic demand 
modelling study which concluded that the East link was not needed. While proponents agreed to re-
evaluate their own models, the practitioner said that he believed the report was actually ignored by the 
agency and the Eastern link remained in the plans.  
 
Participants also discussed uncertainties with regard to the proposed mitigation measures such as wildlife 
passages, fencing, habitat compensation, and stormwater management. The uncertainties were due largely 
to the limitations in the knowledge available to determine the effectiveness of the proposed structures.  
Participants often stated that wildlife is unpredictable, and in terms of stormwater ponds, several 
interviewees were not confident that the measures would be reliable. Five interviewees were pessimistic 
about the likelihood that the planned compensation for wetlands and habitats would be successful. 
However, proponents discussed that they sought the input from experts that helped determine suitable 
locations for mitigation measures via hot spot analysis, and other structural design recommendations.  
 
Uncertainties in the Stages of the EA Process  
 
Interviewees were invited to discuss particular stages of the assessment where they perceived 
uncertainties to be associated with the activities or approach. Table 4.2 depicts the distribution of 
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Table 4.2: Uncertainties in the stages of the EA process that were reported during interviews with 
participants in the study 
 
Stage Activity n 
Preliminary Assessment   
Screening 1 
Scoping 17 
Detailed Assessment   
 Impact Prediction 9 
 Impact Assessment  14 
 Mitigation 13 
Follow-up   
 Monitoring and Management 10 
 
(1) Preliminary Assessment  
The majority of uncertainties described in the preliminary assessment were the result of the chosen level 
of detail, data availability, time, and resources available, especially during the selection of the proposed 
route and scoping. Participants in the proponent, practitioner, and authority groups felt that uncertainty is 
inescapable in the preliminary stages, but that it can be reduced as the process progresses with the 
appropriate approaches (i.e. new information). For example, this epistemic uncertainty was identified here 
by a proponent who explained that during the EA they experienced a lot of uncertainty at the very 
beginning and it was not possible to address all of it, “…some uncertainties you need to wait until you are 
down to the final line…” (PROP-2), and that as the process progresses many uncertainties can become 
more refined, “..we start with large uncertainties and get to smaller ones.” (PROP-3). Ambiguity-related 
uncertainty due to multiple frames of the actors involved was also identified. For example, during 
scoping, several participants felt that there were biases to include Valued Ecosystem Components that had 
major regulatory and legal backing, such as provincially listed species at risk, while the others, such as 
locally significant species, were given lesser consideration.  
 
(2) Detailed Assessment  
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Uncertainty was a critical feature during the detailed assessment stages of the EA. Participants made a 
number of references about the limitations in knowledge and their limited ability to predict with accuracy. 
Both epistemic and variability uncertainties were predominantly found in the stages of the detailed 
assessment stage and activities (i.e. impact prediction, assessment, etc). For example, prediction 
uncertainties due to data challenges were more commonly referenced by practitioners who were 
intimately involved in the prediction activities and the uncertainties were generally the result of 
incomplete, or lack of useable and reliable data. 
 
In the impact assessment stage, participants felt considerable uncertainties as a result of the criteria, 
assumptions, and subjectivity involved when determining the significance of the impacts. The nature of 
such uncertainty was ambiguity. The proponents interviewed expressed the difficulties associated with 
this stage of the EA referring to a balancing act between satisfying the agencies and the public. The 
process introduces additional uncertainty as the result of the different disciplines coming together to 
assess the impacts.  One practitioner explained that, “depending on your discipline, you are going to 
follow a different guideline and your data will be set up differently. The uncertainty comes when all the 
disciplines sit down together and try to make sense of it all, weight it up, and add values to it” (PRAC-
C4). Similarly, a provincial authority highlighted the importance of transparent communication when 
disciplines and experts are coming together at this stage because “some of the uncertainties can be built 
into the background knowledge of a particular discipline and others might not be able to pick up on it…” 
(CA-2). The interpretation of uncertainty may therefore vary strongly among disciplinary teams or even 
stakeholder groups making it increasingly difficult to recognize.  
 
Proposing and planning mitigation involved uncertainties related to the effectiveness of the proposed 
mitigation measures, and predominantly about stormwater management, compensation ratios for habitat 
and wetland complexes, wildlife passages, and noise. The lack of suitable comparable data or studies to 
verify the reliability of the proposed mitigation relates to epistemic uncertainty, but at other times, 
participants reported that there was ambiguity in terms of what exactly was being proposed.  
 
(3) Follow-up 
The project had just recently been approved (July 2011) and with construction underway, interviewees 
felt a lot of pressure and uncertainties with the follow-up stages that are largely due to the fact that 
construction and implementation had been assigned to a contractor. Many felt that while uncertainty was 
communicated and considered during the EA, that there was a great deal of uncertainty remaining in 
terms of how the contractors or follow-up consultant team would monitor and manage the impacts. MTO 
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is undertaking the follow-up program under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA). The 
program stipulates that MTO must submit an annual report for compliance with provincial conditions of 
approval and, it should include progress and results on the project development, monitoring, and 
mitigation plans for surface water; major biological features; vegetation restoration; construction noise 
and air quality. Some important implications were raised about professionalism, commitment, and staff 
turnover. Many described how over time, monitoring and follow-up commitments can be neglected as 
study teams change and people move on to newer projects. According to the proponents, the follow-up 
reports will address the uncertainties by overcompensating for potential negative effects. However, the 
other respondents felt that the follow-up program in place was minimal or biased to focus on regulatory 
backed components (i.e. Fish and Fish Habitat, Species at risk, etc). First-Nation interviewees stated that 
they were very uncomfortable with the program, especially in terms of being able to monitor and avoid 
cultural impacts that may arise during construction and after implementation. For example, interviewees 
in these groups discussed the prevalence of cultural artifacts in the area and ancestral burial grounds. The 
uncertainty relates to empirical uncertainty because these groups felt like the studies that were done 
lacked knowledge and could have benefitted from more time and resources to refine the anticipated 
impacts. Ancestral burial grounds were found and reported but both First-Nation interviewees did not feel 
as though proponents were honest in their findings and may not adequately report other cultural sites.  
3.3.2 Uncertainty Perception 
 
Participants’ perspectives on uncertainties were different, but all interviewees acknowledged the presence 
of uncertainty in EA practice in general and particularly in the 407 East project. Proponents and 
practitioners alike interpreted uncertainty as an unavoidable feature of EA practice while other 
participants, especially affected interest groups and authorities, emphasized that it was unavoidable but 
also important for it to be communicated to them. An important fear was that misunderstandings of the 
inherent uncertainties can delay the project actions. The public’s perception was viewed as a significant 
factor that could impede the process if information is not presented with caution. Interviews frequently 
insinuated that members of the public did not share the same appreciation for uncertainties as EA 
practitioners and thus are more likely to misinterpret uncertainties as a deficit in the work being done:  
“we don’t want the public thinking that we do not have enough information or don’t know what we are 
doing” [CA-2]. However, project proponents assured that it was not in their interest to hide uncertainty 
from the public and that it would only create social unrest and mistrust: “we found that with our 
experiences over the years it is not worth hiding information from the public ” [PROP-1]. The public’s 
attitude was in many ways a precursor for the development of an enhanced public consultation program. 
Past experiences that presented the public and stakeholders with limited opportunities for engagement and 
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participation did not always go smoothly and proponents seemed to agree that the 407 East was intended 
to be different. Nevertheless, one authority revealed that proponents may be hesitant in communicating 
uncertainties to the public because the public might delay the project: “the more the proponents 
communicate, the more the public can twist the information and use it against them” [RAP-1].  
 
Impact significance, alternatives to, and selection of indicators were some of the most common challenges 
relating to varying perceptions and often times, these activities involved conflicting perceptions about 
valuation, weighting, or scoring of impacts and alternatives. The issue of uncertainty extends to how 
complete the knowledge base is, and what the scientific standards are, as there is a lack of shared or 
agreeable criteria for determining significance and weighing out the various components of the 
assessment. The amount of information in EAs is synthesized and there are trade-offs between the quality 
of information and the quantity of manageability of information. With regard to the 407 East, three 
practitioners acknowledged that if the process were to be done all over again that it would not necessarily 
have the same outcome because, for instance, different information may have been presented, different 
trade-offs may have been made, and other criteria could have been suggested and used. Due to the multi-
disciplinary nature of an EA and sheer volume of the assessment report, there is a good chance that 
stakeholders do not get the opportunity, or have the capacity to understand all the uncertainties. Currently, 
the only way for uncertainties to be presented during these important discussions is usually through the 
information that is presented during the meetings with practitioners, proponents, and experts. Practitioners 
in particular discussed how it is not easy to determine impact significance for instance, while at the same 
time, proponents stated that it was impossible to satisfy everybody and that often, such discussions may 
lead to disagreements or misunderstandings. A lack of transparency can create a level of mistrust among 
practitioners. Every practitioner interviewed agreed that when all consultants and stakeholders know more 
about uncertainties, trade-offs are made with more confidence and decision-making can be performed 
with more confidence. 
 
Nearly all participants discussed how at such a large scale, the 407 East was particularly sensitive to 
social and political conflict, and authorities, proponents, and several practitioners put forward that a lack 
of political or public support will seriously thwart proposals. For instance, the proponents reported on the 
potential economical and political factors shaping perceptions by stating, “As a government agency we 
always try to weigh the cost of things and decisions like that are really difficult because everyone has 
different agendas and understandings, but we also have dollar signs in the back of our heads…” [PROP-
3]. Other times, decision-making bodies were viewed as inherently biased towards a predetermined 
outcome that would serve their institutional interests. For example, it was said by a practitioner that 
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uncertainties did not influence the decision because the project was significantly backed politically and 
socially.  
3.3.3 Communication of Uncertainties  
 
The research identified two principle ways that information about uncertainties was communicated during 
the EA process: (1) verbally, via consultation and other participatory approaches, or (2) in writing, or 
disclosed in the CSR report.  
 
Verbal Communication of Uncertainties  
The majority of the participants in the research were satisfied with the verbal communication of 
uncertainties and credited the proactive participatory process engaged. The approach included the 
Community Value Plan (CVP), Public Information Centres (PICs), Regulatory Advisory Group (RAG), 
Community Advisory Group (CAG), and the Municipal Technical Advisory Group (MTAG). The 
proponents interviewed remarked that the standard template they use for public and stakeholder 
participation was specifically enhanced for the 407 East, and other respondents confirmed that the 
approach adopted was different, accommodating, and much more flexible than other EAs they had 
experienced. Three practitioners said that in their experience project proponents will often try and avoid 
public and stakeholder participation but that MTO not only encouraged, but also broadened the scope for 
engagement. The majority of research participants discussed personal and broader benefits of the program 
in managing and addressing uncertainties. Proponents and practitioners felt confident that the consultation 
program helped reduce uncertainties by sharing information, solicitation expert and public knowledge, 
filling in gaps wherever possible, and providing a forum for uncertainties to be raised and addressed. For 
example, one practitioner’s experiences demonstrated how uncertainties about assumptions for which 
inaccessibility to private property prevented data collection were resolved during community consultation 
and meetings with property owners. Enlarging the scope for engagement allowed this consultant to reach 
out to community members and access information that was not previously available.  
 
Despite the instrumental value of the participatory framework employed, the communication of 
uncertainties to lay people was still viewed as difficult. The application of the participatory framework 
made it easier for uncertainties to be raised during informal decision-making but proponents explained, 
“they might not agree with what we are doing and how we got there; but at least they were given the 
opportunity to be heard, and I think that made a lot of people feel better…” [PROP-2]. Three interviewees 
were dissatisfied with their participatory influence on decision making and stated that the degree of 
accommodation they received as an affected interest groups was much less than what they had expected: 
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“…they had a duty to consult with us but we received the minimum and that is part of a political problem 
which creates full of uncertainties for us…” [FN-1]. The presentation and communication of uncertainty, 
according to most respondents, was carefully considered by those involved in producing it because of the 
perception that lay people have difficulty understanding the technical reports. Because of this, the 
information provided to the public is not necessarily the same as the information disseminated to the 
agencies, and according to one proponent interviewee, “…when we present something to the public, 
usually our text is something that someone from a grade 8 level can read and also, over the years we 
found that using maps and drawings are more effective than textual approaches…” (PROP-1). The 
information that is made public should be easy to understand because the assumption was that the public 
continuously misinterprets the information and can get lost in the numerical statements. 
 
Disclosure of Uncertainties in the CSR Report 
A query search was performed to locate the words ‘uncertainty’, ‘uncertainties’, and ‘uncertain’ in the  
Comprehensive Study Report (CSR) produced by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 
(CEAA) for the 407 East Transportation project, as a supplemental exercise to performing the interviews. 
The purpose was to determine the extent to which uncertainty was disclosed in the CSR and corroborate 

























The word ‘uncertainty’ appeared in the executive summary of the report in relation to the follow-up 
program. Another related to mitigation and design was referenced in section 6.4 about surface and 
subsurface geology, and in section 6.8 for fish and fish habitat. The word was used more generally in the 
section 6.10 related to species at risk, and in 6.15 about renewable resources.  
Section  Sub-Section Page # Reference 
Executive 
Summary                 
Follow Up 7 - 8 The purpose of a follow-up program under the Act is to verify the accuracy of the environmental 
assessment and determine the effectiveness of mitigation measures. In accordance with the 
requirements of the Act, a follow-up program is required for the Project. The program will focus on 
those environmental components where there is a relatively larger degree of uncertainty about the 
predicted effects. MTO will provide annual follow-up reports on vegetation (including wetlands), 
surface water, groundwater, wildlife, fish and fish habitat.  
6.4 Surface and 
Subsurface 
Geology and 





42 NRCan inquired MTO whether conducting additional studies could minimize uncertainty as to 
whether some deep cuts would be above or below the water table. MTO confirmed that additional 
geotechnical borehole drilling has been conducted at 31 deep cuts and high fills and that 
geotechnical studies are ongoing and will be completed to support future detailed design phases. 
The results of these studies will be taken into account in the site-specific foundation designs to 
mitigate effects on groundwater.  





63 The unique aspects of this project in relation to the large structures required to accommodate the 
ultimate design scenario may require further specific restoration considerations, as outlined in the 
site-specific mitigation measures. Specifically, the vegetation loss and die-back under the ultimate 
design structures is anticipated to have potential implications for maintenance of channel form, 
morphology and associated habitat elements under the structures. The degree and type of potential 
adjustment and habitat related effects will vary with the specific fluvial geomorphologic and habitat 
conditions associated with the affected watercourse reach. Therefore, to address this uncertainty 
and inform the refinement of the design of watercourse crossings that require relocation, 
particularly where the watercourses are sensitive to erosion and/or support sensitive species or 
habitats, the following measures are recommended…. 





71 For Redside Dace, the overall effects will be reduced through the implementation of mitigation 
measures however, the likely residual effects still include disruption to Redside Dace habitat at 8 
watercourse crossings due to shading from large scale structures and associated loss of vegetated 
‘deep’ pool refuge habitat used by Redside Dace, as well as general uncertainty associated with 
potential for indirect effects on channel stability and form related to vegetation loss.  
6.15 
Consideration of 








81 In most cases, large structure spans have been designed to avoid direct impacts to fish and fish 
habitat, but shading and associated loss of vegetated ‘deep’ pool habitat, as well as general 
uncertainty associated with potential indirect effects on channel stability and form related to 
vegetation loss will result in residual adverse effects on fish and fish habitat. However, these effects 
are very localized and are not likely to threaten fish stocks within the watercourse, nor across a 
broad geographic area such as the RSA.  
Source: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA), 2011. 407 East Transportation Corridor. Comprehensive Study Report.  
 
Table 4.3: Query results for ‘uncertainty’ and related words found in the CSR 
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During the interviews, participants were further encouraged to discuss how uncertainties were presented 
and communicated in the CSR report to verify the above findings. It became clear from the responses that 
not all participants had read the final report in its entirety, and some not at all. Despite the report being 
publicly available to all stakeholders and non-experts, it was not possible for participants to easily identify 
uncertainties disclosed within the reports. Proponents explained that it was their responsibility to make 
sure all the legislation and regulatory concerns are addressed, and that the information is transparent. 
Regulatory authorities further emphasized their responsibility in properly reviewing the reports provided 
to them before handing them over to the minister. On the other hand, the practitioners hired on behalf of 
MTO are usually responsible for carrying out particular studies (e.g. hydrogeology, air quality, etc.) and 
thus, many practitioners felt that reading beyond their specific section was unnecessary because, 
according to them, the coordinated process was sufficiently conducive. One practitioner mentioned, 
“..most consultants will just work in silos but, in our group, we encourage discussions and we synthesize” 
(PRAC-C1). Another practitioner highlighted the project-specific context: “The beauty of this EA was 
that it was truly integrated, and we were allowed to throw in enough resources to get it there by writing, 
reading, rewriting and referencing each other along the way” (PRAC-C2). Many practitioners suggested 
that uncertainties or knowledge gaps were handled through such an integrated approach, and two 
practitioners believed that it made the EA appealing to decision-makers which was why it did not take 
long for proponents to be granted approval. 
 
Ultimately, of the nine practitioners interviewed for the research, and part of the teams hired by MTO to 
perform the analyses and activities of the EA, five of them mentioned the fact that they were not asked to 
explicitly disclose uncertainties in their assumptions or methodologies. These practitioners were 
sometimes wary of their reputation because being hired by a reputable government agency like MTO can 
make consultants feel more pressure to comply and please because, “…they don’t want consultants that 
are headaches…” [PRAC-E2]. Most practitioners would argue that although it was not entirely 
prohibited, uncertainties were mostly not disclosed in the reports because it was not explicitly required by 
the proponents for them to do so or prescribed under EA guidelines that they were following. According 
to a practitioner, “…because they did not ask us, we just built certainty…” (PRAC-C 2).  
 
Authorities and all the proponents interviewed were satisfied with the final report. However, proponents 
candidly said that they do not use the word ‘uncertainty’ in the written reports: “We wouldn’t use the 
word uncertainty, I would be surprised if you found it…” (PROP-2). Proponents and several practitioners 
claimed that disclosing uncertainties would be impractical, confusing, and even unnecessary. Most 
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practitioners were also explicit about the improbability of coming across the word uncertainty, or any 
related terms in the documents. One consultant explained that the word uncertainty is not part of the 
vocabulary of the average consultant and said, “…we did not use the term uncertainty the way you are 
using it, it is just not part of our professional discourse… we very carefully chose those words like ‘may’, 
and ‘could’, and ‘would’, and ‘will’..” (PRAC-C4). 
There was a notion that the EA report should be salient—relevant to the potential users in order to be 
influential. It was important for the respondents that the report would contain information that meets the 
requirements of the agencies and authorities as well as the needs of the decision makers. Therefore, 
current practice does not necessarily include the disclosure of uncertainties. Proponents and the majority 
of practitioners argued that too much emphasis on uncertainty could give way to unnecessary discussion 
and project delays, and that the uncertainty information disseminated should therefore be limited and as 
policy relevant as possible. Authorities revealed that they have their own internal experts to rely upon that 
help make sure the information provided by project proponents is sound. Therefore, as one of the 
proponents mentioned, it becomes important to effectively manage the uncertainties during the process. 
The uncertainty information, according to most authorities, was disclosed to them accordingly and where 
gaps in the information occurred, or the quality of the information was questioned, the proponent was 
forthright with additional information and answers. Proponents of the 407 East thought that delays would 
only worsen if stakeholders believed information was kept from them and authorities were particularly 
confident with MTO as a proponent. According to the authorities, developments with a government 
proponent can benefit from more time and financial resources, and are usually more sophisticated and 
responsible proponents. One authority remarked that if the proponent left something out, they will most 
likely find out and it will just be more work for the proponents.   
 
The Responsibility of Communicating Uncertainties  
Respondents were asked to explain where the responsibility for communicating uncertainties lay, and 
overall, participants were in agreement that the responsibility was shared, but the ethical obligation to 
communicate uncertainties was seen to be with project proponents. This, according to many, was because 
proponents have ultimate control over the EA and therefore are in obligation to disclose and communicate 
the information publicly and to the decision-makers.  
 
The authorities interviewed assumed their responsibility in making sure that the process is open and 
transparent, but they also emphasized their limitations. One authority said: “…all parties are responsible 
but in the end it’s a proponent lead process and it’s the proponent’s job…” (RA-P1). Authorities 
maintained that it was important for them to be given all the information about the predictions and 
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underlying assumptions so that they are able to provide a rational recommendation to their government 
bodies (i.e. Agency or Minister). However, there was an awareness of the inherent biases involved in the 
process and the possibility that the project team may be strategically hiding valuable pieces of 
information to get quick approval, for example, “…there is always different ways that information can be 
presented and as a reviewer our job is to determine whether this report is being spun in an overly 
optimistic way, or in a way that diminishes signiﬁcant effects and hides uncertainties…” (RA-F1). 
Authorities emphasized that there should be integrity used at every level of the assessment process.  
 
3.3.4 Uncertainty Handling and Consideration  
 
Participants remarked that they encountered many different types of uncertainties in their work and 
equally diverse ways of handling them. The majority viewpoint was that uncertainties should be reduced 
wherever possible and that only significant uncertainties and those that cannot be reduced internally 
should be addressed and communicated to the decision-makers so that these could be considered in the 
decision outcomes.  
 
Acknowledgement of uncertainties was described as being a fundamental step towards incorporating 
uncertainties in the process. Even though participants in the study had relatively high awareness about the 
inherent uncertainties in EA practice, participants expressed that the most rational way of dealing with 
them were to determine which uncertainties are the most important, in terms of having a significant effect 
on the outcome, and which are not, because so many types and sources of uncertainties are present. 
Interviewees from authority groups stated that transparency in the process is important for them because 
too often proponents will provide reports that are biased and fail to recognize the assumptions and 
limitations in their work. In section 3.3.3, results show that there was a deliberate avoidance in disclosing 
uncertainties in the CSR report. Documenting the initial uncertainties and the approaches used to treat 
them was viewed impractical by the majority of participants. The alternative ways to handle uncertainties 
in the process according to interviewees in the case study are the following: 
 
• Soliciting expert opinion (e.g. mitigation measures) 
• Use of professional judgment (e.g. subjective value judgments based on experience) 
• More information to improve knowledge (e.g. collection of additional data) 
• Communication of salient uncertainties  
• Software and analytical solutions (e.g. models and simulations) 
• Use of decision criteria (e.g. reasoned argument approach)  
  56 
 
The participants were encouraged to discuss the ways in which the uncertainties encountered throughout 
the process, communicated, and considered have improved or influenced decisions. Most respondents 
indicated that uncertainties would most likely play a big role in the development of the follow-up program 
and that the follow-up program would also be the most important tool to address and manage remaining 
uncertainties. The importance of communication was expressed by an authority here, “in order to utilize 
the tool effectively, we need to have had communicated where the areas of greatest uncertainty were” 
(RA-F1). Many interviewees agreed that when uncertainties are disclosed, these are generally addressed 
by putting fairly rigorous monitoring and follow-up commitments for the subsequent operations.  
 
Precautionary Principle and Adaptive Management  
A query search for the words ‘Precautionary Principle’ and ‘Adaptive Management’ performed on the 
interview transcripts determined the extent to which the terms were mentioned by the respondents in 
different groups (Table 4.4). The references are counts of the number of selections within each source. 
For example, there were three provincial authorities interviewed and altogether, the words “adaptive 




The precautionary principle was discussed much less than adaptive management during the interviews. 
Only three participants mentioned, commented on, or discussed the precautionary principle. In addition, a 
query search of the CSR of the term ‘precautionary’, ‘precaution’, and ‘precautionary principle’ returned 
no results from the main text of the EA and only one mention of the PP in the comments section that was 
Stakeholders n AM References PP References 
First Nations 2 0 0 
Proponent 3 5 0 
Public/Local Stakeholder 1 1 0 
Practitioner/Expert 9 55 3 
Authority/Agency 6 61 20 
Municipal Government 1 0 0 
total 22 122 23 
 
Table 4.4:  Query results for the terms ‘adaptive management’ (AM) and ‘precautionary 
principle’  (PP) in the interview transcripts 
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not significant. The principle, according to two interviewees, is no longer being fully embraced and 
adaptive management is seen as a more practical approach.  
 
The interviewees that spoke about adaptive management perceived it as a valuable tool for uncertainty 
consideration. However, four participants remarked that the benefits of this approach is strongly 
connected with monitoring activities. To ensure that EA is meaningful, another federal authority 
described the importance of addressing the uncertainties via an adaptive management approach and that 
the follow-up program is the most viable tool for incorporating adaptive measures: “You need to know 
your uncertainties so that you can put emphasis upon them in the follow-up reports, which ultimately is 
the most important tool for ensuring an effective EA” (RA-F1).  
 
Five practitioners remarked the importance of follow-up monitoring and adaptive management and 
claimed that it is an effective way of handling uncertainties that can arise. One of them said, “…whenever 
we want to monitor something that isn’t fully certain, or we need confirmation, then adaptive 
management is where we turn to…” (PRAC-C3). In terms of ecological work specifically, opportunities 
to monitor post-EA are the only way to see how things evolve and to check the accuracy of the 
predictions. Practitioners made important comments regarding monitoring and adaptive management in 
particular for wildlife crossings and ecological restoration (i.e. wetlands). It was said, “It’s one thing to 
put a few passages here and there, but it’s another to monitor and see if they are actually being used” 
(PRAC-E2), and “…you need to monitor adaptively the ecological restoration works—I’ve seen areas 
slotted for compensation that years later are just dead wetland or inundated with weeds…” (PRAC-C5). 
Whether or not the commitments to monitor and follow-up are actually being enforced is difficult to say. 
Three practitioners and one authority recognized this flaw in the regulatory process.  
 
The characteristics of the project, namely project type and project size, were said to be highly important 
in determining what the follow-up program would entail and how it would be carried out. Some implied 
that the purpose of follow-up was to determine the accuracy of the predictions but not necessarily to 
correct them, and fewer respondents assumed that the follow-up program would be adaptive and reactive. 
According to a proponent, the purpose of EA follow-up is to address uncertainties: “It’s one of the 
reasons why we do it” (PROP-1). Authorities, proponents, and several practitioners discussed how 
follow-up was important for the 407 East because of the remaining uncertainty, issues of liability, 
accountability, and to ensure that future projects can benefit from the findings and performance of the 
project.  
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However, the ability to address the uncertainties during follow-up is undermined by institutional factors 
such as capacity, time, and accountability. For example, one practitioner said that in EA practice, people 
generally move on to bigger and better projects, “..when the consultants are changed, and then the upper 
management players are gone there is no system left to track these things and it makes follow-up difficult 
to manage” (PRAC-E3). An emergent challenge raised by a number of participants in the study was that 
of the continuation of the knowledge once the EA is complete and the project is awarded to the 
consortium. This would often result in a lot of post-EA uncertainties. 
3.4 Discussion  
 
In this section of the thesis we will explore the main findings of our research by providing a brief 
explanation of the uncertainties in the 407 East Mega-Project and the contextual dynamics. The research 
revealed that uncertainty was due to incomplete knowledge (epistemic), inherent randomness 
(variability), and to different and multiple interpretive frames (ambiguity). Furthermore, elements of the 
context, including project features such as size and location, contributed to some of the uncertainties 
identified by participants of our study. In the process, uncertainties were reported in all of the stages but 
were more relevant during the preliminary assessment and detailed assessment stages. In terms of 
communication, we explain how contextual variables and dynamics, including institutional, 
administrative, political, socio-economic, and cultural factors, influenced uncertainty communication and 
disclosure practice. Lastly, we present and propose recommendations for future practice.  
3.4.1 Uncertainties in the Project  
 
In order to address uncertainties, it is important to assess the nature of the uncertainty (Walker, Rotmans, 
et al., 2003). This is important because uncertainties that have a different nature will generally require 
different coping strategies (Brugnach, Dewulf, Pahl-Wostl, & Taillieu, 2008; van der Keur et al., 2008; 
Walker, Rotmans, et al., 2003). For example, if epistemic uncertainty is identified, additional research 
may improve the quality of the knowledge and thereby reduce the uncertainty. However, this strategy is 
not always appropriate for solving situations of variability or ambiguity-related uncertainty. Therefore, in 




As shown in section 3.3.1, all interviewees made at least one reference to uncertainty belonging to the 
environmental system. Reasons offered by respondents for the uncertainty in the environmental system 
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included: Project type, location, size, and lack of time, of appropriate data, of familiarity with impacts and 
techniques, and questionable relevance of methods for determining environmental impacts specifically. 
 
Ecological impacts related to water, aquatic wildlife and habitat, and terrestrial wildlife and habitat were 
identified as having elements of both variability and epistemic uncertainties. Fundamental was the 
existence of natural variability or inherent randomness stemming from the chaotic and unpredictable 
behaviour of the natural processes under investigation (Ascough II, Maier, Ravalico, & Strudley, 2008; 
Sigel et al., 2010; Walker, Harremoës, et al., 2003). For example, we found that authorities and external 
stakeholders expressed a lack of knowledge about what the effects of road salt would be on both 
terrestrial and aquatic species’ and their habitats. Interviewees considered the potential effects to be 
highly important yet largely uncertain. On the other hand, several claimed that the predictions were based 
on inaccurate information and were not confident in the work that was done to predict and assess the 
impacts of road salts. For some, this epistemic uncertainty was linked to the idea that proponents’ and 
authorities have a vested goal to under emphasize the impacts of road salts. Compared to other provinces, 
Ontario is the largest user of road salt and it has been estimated that some 1,148,570 tonnes of road salt 
are applied annually (Environment Canada & Health Canada, 2001; Morin & Perchanok, 2000). At the 
same time, the Ontario Ministry of Transportation (MTO) remains one of the largest single users of road 
salts in Canada and uses on average between 500,000 and 600,000 tonnes of road salt annually. 
Surprisingly, proponents and consultants hired by the proponents did not display the same concern about 
water quality. In fact, we found a published review predicting a 20% reduction in salt loads and salt 
concentrations in Toronto-area streams performed by the same consulting firm hired by MTO for the 407 
East Transportation EA. We found no other study to corroborate the reduction but rather, one study 
performed in Pickering, Ontario, showed that up to 50% of the salt applied to roads end up in 
groundwater (Meriano, Eyles, & Howard, 2009), and a report by an NGO group suggested that MTO has 
actually increased road salt use since 1996 (Riversides Stewardship Alliance & Fund, 2006). In general, 
subjectivity and assumptions within models being utilized was found to be a concern by several 
practitioners in the 407 East case. 
 
 Epistemic uncertainty was observed most often in the environmental system and our results show that the 
location and scale of the project may have enhanced this type of uncertainty. For example, the majority of 
the project is being implemented in an area not yet touched by development and participants described 
data gaps, limitations, and uncertainties due primarily from a lack of baseline knowledge. Epistemic 
uncertainty may in fact be reduced by further research (Walker, Rotmans, et al., 2003) but a few 
participants suggested that proponents are reluctant to go get the missing information or expert advice. 
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External practitioners were particularly concerned with the adequacy of the data being used to make 
predictions, claiming that they were not always convinced that the appropriate data was used, or collected, 
to reflect the scale and scope of the project. Some respondents felt that some uncertainty could have been 
reduced in the absence of strict budgetary and time constraints. Others did not identify budget and time as 
constraints but rather, they viewed these as realities involved in any large-scale EA and suggested that it 
would be unrealistic to perform the detailed study that so many requested due to the vast extent of the 
project. However, the quality of an EA is arguably dependent on the skills, access to knowledge, funds, 
and time available (Kolhoff, Runhaar, & Driessen, 2009). The disparity here may have caused proponents 
to use readily available data (van der Sluijs et al., 2004) and minimize the collection of additional data. 
Our results correspond with other works that address the data limitations commonly associated with 
ecological impact assessments of transportation infrastructure projects (Treweek, Thompson, Veitch, & 
Japp, 1993).  
 
Socio-Political 
Participants in our study expressed a number of uncertainties related to the socio-political system. There 
was a relationship between project size and ambiguity-related uncertainty. In mega projects, collaboration 
among diverse groups is necessary, but can result in conflicts due to different mandates and modes of 
rationality (van Marrewijk et al., 2008), and participants discussed that many disagreements between 
parties originated from variations in organizational mandates and legistlative requirments. According to 
actor-network theory, uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of actor interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). This theory also can be used to explain how power can influence problem framing and be used to 
create and close down facts by influential actors (Latour, 2005). For example, some stakeholders felt that 
there was insufficient protection awarded to locally and provincially sensitive species and, that only 
federal regulations seemed to matter and take precedence in final decisions.  
 
In particular, participants experienced ambiguity in relation to their roles and responsibilities which 
stemmed from institutional hierarchies and arrangements that were unclear. We presume that this was 
directly related to the size of the project and the lack of strategic guidance in terms of managing the 
overlapping governance structures (i.e. municipal, provincial, regional, etc) and the diversity of different, 
competing, and vested interests. Jurisdictional and municipal boundaries were crossed which also 
complicated decision-making. Proponents and authorities felt the pressure to accommodate everyone, but 
the internal conflicts and dynamics are, according to Bartlett and Kurian (1999), ‘unavoidably biased’, 
and correspond with the power relationships expressed in the research interviews. The main ones 
identified in the research were between proponents and First Nation representatives, federal authorities 
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and local authorities, and internal (e.g. practitioners hired by proponents) and external practitioners. 
However, the general impression was that the EA itself was effective and most concerns were about the 
post-decision activities and follow-up commitments.  
 
The mega-project literature considers that changes in requirements, public resistance, new regulations, 
budget cuts, and inflation as realities that create complexity and uncertainty (Miller & Lessard, 2008). We 
observed how two abrupt changes, first the Red Chris Mine decision and then to the Species at Risk Act, 
contributed to operational uncertainties that necessitated quick, efficient, and adaptive action. This is 
because the uncertainty originated from a change in the institutional political process and beyond the 
scope of the proponents; a kind of societal variability that is major contributor to uncertainty (Walker, 
Rotmans, et al., 2003). 
 
Technological  
Mega projects are marred by a number of uncertainties including those that are related to technological 
design (i.e. innovation, size, etc.) and implementation (i.e. public-private partnership, complexity, 
commitment, etc.) (Flyvbjerg, 2007) and both of these were raised a number of times during the research 
interviews.  
 
Despite the confidence in the planning and EA, respondents reported uncertainty about project design and 
mitigation that involved epistemic, variability, and also ambiguity-related uncertainty. For example, we 
observed that some participants were concerned with side-effects and mishaps associated with the novel 
and innovative infrastructure technologies being proposed. At the same time other participants welcomed 
and spoke highly of the technological novelty associated with the project. Building large and innovative 
projects has become important for economies around the world (Flyvbjerg, 2014). In a case study of the 
San Fransisco-Oakland Bay bridge, for example, it was argued that the ‘technological sublime’ 
dramatically influenced the design and project outcomes (Frick, 2008). Frick (2008) introduced the term 
as the excitement engineers and technologists get from building large and novel projects, i.e. the tallest 
buildings or first of anything. Flybjerg (2014) proposed three additional sublimes: political, economic, 
and aesthetic. In our study, we found no explicit evidence to suggest that the project outcomes were 
heavily influenced by the project’s technological novelty but a few participants did make it clear that they 
felt the project was extremely important for the province, i.e. economically and politically, and that 
therefore the EA had little influence on the overall approval. There was also incomplete knowledge 
largely because according to a number of participants, the project was ‘one-of-a-kind’ and therefore the 
technologies being proposed had not yet been tested or trialed in southern Ontario and participants felt 
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uncertain about how well the project design would reflect the landscape, and at the same time, how well 
the landscape would withstand or respond to the project.  
 
Uncertainties with regard to implementation were particularly related to ambiguity regarding the capacity 
of the contracting team and, as previously stated, the design of the Eastern link. Despite considerable 
public and stakeholder resistance during the selection of alternative routes, the Eastern link remained on 
the table as a viable option. It was interesting to receive input from an expert who provided decision 
makers with an updated traffic demand model because, according to the individual, the model which was 
used to determine the final decision was using outdated data and assumptions. It is not uncommon for 
road traffic forecasts to be wrong; in fact, Flyvbjerg (2007) performed a demand study for 208 projects 
and found that 50% of road traffic forecasts were wrong by more than 20%. For the 407 East, the refined 
model with updated data and assumptions disclaimed the need for the East link; yet according to the 
expert modeler and three additional respondents, the uncertainty only worsened when proponents and 
decision makers did not reassess the alternatives using the updated model. According to these four 
participants, proponents and authorities avoided to provide a justification for their decision to keep the 
Eastern link in the plans despite the evidence that it was not technologically nor environmentally feasible. 
Similar discourses were identified by Rozema and Bond (2015) who found that the flawed justification of 
two controversial infrastructure projects rendered the assessment process as ineffective. The choice of 
alternatives is often subjective and arbitrary while opposition to the selected alternatives may have came 
too late into the process (Steinemann, 2001). Moreover, the literature has argued that political powers and 
compromise-making are often more powerful than the actual scientific evidence for reaching decisions 
(Bartlett & Kurian, 1999; Cashmore, 2004; Geneletti, 2002; Miller & Lessard, 2008; Salet et al., 2013). 
Similarly, a study of EAs in the United States found that analysis of alternatives are often informally 
determined by agency agendas and foreclosed before public participation begins (Steinemann, 2001). 
Alternatives may have reflected the political and technological project objectives and agendas because 
expert and public opposition seemed to have little relevance in redirecting the proposal. Notwithstanding 
the significant ecological concerns associated with the virginal landscape and the degree of public 
resistance against the Eastern link, the lack of evidence-based justification of this option led to more 
distrust and uncertainties for actors in the 407 East EA. Duncan (2012) gives an account from a major 
energy infrastructure project known as the Basslink case where flaws were found in a simulation model 
only when it was no longer possible to perform additional simulations and that still, the proponents were 
able to make the bias appear negligible and convinced the assessment panel to authorize the project. As it 
would appear only later, the outcome of the model bias resulted in severe environmental consequences 
that could have been avoided at the onset if the proponent had realized legitimate disclosure (Duncan, 
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2012)  
 
3.4.2 Uncertainties in the EA Process 
 
Case study participants identified uncertainties at every stage of the EA process, but uncertainties were 
mainly identified in the scoping activities and detailed assessment stages.  
 
Compared to all stages in EA, uncertainties that occurred during scoping were found to permeate into 
other stages. For example, interviewees criticized the scoping phase for being too narrowly focused, 
incomplete, and even inadequate. Interest groups were particularly critical of this stage and felt like they 
were not sufficiently involved in the decisions at this stage. According to Hellström and Jacob (1996), 
scoping is dependent on the political system and the ability of the technical specialists to identify and 
reach relevant stakeholders. It is important that everyone can participate during scoping to ensure that all 
concerns, issues, and uncertainties will be addressed during the detailed assessment. For example, we 
observed that for First Nation representatives, uncertainty during scoping could have been reduced if 
proponents would have reached out to them earlier, this would have allowed them to mobilize their 
experts on the proposed site early on so that they may have produced more thorough archeological 
mapping. Doing so may have avoided accidental excavations of burial grounds during construction. 
Similarly, the member of the public discussed how issues related to local watersheds received little 
attention during scoping and were therefore inadequately addressed during the EA. According to the 
interviewee, proponents and federal authorities were focused on larger federal mandates and largely 
ignored the concerns of the public regarding the adverse impacts of the project on local wetlands and 
watersheds.  
 
Although all participants were deeply aware of the heightened presence of unavoidable uncertainties in 
scoping generally, no measures were found to have been introduced to address uncertainty specifically. 
Indeed, several practitioners, proponents and members of authority group in our study affirmed that due 
to the scope of the project, it was unrealistic to produce a more detailed study and therefore, the scoping 
activities warranted a ‘broad brush approach’. There were numerous opportunities for all interests to 
participate during scoping, however, some participants felt like there was a lack of willingness to actually 
consider the input provided by interest groups, members of the public, NGOs, and other stakeholders. 
Active and open participation as well as accountability would have reduced uncertainty and improved 
trust. It is largely believed that the context plays an important role during decision-making particularly 
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when trade-offs among social, environmental, political, and economic factors are being made—usually 
behind “closed doors” (Sadler, 1996).   
 
Collectively, the detailed assessment stage, which includes impact prediction, assessment, and mitigation 
activities, involved the most uncertainties. Many of the uncertainties were the result of the diverse and  
multiple perspectives of the actors involved in the process which we described as ambiguity-related 
uncertainty and institutional uncertainty. Respondents expressed this by discussing the disparate 
approaches and methodologies, accuracy and reliability of the predictive methods, and subjective 
judgments that came together in the detailed assessment stages. For example, a practitioner commented 
that it was difficult to merge all the disciplines together and integrate their work because the criteria and 
methods are not the same across the different fields. Our results support Duncan’s (2012) finding that 
unifying the works of various experts and teams of consultants into one consolidating report reduces 
transparency about uncertainties. Despite coordination and multi-disciplinary integration, both strategic 
uncertainty with how actors frame and develop their studies and strategies, and institutional uncertainty 
with regard to procedures, rules, and integration were present. Epistemic uncertainty was also discussed 
for all three activities (i.e. impact prediction, impact assessment, and mitigation). For example, 
participants discussed how predictions were constrained by the range of available data and strict timelines 
of the process. Generally, an EA conducted by the Agency must be completed within 365 days and, in our 
study, proponents had to adhere to both Agency and developer timelines. Costs also seemed to be 
influential in determining the direction and quality of the prediction process. For instance, one consultant 
stated, “Because cost is obviously a concern, sometimes you have to work with existing data that is pretty 
dated or from other places or from a smaller set of data than what you should be using, but you make 
conclusions based on what you have access to as opposed to spending time and money finding answers on 
the ground” (PRAC-C5). Prediction activities are resource consuming especially when the proposal 
involves a large undertaking because the extent of the impacts is greater. Proponents can experience 
pressure from decision-makers, stakeholders, and project timelines (Ross et al., 2006). EA prediction 
performance studies have shown displeasing results regarding the accuracy of predictions (Buckley, 1991; 
Tennøy et al., 2006b; Wood et al., 2000). However, most interviewees felt confident enough in the quality 
of the work, but there were a few interviewees who felt that the predictions were unreliable and could 
have been improved or expanded with more data.  
 
Impact significance was perceived to be highly uncertain by the respondents. The scholarly literature has 
acknowledged the importance of significance determination in EA and argues that it remains one of the 
most complex and least understood activities in EA (Lawrence, 2003; Söderman, 2005; Wood, 2008; 
  65 
Wood & Becker, April, 2004). In Canada, impact significance interpretation involves general guidance 
tools like sample criteria to give a sense of which impacts are more or less important for consideration. 
The definition of significance in Canada is quite narrow (i.e. adverse effects only) (Lawrence, 2003) and, 
according to our interview results, uncertainty arose at this stage due to subjective and professional 
judgments, a reliance on expert feedback, a failure to recognize the broader context (i.e. social, economic, 
and environmental), lack of formal criteria, disparate methodologies, interpretation of impact 
significance, and others. According to our findings, significance determination inferred a lot of 
ambiguity-related uncertainty due to the differences in the actors’ perceptions, frames, and organizational 
values. Significance is not value-free. It is subjective, normative and value-dependent and therefore, 
significance determinations should be explicit, substantiated and most importantly collaborative and 
inclusive to all stakeholders, including affected interests and members of the public. We found 
inconsistencies in how participants felt about the manner in which significance determination was 
conducted. For example, we found that two interviewees were unhappy with the judgments and claimed 
that the discussions were biased to favor federal agency concerns (e.g., fish and fish habitat). Significance 
determination procedures should indeed be focused matters critical and relevant to decision-making, 
including regulatory requirements and agency concerns however, all judgments should be traceable so 
that other parties can independently reconstruct how judgements were derived. This could reduce biases 
and ensure that judgements are appropriate. In our study, only a few practitioners were able to describe 
the significance thresholds that were used during the process. We got the impression that determining 
significance is not systematic nor easily traceable. However, practitioners that were from the same 
consulting firm described how determining significance was performed as a group and this made the work 
come together in a comprehensive way rather than in ‘silos’. However, care should be taken not to 
exclude or marginalize other forms of input. The public should fully participate in developing thresholds 
and criteria’s and in the interpretation of significance, alongside practitioners, proponents, and regulatory 
figures. Making significance determination inclusive, participatory, and transparency is thus highly 
dependent on effective public participation.  
 
Respondents placed considerable attention on the need for following-up, but we observed that there was 
considerable ambiguity about the degree to which monitoring and effective adaptive actions would be 
carried out. Follow-up is often poorly developed and the prescriptions can be limited (Lobos & Partidario, 
2014). In our case study, because follow-up has not yet begun, participants could only speculate about it, 
and the prominent viewpoint was that the prescriptions would be too narrow and biased by federal agency 
concerns. The Agency, in consultation with federal authorities, defined the scope of the follow-up 
program and determined which factors warranted inclusion. Currently, federal authorities (i.e., TC, DFO) 
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are responsible for the implementation of the follow-up program under the coordination role of The 
Agency, while MTO is responsible for providing annual progress reports on impacts, mitigation, and 
project implementation. The importance of follow-up for this project resonated in every interview yet 
several participants discussed feeling worrisome about the degree of commitment on the part of MTO. 
Usually, proponents will employ a team of specialists and consultants to obtain the input necessary for 
compliance, in this case, an annual report. Participants in our study reported that proponent practitioners 
often lack the resources and capacity to carry out follow-up activities. At the same time, it is equally 
challenging to obtain adequate funding and other resources to supply follow-up activities long term 
(Wood et al., 2000) since proponents have a tendency to focus on monitoring programs and compliance 
that satisfies public opposition and regulatory agencies during the process, but not necessarily after 
approval is granted. Because the 407 East EA has just recently been approved, we cannot determine the 
degree to which monitoring and follow-up commitments are being satisfied, but the literature suggests 
that once a project is granted approval, monitoring activities are often neglected (Morrison-Saunders & 
Bailey, 2001).  
 
Legislation should validate the scope for sound follow-up and ensure that all appropriate components, 
impacts, and concerns will remain under close watch; yet, it has been argued that the Act and the 
requirements for follow-up in Canada places a narrow focus on mitigation of adverse effects and 
discourages follow-up on social and economic components (Noble & Storey, 2005). Similar points were 
raised by respondents in our study who called for improved social impact mitigation and follow-up. The 
scope of follow-up should be consistent with the definition of ‘environment’ under the Act which spans 
the biophysical, social, and economical dimensions of development, and our study suggests that 
improvements are still needed in putting this requirement into practice. Unfortunately, changes to the 
former Act have actually greatly reduced the scope of EA (see Gibson, 2012).  
 
Another important finding is the perception by respondents that follow-up effectiveness depends on the 
degree to which knowledge is transferred, communicated, and carried through post-decision. According 
to Morrison-Saunder and Bailey (2001), proponents and practitioners tend to move on quickly during land 
development projects and there is no continuity in project management and monitoring because 
responsibilities are transferred to various agencies. This observation is consistent with our findings where 
participants reported that the uncertainty was due to limited knowledge transfer to post-decision stages 
and activities. This can be problematic especially if there is a lack of knowledge transfer and individuals 
in charge are not made aware of the uncertainties.  
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3.4.3 Communication about uncertainties 
 
Uncertainty communication is good scientific practice that promotes accountability and involves being 
open to both decision-makers and the public (Wardekker et al., 2008). Information about uncertainty 
should be effectively communicated to the public, decision-makers and other stakeholders (Budescu, Por, 
& Broomell, 2011). While many scholars have argued that the context of EA—politics, culture, society, 
and the organization and institutions—influences the effectiveness of EA (Bina et al., 2011; Bina, 2008; 
Owens, Rayner, & Bina, 2004; Wang et al., 2012), we observed that the context can further influence how 
information, including information about uncertainties, is communicated. Our results indicated that there 
were several factors that either hampered or contributed to uncertainty communication and consideration 
(Table 5). Every EA has its own unique context (Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007) and interviews 
with project participants helped identify specific elements of the context for the 407 East EA. These are 
explored below.  
 
Table 5: Factors that hampered (-) or contributed (+) to uncertainty communication and 
consideration 
Factors that hampered (-) uncertainty 
communication and consideration 
Factors that contributed (+) to uncertainty 
communication and consideration 
1. Practitioner professional culture of 
minimizing uncertainty 
1. Mega project features leading to 
adjustments in project aspects (i.e. 
accountability)  
2. Lack of formal requirements or 
incentives for uncertainty disclosure  
             2. Improvements in participatory program 
3. Institutional arrangements             3. Proponent's desire to maintain trust  
4. Limited public participation             4. Regulatory oversight and review 
5. Lack of time or commitment for 
reading and reviewing CSR 
            5. Internal practitioner dynamics 
 
 
1) Institutional culture constraining uncertainty communication  
 
Our results suggest that cooperation and communication between organizations and actors was heavily 
nuanced by institutional culture. In accordance with other studies, we found that some participants felt 
that communicating uncertainties, limitations, and assumptions was much less important (R. K. Morgan et 
al., 2012)—even unnecessary. For most practitioners it appeared to be common practice to deal with 
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uncertainties internally—and only when they could not be reduced or managed by the teams of 
consultants and experts themselves should they be communicated and passed on to the proponents. Part of 
the reason might be that practitioners feel a responsibility to their client in terms of getting their projects 
approved without social or public opposition. Not specific to the 407 East EA, the following quote 
describes the cultural barrier of uncertainty communication: “transparency is difficult because consultants 
certainly do not get hired again if they are too honest—proponents do not want to hear that because they 
are worried they won’t get their approval” [RAF-1].  
 
We agree with Larsen et al. (2013) who argued that the need or desire to avoid conflict or mistrust in 
experts and authority can lead to intentional uncertainty avoidance. In particular, it was found that 
participants in our study did not feel as though the public shared the same appreciation for uncertainty and 
as a result, may misinterpret uncertainties as a deficit in the work being carried out. This led participants 
to describe how uncertainty disclosure is often intentionally minimized during public deliberations. 
According to Frewer et al. (2003), scientists’ perceptions of uncertainties revealed that the majority of 
scientists believed that the public was unable to conceptualize uncertainty and that providing them with 
such information would only have negative consequences (e.g. mistrust in science). Expectedly, the 
scientists in their study supported a ‘deficit’ model of communication which encourages the withholding 
of uncertainty information by experts.  
 
Interestingly, we found that practitioners with a close professional relationship with the proponents (i.e. 
hired by the proponents to perform a specific task) showed greater inclination to minimize, reduce or 
avoid uncertainty communication compared to other interviewees who, although involved in the EA, had 
fewer or no direct professional responsibilities to the proponent. These individuals appeared to be more 
inclined to criticize the way professional culture has placed a reliance on objective science and on making 
uncertainty appear certain, and encouraged a more accessible, open, and transparent approach to 
uncertainty communication among professionals and between major actors, including proponents, 
authorities and members of the public.  
 
2) Institutional and administrative arrangements as a barrier to uncertainty communication 
 
Participants often described how the size of the proposal and the scope of the EA made it increasingly 
important albeit challenging to get everybody on board and cooperating. The majority of interviewees 
discussed how they frequently communicated about the uncertainties that they had been faced with and 
how they sometimes communicated these uncertainties to
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predominantly observed during interviews with members of the same organization or agency (e.g. 
consulting firm). Inadequate and insufficient knowledge sharing was especially seen between disciplines, 
and often between major actor groups from different organizations or agencies (e.g. practitioners and 
public).  
 
The diversity of agencies, groups, organizations, and authorities involved was previously identified as a 
source of uncertainty (See section 3.3.1). Closer examination revealed that this presented a barrier for 
uncertainty communication because of the presence of many different legislative, administrative, and 
institutional frameworks that influences how actors interpret what is uncertain and what is not. For 
example, one interviewee that was involved in the social components of the EA explained how it remains 
practically impossible for natural scientists and social scientists to see eye-to-eye. Also, the interviewee 
revealed that often uncertainties are not communicated to other disciplines or agencies because the issue 
may have not been an uncertainty in isolation but becomes one when it is combined with other variables 
in another field. This is among one of the many problems associated with inter-agency coordination in EA 
(Brugnach et al., 2011; Matthew Cashmore et al., 2004; Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000; Spiegelhalter & Riesch, 
2011; Zhang, Kørnøv, & Christensen, 2013).  
 
Many interviewees in our study highlighted that insufficient coordination between departments was a 
major problem and our interpretation of the results suggests that cooperation was successful within 
professional organizations (e.g. consultation firm), but beyond this, interagency cooperation and 
integration was found to be lacking. There was inconsistencies between methods used in the EA as well 
as tensions related to the variations in EA paradigms of the different disciplines and groups involved 
(Lee, 2002). This led to mistrust, particularly among local, provincial, and federal agencies who displayed 
limited coordination between and within their sectoral departments. We argue that the unexpected 
changes to the political and institutional structure (i.e. change in EA process) created confusion among 
those involved and that there may have been a lack of administrative support to clarify and allocate 
responsibilities and roles amongst organizations.   
 
The lack of information sharing in EA among actors and departments is not a new finding (see: Bina et 
al., 2011; Tennøy et al., 2006). Results from our study suggest that external experts and actors felt that 
they are typically given limited opportunities to openly engage in and contribute to EA. In contrast, 
interviewees from other groups, such as proponent consultants, proponents, and federal authorities felt 
confident about the way in which the 407 East EA included, engaged with, and enhanced opportunities 
for the public and stakeholders. Consultation plans, meetings, and participatory programs certainly helped 
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disseminate and share information about the project and the EA, but there are also discrepancies regarding 
how useful these efforts were in terms of shaping or influencing outcomes. In the transport sector, Bina 
(2008) states, “the rigidly hierarchical structure, combined with the culturally and institutionally 
embedded divide between technical experts, bureaucrats, and senior leadership limited the quantity and 
quality of information being disseminated from the top down.” (p. 723-724). Institutional hierarchies and 
arrangements may have constrained the opportunities for external experts, members of the public, 
affected interests, and other lower-tiered groups to provide input and interact with the EA in this case. For 
example, one local authority said that everyone had an opportunity to raise concerns, provide input, and 
comment on the EA but that once the EA was approved and planning commenced they were no longer 
being heard, particularly their concerns with the construction activities.  
 
According to Kørnøv and Thissen (2000), when decision-making involves several organizations or actors, 
mutual dependencies and power inequalities among participants becomes an important issue that 
influences the process. For example, there are more people, more voices and, more concerns raised. 
Interviewees in our case study revealed examples of how teams or individuals responsible for different 
parts of the EA actively took part in cooperative processes or other means of information exchange to 
ensure that the EA was integrated. Practitioners in particular described the importance of maintaining 
close contact with one another in order to strengthen an interdisciplinary study. The integration of 
different specialities supports shared learning that serves to increase the robustness of EAs (Hildén et al., 
2004). However, as the process unfolded, synthesizing assessment information was met with difficulties. 
First, there was strategic uncertainty resulting from the presence of various actors—each with their own 
perceptions, strategies, and agendas. Correspondingly, this relates to the concept of ‘interprofessionalism’ 
that refers to teams of practitioners from different professions working collaboratively on a specific task 
(Morgan et al., 2012). Assessors frequently disagree about matters of assumptions, methods and 
interpretations, and may also question the quality of each others work (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Participants described how they are mutually dependent upon one another during the EA process, i.e. 
impact assessment and significance, and that often these critical interactions and partnerships may be 
confounded by individual actors steering towards their own agendas or preferences. Participant views and 
underlying motivations are not predictable and neither are the decision outcomes (Kørnøv & Thissen, 
2000). 
 
3) Cultural and social variables enhanced possibilities for uncertainty communication 
 
  71 
Every participant interviewed made reference to the exceptional participatory program, which included 
the creation of community, professional, and public groups, and numerous PICs (public information 
centers)—and a few interviewees perceived them to be motivated by the proponent’s desire to appear to 
be doing their due diligence and ‘spin’ the project in the eyes of the public and regulators in order to get 
approval smoothly: “these little checks and balances only to make sure that they are getting the 
communities involved, that they are liaising.” Diduck and Sinclair (2002) argue that public involvement 
can be controlled by proponents by way of setting the terms of debate and ensuring that participation is on 
track with their hidden agendas. Notwithstanding, we agree with the majority of participants who felt that 
these initiatives were adapted to the project context (i.e. large number of affected interests requiring more 
care), which allowed for more opportunities for uncertainty communication. We observed that the 
decision to adopt strategies that heighten stakeholder and public involvement during the process was 
influenced by contextual factors. For example, proponents mentioned how the participatory program was 
enhanced due to the enlarged scale of the study and the desire to appease public and stakeholder mistrust. 
The shift in attitude resulted in comparatively high degrees of public and stakeholder engagement. The 
EA regulations that applied to the 407 East Project, including requirements for greater public engagement, 
may explain the reason why the process was characterized as being more inclusive. In a recent study, 
Hansen and Wood (2016) found that engagement and disclosure of information depended on the 
likelihood of encountering public opposition, the size and location of the project, and the perceptions of 
the affected stakeholders. In our study, the public’s perception was viewed as being one of many reasons 
for broadening the participatory approach.  
 
The influential role of context in the field of planning has been addressed by Sager (2001) who stressed 
that factors other than those related to the institutional setting can shape planning styles, such as pressure 
groups and powerful stakeholders. According to Sager (2001), planning is not carried out in an 
institutional vacuum but is actually a political activity where pressure groups and powerful actors can 
shape the outcomes. In our study, for example, trust and transparency were identified as important factors. 
Mega projects are often subject to public opposition (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Vidal & Marle, 2008) and the 407 
East was certainly subjected to resistance. For fear of damaging their reputation and to address the 
pressure from regulatory agencies and the public, proponents and professionals will likely enter the 
debate especially when there is a need to communicate uncertainties, risks, and limitations involved 
(Harding, 2002). The negative perception of the proponent, the project, and the EA was driven by some 
mistrust that could be due to previous transportation project failures, the proponent’s reputation, and other 
reasons. Slovic and Fischoff (1982) showed that past experience has a tendency to bias future judgments 
and Sandman (2012) stated that concerns can arise when the risk is man-made, novel, when there is 
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uncertainty, when there is memory of prior mistakes, and when information is withheld. In our current 
study, the proponents and authorities responded to this danger by proactively broadening the conventional 
participatory approach. Therefore, our findings suggest that the level of participatory involvement and the 
engagement approach in this case was indeed influenced heavily by contextual factors.  
 
Our findings indicate that different and multiple perceptions, selection of information relevant for 
consideration, lack of uncertainty recognition, and lack of appreciation for the broader social and political 
context were among the most significant drivers for improving communication by the proponents and 
authorities during the EA process. Sharing the information with the public and increasing public 
awareness have been described as worthy means of building trust (Sandman, 2012) and the redefined 
participatory program of the 407 East EA certainly increased communication during the process. Over the 
course of the EA process, consultation involved presentations, individual meetings, workshops, fact 
sheets, websites, flyers and other visual cues, toll free phone numbers, First Nation councils, public 
information centers (PICs) meetings, and advisory groups. The program established three main advisory 
groups (MTAG, RAG, CAG) which gave an opportunity for individuals to meet with their respective 
counterparts regularly and discuss relevant project matters. Respondents explained that in this way 
information could be disseminated appropriately to the various interests. Methodological details and 
technical information would most likely be discussed in the Municipal Technical Advisory Group 
(MTAG), while less technical information would be communicated during the Public Information 
Centre’s (PICs). The information is tailored to a target audience, which is in accordance with the concept 
of ‘progressive disclosure’ that applies to the reporting of uncertainty in EA reports (Kloprogge et al., 
2007). Similarly, Kuhn (2000) argues that the disclosure and retrieval of uncertainty information should 
in fact concentrate on how the targeted audience perceives uncertainty since, besides being highly 
important, it may not always be appreciated and or of interest to them. On the other hand, consultation is 
verbal and interactive and there is a danger that there might be non-disclosure of valuable information 
(Lawrence, 2003). We found that the perception of the public interestingly shaped the way uncertainties 
were handled and communicated. Our findings reveal that many participants held the view that the public 
and non-technical actors do not conceptualize uncertainties in the manner in which the project team does, 
and participants remarked that what is presented during public meetings will most likely not delve into the 
methodological aspects. We have seen that uncertainties were not reported in the CSR and suspect that 
they would not be unless brought up by a concerned party. According to Lawrence (2003), there is a 
resistance for proponents and organizations to engage in processes that reveal uncertainty which 
compliments our findings of the 407 East accordingly.  
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Our results show that there was an overall appreciation for the participation program and that it was 
valuable as it helped provide a platform for issues to be raised, questions to be addressed, and information 
to be shared. However, we hypothesize that the main viewpoint might have differed if our participant 
sample pool had involved more members of the public and affected interest groups because our study 
involved primarily professionals. It is argued that individuals have a tendency to judge risks and 
uncertainties as more serious when the agency or proponents seem unresponsive to their concerns about it 
(Sandman & Johnson, 1992). We found that opposition and resistance to the 407 East mega project to 
have been reduced, but not eliminated, by the enhanced participatory scheme. According to our findings, 
proponents favored integrity and credibility stating that they have learnt over the years that withholding 
information from the public and regulatory agencies only leads to opposition and mistrust. Thus, they 
applied what they had learnt to the EA for the 407 East and expressed their satisfaction in doing so.  
 
4) Lack of administrative framework to encourage uncertainty disclosure 
 
Despite the academic literature urging for better uncertainty communication in EA practice (Tennøy et al., 
2006; Wardekker et al., 2008b) our results of the content analysis show that uncertainties were not 
explicitly disclosed in the Comprehensive Study Report (CSR). The lack of uncertainty disclosure is 
typical as confirmed by other studies and authors in the literature as well (Andrews, 1988; Geneletti et al., 
2003; Leung et al., 2015; Tennøy et al., 2006; van Asselt, 2000; Wardekker et al., 2008b; Wibeck, 2009; 
Wood et al., 2000). Andrews (1988) refers to the study by Caldwell et al. (1982) which looked at the 
disclosure of uncertainty in 74 EISs in the United States. They found that uncertainty was not 
acknowledged in more than 22% of the cases and that no report did so in a systematic way. Similarly, 
Tennøy et al. (2006) reviewed 22 Norwegian EA reports (decision documents, EISs) and found that 43% 
of the reports did not mention uncertainty, 13% mentioned but did not explain nor discuss uncertainty, 
and 37% of the reports failed to disclose the underlying assumptions in the data and models used in the 
prediction process. Similarly, our study found only five mentions of the word ‘uncertainty’ in the CSR 
report. This is surprisingly few. Also the descriptions were limited and we could not always discern what 
the uncertainty was about, which was because of a lack of standard practice for reporting and 
disseminating uncertainty in the reports (Leung et al., 2015). Our results are comparable to those of Lees 
et al. (2015) demonstrating that the disclosure of uncertainty in EA reports lacked consistent reporting, 
procedure, and terminology. Implicit disclosure of uncertainty and vague depictions such as ‘may’, 
‘could’, ‘probably’, and others may still be used, but our study was limited to words directly related to 
‘uncertainty’. Vague terminology is also problematic as it may create difficulties for decision makers to 
readily identify the importance of the issue (Lees et al., 2015).  
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The EA process resulted in numerous reports and large quantities of environmental summaries that were 
synthesized for the CSR. According to proponent interviews, all accompanying studies, meeting minutes, 
and information was made available to the public and any interested stakeholders. Irrespective of quality, 
we argue that such publicity increased transparency and promoted accountability by way of making the 
data, assumptions, and justifications relatively public. Despite the lack of uncertainty disclosure in the 
CSR, this was understood as a benefit of the 407 East participatory program. Proponents and their 
consultants in our study explained that disclosing uncertainties in the reports is not standard practice and 
they do not recommend it. Not surprised by the lack of uncertainty disclosure in the CSR, participants 
expressed that uncertainty is not necessarily hidden, but strategically omitted so that only salient 
uncertainties are communicated to decision makers and the wider society to ensure that they are not 
confounded by unnecessary information. We did not find evidence that would suggest that proponents are 
intentionally concealing uncertainties (see Wood, 2008), but rather choose to selectively disseminate 
information on the basis that it will have positive implications for the decision outcome, which is 
somewhat different than deliberately concealing uncertainty.  
 
With a lack of guidance and good-practice disclosure requirements, practitioners and proponents may 
continue to discount uncertainty in their reports and choose to strategically report uncertainties which they 
deem necessary on their own. Cashmore et al. (2010) explain that impact assessment instruments reify 
governance norms and determine how issues are framed, analyzed and debated, which means that 
governance structures can have a direct influence on what types of knowledge are pertinent to decision 
making.  
 
5) Tensions between growth priorities and environmental concerns limit uncertainty 
communication and disclosure practice 
 
The underlying purpose of the EA can be articulated as, “Are the potential impacts of extending the 407 
East acceptable?” This question led the EA to determine the acceptability or not of the proposal as it was 
presented, including alternatives to. However, one external practitioner claimed, “The EA did not matter” 
because there was such a strong economical, political, and social desire for the project to be approved that 
it was expected that all environmental concerns would be subverted. It has been argued that decisions are 
made on the basis of organizational and institutional structures, and are framed by the dominant political 
and social contexts (Bartlett and Kurian, 1999). If this is true, then the dominant political and social 
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context may have played an influential role in the way in which uncertainties associated with the EA were 
or were not communicated or considered.  
 
For example, in a study involving 40 cases across the UK, Wood and Jones (1997) found that although 
EA enhanced the provision of information to decision-makers and, to a lesser degree, assisted in making 
project modifications, EA had no influence on the decision outcomes. In the same way, we found that in 
general, participants in our study did not feel like the presence of more or less uncertainty would have 
influenced decision outcomes. Our results further suggest that although uncertainties are not explicitly 
disclosed, decision makers felt that they were sufficiently aware of the underlying and unavoidable 
uncertainties. Despite insufficient information about uncertainties being handed over to the public and 
decision makers, there was a general consensus that the information was adequate to determine the 
approval and recommendations for project follow-up. Uncertainty consideration was deemed important 
by study participants. Authorities interviewed in our research agreed that they expect proponents and 
consultants to be ethical and transparent about uncertainties. And our results are in agreement with 
Tennoy et al. (2006) who found that decision makers are not made fully aware of the uncertainties in EA, 
on the basis of the reporting documents. However our findings from interviews with authorities would 
indicate that as intermediaries, authorities do their best to make sure that project proponents provide 
transparent reports. For example, two authorities described how they went about asking MTO for better 
and more objective information about matters such as stormwater management and noise impacts. Unlike 
the findings by Tennoy et al. (2006), we argue that decision makers are to some degree aware of the 
inherent uncertainties despite the lack of disclosure, but that they are most satisfied with the way in which 
proponents handle uncertainties. Many authorities claimed to place a high value on the information 
contained in the CSR, but like other studies (Cashmore et al., 2007) it was difficult to determine the 
instrumental role of the information on the decision outcomes. In addition, some authorities were explicit 
about having not enough time to read through the entire reports. Similar conclusions by other authors 
support our findings that stakeholders and decision makers may miss important information due to time 
constraints in reviewing the documents (Cashmore et al., 2007). Our findings suggest that the preference 
would be to consider uncertainties that have a bearing on the decision to be made. At the same time, the 
assumption was that potential environmental and technical issues would be raised by the authorities, a 
finding which was also given by Cashmore et al. (2007) and Wood and Jones (1997). However, our 
interviews with authorities reported that reviewing the documentation was time consuming and the 
possibility for oversight is highly likely. Consideration of all potential uncertainties was seen as 
impossible due to time and financial constraints. Duncan (2008) concludes that decision makers may not 
intentionally address uncertainties that are presented to them and, therefore it can be said that decision 
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makers for the current 407 East project prefer that uncertainties are disclosed particularly when they have 
a direct effect on the decision to be made (i.e. salient uncertainties). Our interviews with authorities 
provide evidence that when information was vague or unsatisfactory, authorities would ask for more 
information about the predictions and uncertainty. Examples are the stormwater management and salt 
practices. This information allowed authorities to provide decision makers with the best information for 
their deliberation (Duncan, 2008; Geneletti et al., 2003).  
 
On the other hand, interviewees that belonged to external groups (i.e. NGOs, affected interests, members 
of the public, etc.) had a different view. According to our results, several participants in these groups felt 
that uncertainties were not well handled or communicated by project proponents and that these were 
therefore not appropriately considered by decision-makers.  
 
3.4.4 Perception  
 
The interviewees revealed that uncertainties are perceived in individually different ways. For example, 
project proponents and experts typically relied on past experience and subjective professional judgments 
to deal with uncertainty. On the other hand, several practitioners expressed that consensus building and 
professional judgments can introduce more uncertainty to the process. Actor-network theory considers 
uncertainty to be an inherent characteristic of actor interactions (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and our results 
have confirmed that participants acknowledge this to be relevant in the 407 East EA. We found further 
evidence to support the uncertainty classification by Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), where uncertainty 
strongly originates from complex actor networks and actor behaviors resulting in either substantive 
uncertainty (uncertainty about how other actors interpret or frame knowledge), strategic uncertainty 
(uncertainty due to the unpredictable actions or behaviours of other actors), or institutional uncertainty 
(uncertainty due to the complex and dynamic presence of diverse actors from different organizations).  
 
Our findings highlight that to better communicate uncertainty in EA, it is important to select an 
appropriate communicative approach that is suitable for the receiving audience. Actors in any EA are 
coming together in partnerships and need to take into consideration the wider context that incudes other 
actor’s perceptions, paradigms, responsibilities, and approaches. Participants in our research had varying 
perceptions of uncertainty and we found that their views corresponded with the degree to which they were 
involved in the process. Generally, the practitioners who were engaged in data collection and analysis 
perceived uncertainty as a ‘day-to-day’ reality, whereas affected interest groups and participants that were 
more distanced from the knowledge production had a tendency to expose higher concerns about 
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uncertainty. The ‘overconfidence effect” is a relevant heuristic that was discussed in Kloprogge et al. 
(2007) which explains how some actors or experts may place unrealistically high degrees of confidence in 
their own personal work. We observed that several practitioners’ in our case study attributed very high 
levels of confidence in their work completed for the EA. At the same time, other practitioners from other 
firms did not always feel confident in the work other actors were completing. Shackley and Wynne 
(1995) observed contradictory evidence among climate change practitioners who would attribute high 
certainty to the knowledge produced by other practitioners than those practitioners would attribute to 
themselves. Practitioners in our study had a tendency to place more certainty in their work than in that 
produced by other firms’ or other experts. There was a lack of trust between external practitioners, those 
not hired by proponents or regulatory agencies, and internal practitioners. There was a fear that because 
the practitioners were being financed by the proponent, their work might be biased.  
 
According to our findings, individuals perceived high uncertainty and discontent when they believed that 
their concerns were not being addressed during the EA (Frewer, Scholderer, & Bredahl, 2003; Rowe, 
2005). For example, we observed how changes that were brought as a result of the transition between a 
provincial and federal EA left some provincial authorities feeling more uncertain about how well their 
prior concerns were being addressed. It can be argued that with increasing distance from the knowledge, 
such as provincial and local actors who felt as though they were no longer as involved as they used to be, 
now created higher levels of perceived uncertainty. Duncan (2008) argued that distance from the location 
of knowledge production can make knowledge claims appear more reliable than they actually are, 
however, our findings suggest that the greater the distance and the less involvement actually made claims 
appear less reliable. We also observed that it was more likely that external practitioners, those not 
specifically hired by the proponent and that were in charge of providing particular or specific knowledge, 
acknowledged limitations in their work including the presence of uncertainty much more than internal 
practitioners. Most internal practitioners attributed high degrees of certainty to their work in a way that 
made uncertainty manageable and reducible. According to Mackenzie’s ‘certainty trough’, those directly 
involved in the production of knowledge, such as practitioners and proponents, will present high levels of 
uncertainty. In our study we found that internal practitioners and proponents had a tendency to attribute 
certainty rather than uncertainty to their work and external practitioners attributed high uncertainty. 
However, we certainly do not reject the idea that increasing distance relative to where the knowledge 
originates from (i.e. model, database, field study, etc) can conceal the contingencies of the knowledge 
claims, but on the basis of perception, our results indicated otherwise in the case of the 407 East EA. 
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The greater distance seemed to make people feel more uncertain about the knowledge claims and 
predictions which is in accordance to Mackenzie’s ‘certainty trough’ as described and applied in 
Duncan’s (2008) study of the Basslink process. Furthermore, authorities and proponents that use the 
knowledge derived by their chosen team of assessors appeared to give high levels of certainty to the work 
that was provided to them. Authorities would often use the word ‘trust’. According to the ‘certainty 
trough’, authorities are at medium distance and will likely attribute low levels of uncertainty to the 
knowledge.  
 
The literature has shown a discord between science and the public’s perspectives on uncertainty that 
welcome conflict and disagreement in public policy and EA (Jasanoff, 1999; van Asselt, 2000). Our 
contextual study identified perception as a constraining factor to uncertainty communication— 
encouraging selective communication under the assumptions that uncertainty information is too difficult 
for the public to understand, susceptible to misinterpretation, likely to cause delays, and therefore is 
avoided (Wynne, 2006). Some practitioners in our study revealed that proponents will often warrant that 
they report less information in fear that too much information will expose them to scrutiny. The 
ambiguity around the social dimensions of uncertainty comes from the contested perspectives, 
justifications, and wider meanings that are tied with a particular issue (Stirling, 1998). In our study, we 
found that the government as a proponent (MTO) negatively affected the degree of credibility and trust. 
Government sources are often seen as being least credible sources of reliable and trustworthy information 
(Frewer et al. 1996).  
 
Particular attention and effort should attempt to illuminate the varying perceptions among the actors to 
improve communication. Results from the case study suggest that the majority of the respondents 
believed communication of uncertainty information should be clear, concise and policy relevant. 
Uncertainty perception was addressed implicitly during the participatory program and important 
references were made towards the adoption of participatory methods during the 407 East EA to 
accommodate information sharing, feedback, and commentary. The authorities mentioned that open and 
transparent processes provide valuable commentary from NGOs, members of the public, and others, that 
might otherwise have been missed. Renn et al. (2011) argue that social learning is necessary to properly 
communicate and frame issues of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity—claiming that  “it is not 
enough that communication is organized” (p.242). While the responsibility of providing appropriate 
information throughout the EA rests with the project proponents (Wood, 2008), respondents in our study 
generally agreed that the responsibility was shared among those producing (i.e. practitioners) and 
disseminating (i.e. proponents) the knowledge.  
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Our findings and the reflections in the literature reveal that uncertainty perception is a critical element that 
shapes and steers the discursive process and the consideration of uncertainty in the process. Furthermore, 
perception varies and likely differs with contextual factors, much like political culture, world views, 
dominant social values, source credibility, and trust (Hood et al. 2002; Covello 1989; Frewer et al. 1999).  
 
3.4.5. Consideration  
 
The analysis showed that most of the documents recognized uncertainties but presented them in an 
implicit and unstructured way. Inconsistencies with respect to how uncertainties were being disclosed in 
EA documentation were also recently found by Lees et al. (2016) who concluded: “Uncertainties were 
sometimes identifiable, but it was often not clear what the uncertainty was about” (p. 7). Furthermore, the 
terminology used to report about uncertainties in the EAs explored by Lees et al. (2016) varied 
considerably. For example, the authors identified a number of expressions, such as ‘may’, ‘probably’, 
‘maybe’, or ‘could’, that were used when uncertainty was present but was not explicitly stated. The 
results of the query search for the 407 East EA revealed only five instances of explicit uncertainty 
disclosure, however, searches for words related to uncertainty, such as those mentioned by Lees et al. 
(2016), were not given further analysis. However, one interviewee stated finding words implicitly related 
to uncertainty, such as ‘could’, ‘would’, or ‘may’, would be much more likely than the word 
‘uncertainty’. A proponent similarly added that it would be surprising if we were to find mentions of the 
word ‘uncertainty’ anywhere. Proponents in our study did not appear to intentionally want to hide 
uncertainties in the reports (see Wood 2008). Proponents and their practitioners felt that it was is more 
practical to implicitly present uncertainties in a way that would be obvious for experts and authorities and 
not overly negative or difficult for members of the public, and other stakeholders to understand and 
interpret. This perspective, we speculate, is problematic and may promote uncertainty avoidance practices 
especially seeing that there was no measures or tools in place to explicitly disclose uncertainties to 
decision makers. According to Duncan (2008), proponents can have a vested interest in making their EISs 
appear politically palatable and defensible, thereby resulting in a practice of minimizing uncertainties. 
Our results are consistent with other findings (e.g. De Jongh 1988; Tennøy et al., 2006; Duncan 2008), 
showing that the information being communicated in EA about uncertainty is often simplified, hidden, or 
incomplete.  
 
A general assumption for understanding how EA actors handle uncertainties is to check whether or not 
the uncertainty in question is acknowledged (Larsen et al., 2013). Despite all of our interviewees 
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demonstrating their awareness of uncertainties only a few were able to describe how the uncertainties 
were further handled. For example, more than half of the practitioners interviewed in our study expressed 
that it was not asked of them to explicitly discuss or describe any uncertainties underlying their work and 
therefore they avoided doing so unless absolutely necessary. Of course, even though large and obvious 
uncertainties associated with the project were incorporated in the EA, we anticipate that the way in which 
uncertainties are being addressed might thus lead to decision outcomes that do not represent uncertainties 
and are based on inadequate knowledge. According to our findings, only uncertainties that are judged to 
be significant would therefore be accommodated or addressed in some way, considered, or disclosed 
appropriately, while those deemed minor, or inherent, would not. In other words, the decisions regarding 
the issue, impact definition, or the importance of an uncertainty is left to the assessor. Subjectivity in the 
EA and decision-making permeates into the project outcomes (M Cashmore, Gwilliam, Morgan, Cobb, & 
Bond, 2004; Duncan, 2008; Wilkins, 2003). The literature has shown that subjectivity due to values, 
worldviews, and judgments can hinder the quality of EAs (Geneletti, 2003; R. Morgan, 2012).  
 
According to Wilkins (2003), the extent to which practitioners seek out new information to narrow data or 
knowledge gaps is affected by social values. For example, some practitioners discussed internally 
handling uncertainties by communicating them to other practitioners in their firm while another expressed 
how professional experience was enough to evaluate what to do facing a particular uncertainty. 
Proponents and authorities also described instances where expert input was needed to help address an 
uncertainty or provide clarification in case of incomplete knowledge.  
 
Of course, participants in our study understood that not all uncertainties could be reduced or managed, 
while many placed a great deal of importance on deliberating and collaborating with their firms and other 
experts to address inconsistencies in the knowledge. Nevertheless, it remains highly unlikely that actors 
can appropriately disclose all uncertainties or knowledge gaps (Duncan, 2012).  In particular, we found 
evidence suggesting that there are difficulties when quantitative and qualitative practitioners negotiate or 
work together. Decisions made during the process are not discreet, are usually made collectively and 
iteratively during an EA, and often take the form of negotiations, bargaining, or compromises (Deelstra, 
Nooteboom, Kohlmann, van den Berg, & Innanen, 2003; Hildén, Furman, & Kaljonen, 2004; Kørnøv & 
Thissen, 2000; Retief, Morrison-Saunders, Geneletti, & Pope, 2013). Unfortunately, when experts and 
practitioners collaborate and work together, disagreements and difficulties about problem framing and 
interpretations are not unusual (Stirling, 2010). Similarly, in their broad study, Cash et al. (2003) found 
that active, iterative, and inclusive communication mobilized knowledge for action and improved 
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legitimacy and credibility of the information. They also reported that stakeholders or interests excluded 
from these processed often rejected and opposed the information produced.  
 
The lack of uncertainty disclosure suggests evidence of Tennøy et al.’s (2006)’s “black box”. The black 
box is an expression illustrating the lack of transparency and accountability about uncertainty information 
towards the public and decision-makers. Even though uncertainty was acknowledged by interviewees, not 
reporting uncertainties as ‘uncertainties’ is troublesome and according to Bond et al. (2015), may lead to 
decisions and eventually follow-up programs and plans which fail to accommodate some uncertainties.  
 
Decision makers were aware that there were uncertainties in the work that was being given to them, and 
they also acknowledged that not all uncertainties would be explicitly discussed. However, we agree with 
Bond et al. (2015) who suggest that the lack of uncertainty consideration in IA is a problem which leads 
to decisions that fail to incorporate uncertainties in the outcomes of planning and development decisions.  
Despite our results which suggest that decision-makers were aware that uncertainties were present, we 
agree with Tennoy et al. (2006) who argued that decision-makers are not made fully aware of 
uncertainties in EAs because these we found that uncertainty was not being disclosed appropriately in the 
documents presented to them. However, we found that decision-makers claimed that it was good practice 
to go ahead and request additional work be completed to reduce or address inconsistencies in the work 
performed by proponents. One authority described several instances where the proponent was asked to 
clarify or provide additional information regarding specific elements of the EA, and other authorities 
added that it happens often, especially if the information is vague or incomplete. Requests for additional 
information, experimentation, or monitoring by decision-makers is viewed as good practice as it may 
promote more prudent strategies and better informed decisions (Geneletti, Beinat, Chung, Fabbri, & 
Scholten, 2003; Reckhow, 1994).  
 
Recently, Leung et al. (2015) proposed that further research is needed to help EA practitioners identify, 
interpret, and communicate information about uncertainties to one another and the wider audience so that 
they can be appropriately considered. However, it is equally important to determine how decision-makers 
are using the information about uncertainties to ensure that it is properly considered during final 
decisions. Once uncertainties have been identified and disclosed, participants in our study revealed that 
consideration of these would most likely be demonstrated in monitoring activities during follow-up. 
Mostly, practitioners expressed how they would disclose contingencies or gaps in their knowledge but 
were not certain as to what decision-makers or proponents would do about them. According to the study 
by Tennøy et al. (2006), when decision-makers were made aware of the uncertainties in a road tunnel 
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project called Grualia-Bruvolle in Norway, mitigation and monitoring programs were set up to detect any 
possible disasters in the face of uncertainty. We suspect that the ambiguity over the way decision-makers 
in our project would deal with uncertainties may be partly due to the fact that the 407 East Extension has 
just recently received approval and construction is still ongoing. Nevertheless, we find similarities with 
the results of the study by Lees et al. (2015) which show that uncertainties are often addressed through 
follow-up programs. The majority agreed that follow-up addresses uncertainties, but it remains unclear 
whether or not these programs are directly aimed at addressing uncertainties that have been disclosed.  
 
3.4.6 Precautionary Approach and Adaptive Management 
 
Interviewees discussed the importance of adaptive management much more often than precautionary 
approaches. Although the precautionary principle (PP)1 is legally recognized, authorities were among the 
few to discuss its importance in dealing with uncertainties. According to Gullet (1998), in order for EA to 
embody the PP there is a need to strengthen its integration in legislation. Since PP is not a rule, and 
strongly relies on value judgment, its interpretation and application is also important (Hellström & Jacob, 
2001). For example, precaution is in some ways inherent to EA practice (Gullett, 1998; Lawrence, 2003) 
and, this may be why it was not discussed by interviewees as much as adaptive management. However, 
Gullet (1998) explains that EA is a procedure and PP is a rule that should inform decisions.  
 
Both PP and adaptive management were interpreted differently by participants, while one even stated that 
they were the same. In their analysis of Canadian EAs, Lees et al. (2016) found that the PP was often 
mentioned without detailed information about how it was going to be applied. Notwithstanding the 
numerous precautionary measures needed to manage anticipated impacts, risks, and uncertainties (Gullett, 
1997), the PP was not mentioned in the case study CSR. PP involves accountability and can contribute to 
reducing and coping with uncertainty; PP affects decision making (i.e. taking precautionary actions, 
weighing uncertainties, etc) and influences EA (i.e. measures to be followed) (Gullett, 1997; Lawrence, 
2003). Criteria, procedures, decision rules and institutional arrangements are needed to ensure that PP is 
being applied (Lawrence, 2003). On the basis that PP was not mentioned, we argue that the precautionary 
                                                 
1 The precautionary principle is an appear to prudence that encourages proactive decision making under 
situations characterized by high risk or uncertainty (van der Sluijs, 2012). The 1998 Wingspread 
Consensus summarized the precautionary principle this way: “When an activity raises threats of harm to 
human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect 
relationships are not fully established scientifically” (“Wingspread statement on the Precautionary 
Principle,” 1998). 
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principle does not appear to have been adequately endorsed both as a procedural requirement, not as a 
rule for decision makers in considering the risks associated with scientific uncertainties.  
 
On the other hand, case study participants discussed adaptive management as a favorable approach for 
handling uncertainties. The newness of the 407 East Extension Project (i.e., technologies, landscape, 
scale) appeared to be an important reason for adopting sound monitoring and AM. A common criticism is 
that AM can lead to situations where the ability of proponents to actually regulate unexpected outcomes is 
grossly overestimated (Brugnach et al., 2008; Wehling, 2006). Yet, as our results have shown, many 
ambiguities and uncertainties during the 407 East EA came as a result of changes in legislation, politics, 
and actors, and adaptive and flexible approaches to planning allowed for remedial actions to help cope 
with such ambiguity. Similar studies have demonstrated that adaptive approaches facilitate learning that 
leads to better coping strategies (van der Keur et al., 2008). Many respondents were hopeful that AM 
would be successful in reducing and coping with uncertainties and unknowns during construction and 
after.  
3.4.7 Recommendations for Future Practice  
 
In order to improve the way information about uncertainties are communicated and considered in EA, we 
offer the following recommendations. First and foremost, we propose adopting an uncertainty typology to 
stimulate a shared understanding of uncertainties amongst the EA community, members of the public, and 
decision-makers. Thereafter, uncertainties should be identified and addressed in a consistent manner, and 
communicated in a way that is understood by all actors involved. Decision-makers, stakeholders, and 
other interest groups may not be aware of the uncertainties hidden in impact predictions (Tennøy et al., 
2006) without an explicit typology. We also suggest that stakeholder mapping and techniques that help 
deal with decision trade-offs can help better manage uncertainties. Finally, we encourage explicit 
disclosure of uncertainty via documentation that is aimed at the public and provided to decision-makers. 
An Uncertainty Report (as part of an Environmental Impact Statement) can bring all the uncertainties to 
light as well as specify the means by which they are being addressed or reduced (Glasson et al., 2005). 
This would urge proponents, practitioners and decision makers to be more accountable for their choices 
and generate a higher level of trust. Most details about these recommendations now follow. 
 
1) Adoption of Uncertainty Typology 
Uncertainty classifications are important tools that should be used more often to ensure that all relevant 
uncertainties are communicated during EA. This research and that of others has shown just how broad the 
nature of uncertainty is (De Jong, 1988; Leung et al., 2015; Walker, Harremoës, et al., 2003). Our 
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findings are comparable to those of Wardekker et al. (2008) who looked at uncertainty perception and 
communication in the Dutch science-policy interface and found that policymakers and scientists held 
mismatched perceptions about uncertainty. Typologies and classifications are therefore helpful and can 
reduce ambiguity, prevent miscommunication and interpretational problems, and improve understandings 
of uncertainty (R. Morgan, 2012; Walker, Rotmans, et al., 2003; Wardekker et al., 2008). Because of this, 
we agree with authors like Walker et al., (2003) who see the need to adopt a mutually agreeable and 
consistent uncertainty typology however, there is limited guidance in the literature in terms of adopting a 
common approach to uncertainty, such as a conceptual framework (Leung et al., 2015). However, 
typologies like the one proposed by Walker et al. (2003) may prove to be highly useful in stimulating a 
shared understanding of uncertainties, including their nature, sources, and locations in EA.  
 
Typologies should pay attention to the particular EA context it is attempting to interact with (i.e. national, 
country specific legislation, etc.). We find that it is important to agree upon a standard uncertainty 
typology for EAs in the Canadian context (e.g. CSR’s, panel review assessments, class EAs, etc) 
specifically and urge other countries and nations to adopt their own similar, context sensitive uncertainty 
typologies that will be adapted to the dominant EA approaches, paradigms, and perspective. Broadly, we 
propose that academics work alongside practitioners, proponents, and other actors to develop an 
uncertainty typology that is suitable and appropriate for the particular context as well as practical for the 
EA community of a particular country or institutional setting. Furthermore, the typology should provide a 
clear definition of uncertainty. The typology should also describe the nature of uncertainty, i.e. epistemic, 
variability, and ambiguity-related uncertainty, explain the many different sources of uncertainty in EA, 
i.e. models, assumptions, subjective choices, and identify the common activities and stages of an EA 
where uncertainties exists. Workshops, certifications, resources, and practical templates could also assist 
the development and shared understandings of uncertainty (van der Sluijs et al., 2003).  
 
2) Guidance for Reporting and Disclosing Uncertainty Information 
Based on our findings and review of the CSR, we find that uncertainties were not appropriately disclosed. 
With only a few mentions, the word uncertainty was sparingly used and vaguely explained in the 
documentation. It seems to have been avoided entirely. In their review of EAs, Lees et al. (2016) found 
that when uncertainty was disclosed it was typically qualitative, implicit and variably reported using 
different terminology. This is a common problem (Walker, Harremoës, et al., 2003) that can be improved 
with an uncertainty typology (see above recommendation). Information about uncertainty needs to be 
made more readily available and that it should be better documented by all of those involved in the 
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process such that the ensuing reports are transparent and explicit and the information related to 
uncertainty is effectively transmitted to decision-makers (Budescu et al., 2011).  
 
There is an impressive amount of research about the implications of non-disclosure yet almost no 
practical guidance about how to go about disclosing information about uncertainty (Duncan, 2012; 
Harremoës, 2003; Leung et al., 2015; Tennøy et al., 2006; Wardekker et al., 2008). Too often it is 
practitioners that are blamed for not adequately disclosing information about uncertainties. However, 
reporting uncertainty is not legally mandated and practitioners are not always equipped to deal with 
uncertainty. Guidance about uncertainty reporting would help present all the information about 
uncertainties in a clear and consistent manner. Assumptions, methodologies, trade-offs, and choices 
would be explained and readers would be better informed (Wesselink, Challinor, Watson, Beven, & 
Allen, 2015). In our study, there were several accounts made about how it was often difficult for different 
disciplines to come together and share their knowledge. The use of a mutually shared approach for 
reporting information about uncertainties can prevent these problems from arising (Stirling, 2010).  
 
With a lack of guidance and good-practice disclosure requirements, practitioners and proponents may 
continue to discount uncertainty in their reports and choose to strategically report uncertainties which they 
deem necessary on their own. For example, proponents and practitioners may have a vested interest in 
making their work politically desirable and defensible (see Duncan, 2008), which would result in EA 
practice that seeks to minimize uncertainties. Several scholars have argued that transparency about 
uncertainties and the limits of scientific knowledge is necessary in order to gain public confidence 
(Brown, 2004; Wibeck, 2009; Wood, 2008; Wynne, 2006). In our study we found evidence of mistrust 
and misunderstandings that were the result of multiple frames and interpretations while also, different 
expectations as to how and why uncertainties should be discussed. The integration of different specialties 
supports shared learning that serves to increase the robustness of EAs (Hildén et al., 2004). 
 
3)  Mapping Stakeholder Involvement and Dealing Effectively with Trade-Offs 
Reaching a wide spectrum of stakeholders requires the use of equally broad means of producing and 
disseminating information. Clear linkages between the information (e.g. studies, plans, surveys, baseline 
data, assumptions, etc) and the EA should be made clear to all stakeholders (Hildén et al., 2004). 
However, we realized that as the 407 East EA process unfolded, decision difficulties arose when decision 
makers and stakeholders involved subscribed to different viewpoints and when roles were no longer clear. 
Although the involvement and collaboration of various actor groups and disciplines was advantageous in 
this case, it caused strategic uncertainty and mistrust for several participants in our study. We found that 
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there was hardly any effort being paid to who is participating in the assessment, why, and how all these 
individuals and teams would cooperate and integrate their knowledge. An example was provided by the 
situation where the sharing of responsibilities between the regulators and municipal, or local authorities 
was ambiguously laid out. To improve on this point, we recommend that actor roles, expectations, and 
organizational mandates are made clear from the onset. This would reduce strategic uncertainty, promote 
accountability, and prevent actor biases. For instance, if practitioners are financially dependent they may 
be exposed to various attempts to influence the results in some way (Kruopiene, Židoniene, & 
Dvarioniene, 2009), thus mapping out stakeholder groups would ensure that all partnerships are made 
explicit.  
 
Important decisions and trade-offs should not be made without negotiations and discussions amongst 
practitioners, proponents, and stakeholders (Hildén et al., 2004). In our study, although participants 
described how they were mutually dependent on one another throughout the process, it appeared that 
certain groups and individuals had more power than others during decision making. Both First Nation 
representatives, two external practitioners, two authorities, and the member of the public interviewed felt 
more detached and more concerned with trade-off outcomes and decisions than other study participants. 
This shows that while apparently there was a commitment to make the EA more open, transparent, and 
receptive to a diversity of forms of knowledge inputting, the concerns and information produced was not 
always being communicated, mobilized, or considered into decision making. There is still a tendency to 
view the decision making process as largely rational and science-based (Partidario & Sheate, 2013). Thus, 
we argue that more effort should be dedicated to ensuring that responsibilities are well understood, that 
trade-offs are better assessed and more openness about how particular conclusions are reached is needed 
to ensure transparency, promote trust, and increase confidence in EA.  
 
Those producing the EA should discuss uncertainties and information, reasons and contingencies in order 
for trade-offs to be better assessed (Wesselink et al., 2015). Participant views and underlying motivations 
are not predictable and neither are the decision outcomes (Kørnøv & Thissen, 2000). Formal decision 
aiding techniques, such as multi-criteria analysis (MCA), according to Retief et al. (2013), may help 
clarify the meaning of the weights assigned to evaluate specific decision making problems in EA (e.g. 
alternatives). In terms of uncertainty communication and consideration we recommend that MCA 
techniques explicitly disclose any uncertainties so that decisions are better informed.  
 
4) Trust, Transparency and Engagement  
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It is important that authorities and proponents are open and receptive to all the forms of knowledge input 
for the EA (O’Faircheallaigh, 2010; Partidario & Sheate, 2013). Public participation and community 
engagement, as observed in our study, can play a key role to ensure trust and accountability, but does not 
necessarily improve the communication or disclosure of uncertainty. Participation was present in many 
forms (e.g. CAG, RAG, MTAG, etc) and gave stakeholders and affected interest groups the opportunity, 
albeit restricted, to communicate uncertainties and raise concerns on the deliberation agenda. Willingness, 
capacity, access to information, timing and trust were important factors for adequate participation (M 
Cashmore, Bond, & Cobb, 2007; Stewart & Sinclair, 2007). Public participation may be used by 
proponents to look as though they are being responsible or to persuade the public to do what they want to 
do, without really considering their needs or input (Zhang et al., 2013). Therefore we propose that 
transparency be improved during consultation and public participation forums. We find it necessary that 
proponents not only attain and maintain trust among all parties but also improve their uncertainty 
discourse during these crucial deliberations seeing as these are important milestones in the EA. 
Proponent’s should also make it possible for all parties to engage equally. For example, it is important 
that all affected interests are aware of their roles and responsibilities as well as the uncertainties. To do 
this, once again, we recommend a better uncertainty discourse. 
 
5) Clear and Responsible Uncertainty Consideration and Management 
Our results further suggest that although uncertainties are not explicitly disclosed, decision makers are 
sufficiently aware to some degree of the underlying and unavoidable uncertainties. Nevertheless, we urge 
that decision-makers better disclose information about what uncertainties remain and how these will be 
monitored, reduced, or avoided. Despite insufficient information about uncertainties being handed over to 
the public and decision makers, there was a general consensus that the information was adequate to 
determine the approval and recommendations for project follow-up, yet, no such information about 
remaining uncertainty was discussed. The uncertainty discourse appears to fade once projects receive 
approval and this is particularly alarming. Without appropriate commitments to address knowledge gaps 
and uncertainties, anticipatory actions may not be sufficient or successful in detouring potential 
catastrophes.  
 
Consideration of uncertainties firstly requires that uncertainties are communicated. However, several 
participants were explicit about having limited time to read through the entire reports, including the final 
CSR. Similar conclusions support our findings that stakeholders and decision makers may miss important 
information due to time constraints in reviewing the documents (Cashmore et al., 2007). Our findings 
suggest that there was a preference would be to consider uncertainties that have a large bearing on the 
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decision to be made. At the same time, the assumption was that potential environmental and technical 
issues would be raised by the authorities, a finding which was also found in Cashmore et al. (2007) and 
Wood and Jones (1997). However, our interviews with authorities reported that reviewing the 
documentation was time consuming and the possibility for oversight is highly likely. For proponents and 
practitioners as well, consideration of all potential uncertainties was seen as impossible due to time and 
financial constraints. If proponents and practitioners are rushing to complete assessments in order to 
fulfill timelines and budgetary constraints than we anticipate that assessments may not be given the 
appropriate level of care and that uncertainties would be covered up or not given suitable consideration. 
With that we recommend that suitable time and funds be allocated to external reviewers in order to verify 
that all aspects of an EA are covered sufficiently. More time and more funds can improve the 
performance of EA in this way. However, doing this may be difficult and would require changes at both 
provincial and federal levels of governance. The ultimate fate of projects remains in the hands of the 
authorities who would be the ones able to bring to light these necessary improvements. Regulations or the 
simple allocation of more resources such as time and funds would ensure that assessments are done 
properly and fully. On the other hand, we can propose a more readily applicable alternative that would 
force project proponents to disclose these limitations in both time and financial resources. This 
transparency would allow for further studies to be conducted where gaps in the knowledge remain, for 
example. We also encourage that when uncertainties are disclosed, decision makers are explicit about the 
approaches that will be enforced to address and manage the uncertainty. This can be done by using a 
checklist of uncertainty wherein uncertainties and their sources would be listed in a way that makes them 
more easily identifiable. This would ensure that potential uncertainties in each section of the EA have 
been looked at. Finally, it would be beneficial for proponents to report on any uncertainties that 
influenced parts of the EA, such as trade-offs. This information would be useful to decision makers as it 
would allow them to see the trajectory that the uncertainties have been through. 
 
Lastly, concerning uncertainty management we recommend that uncertainty reporting tools be used to 
promote and facilitate the transfer of knowledge for follow-up and monitoring. According to Morrison-
Saunders and Bailey (2001), proponents and practitioners tend to move on quickly during land 
development projects and there is no continuity in project management and monitoring because 
responsibilities are transferred to various agencies. This is consistent with our findings where participants 
reported that some uncertainty was due to limited knowledge transferability between post-decision stages 
and activities. Participants informed that staff turnover in both proponent and regulator agencies alike, as 
well as lack of commitment, financial capacity and time, can lead to failed follow-up programs. Frequent 
staff turnover means that there is a loss of knowledge (Morrison-Saunders, Baker, & Arts, 2003), 
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including information about uncertainty. Therefore, we recommend that the EA community adaptively 
monitor uncertainties that have previously been identified and disclosed in EAs. This would mean that 
knowledge is being updated and the potential for unanticipated impacts can be reduced.  
 
6) Paying Attention to Context 
Understanding the elements and dynamics of the context which EA is to be implemented has been viewed 
as being highly important for ensuring effectiveness (Bina, 2008; Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007), 
and our examination of the 407 East EA found that context also influences uncertainty and the way in 
which information about uncertainties is communicated and considered. Projects will exhibit varying 
types and levels of uncertainty and the way in which these are communicated and considered throughout 
an EA process will vary considerably. For example, in our case, the location of the project was found to 
be a source of uncertainty which would not necessarily be the same for a project located elsewhere. 
Therefore, in order to identify the types and sources of uncertainty influencing a project, we recommend 
that EA processes be aware of the particulars of the context within which it is interacting with. Our results 
and analysis demonstrate how opportunities to address and disclose uncertainties were broadened once 
the project became a federal undertaking and proponents enlarged the participatory program. Hilding-
Rydevik and Bjarnadóttir (2007) argue that “it seems that certain contexts are receptive to tools when… 
the political will, the organizational commitment, the professional skill and learning motivation exists” (p. 
673-674). They also highlight that it is important to have context sensitivity in order to integrate 
environmental perspectives in EA and decision-making. Also, recognizing the context as a dynamic and 
causal element can better prepare practitioners and decision-makers for the inevitabilities that may arise, a 
point that was strengthened by findings in our study. This recommendation would require that suitable 
background and baseline studies are conducted for each undertaking. Current practice appears to desire 
quick and hasty preliminary work in the hopes that the EA goes smoothly. However, we have shown that 
for the 407 EA, unexpected changes in legislation for example require quick decisions and alterations. To 
this, we recommend that a less rigid and more adapted process be adopted now and to all future EAs. 
Proponents should have a suitable understanding of all the elements of the project so that better 
anticipatory measures could alleviate potential bumps in the road. Better uncertainty communication and 
consideration may be embedded in or reinforced by a diverse range of contextual factors including 
legislative frameworks, planning paradigms, and worldviews.  
 
Several assumptions in our paper indicate that there is still a need for studies to elaborate further on the 
relationship between uncertainty communication and context.  
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Chapter 4: Overall Conclusion 
 
Among the concerns dealt with in EA, the communication and consideration of uncertainties is a 
relatively new one that has received increasing attention over the past decade. The current study explored 
how uncertainties were communicated, handled and considered by those involved in the EA for a 
Canadian mega transportation project. Thus far, EA and megaproject governance literatures have 
remained relatively separate, with the former having paid hardly any attention to the specific challenges 
or needs of those undertaking large megaprojects, and the megaproject literature continually limiting its 
scope largely to risk- or cost-benefit assessments, and failing to develop key lessons informed by EA 
realities and requirements. However, we found that both bodies of literature shared a common ground 
when it came to the problem of uncertainty (See for e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2014; Jay, Jones, Slinn, & Wood, 
2007; Priemus, 2010; Salet et al., 2013; Tennøy et al., 2006; Walker, Harremoës, et al., 2003; Wardekker 
et al., 2008). The present thesis aims to make this connection, by making an assessment of uncertainties in 
the 407 East transportation case. By drawing on lessons presented in the two bodies of literature, we 
attempted to understand the way in which information about uncertainty is perceived, communicated, and 
considered in a transport megaproject EA.  
 
The primary endeavor of the present thesis was to explore how contextual dynamics influence the 
communication and consideration of uncertainties in the 407 East EA. The rationale was that by exploring 
what the key uncertainties were, in particular how these are perceived by the actors involved in the EA, it 
would be possible to develop more systemic ways of identifying, communicating, and considering 
uncertainties. To explore the influence of context, the study investigated how these uncertainties were 
communicated during the EA and considered for decision-making. The research revealed a number of 
important findings including the many factors that both hampered and contributed to uncertainty 
communication and consideration.  
 
First, the analysis confirmed that indeed the 407 East transportation case involved a complex and broad 
set of issues including many uncertainties. As pointed out by previous studies, uncertainties were present 
in all stages of the EA process (De Jong, 1988; Duncan, 2008; Geneletti et al., 2003; Hellström & Jacob, 
1996; Söderman, 2005; Tennøy et al., 2006; C. Wood et al., 2000) and there were no systematic approach 
for identifying uncertainties (Walker, Rotmans, et al., 2003). Many of these uncertainties could be better 
addressed and managed by improving certain aspects of EA practice such as increasing uncertainty 
disclosure practices during participatory processes with affected interests, members of the public, and 
with multi-disciplinary teams, enhancing regulatory oversight, or adopting less rigid timeframes to 
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complete assessments, not to mention introducing an uncertainty typology or template to better identify 
and address uncertainties.  
 
At the same time, our study revealed other types of uncertainties that occurred as a byproduct of 
environmental, social, political, and technological elements of the context. These were the results of 
complex and dynamic contextual factors, e.g. socio-political arrangements, environmental setting, 
regulatory arrangements, etc., and most of which were of an ambiguity or variability nature (Ascough II 
et al., 2008; Brugnach et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2005). Like most mega-project EAs, the project was large-
scale, involving a broad range of provincial, federal, and municipal government actors, numerous 
community groups and concerned citizens, and was being implemented in a setting that heightened 
uncertainty, especially in terms of ecological concerns. The scope of the EA was resultantly very wide, 
and the many actors, components, and interacting elements of the context introduced a number of issues 
and uncertainties that are different than those inherent to the process and practice of EA, and may not be 
present in EAs smaller in scale and scope. Much debate on uncertainty in EA relates to process 
uncertainties, e.g. in terms of prediction accuracy and assumptions, models and projections, etc. At the 
same time, it is widely recognized that context significantly influences EA and the decision-making 
outcomes (Gazzola, Jha-Thakur, Kidd, Peel, & Fischer, 2011; Hilding-Rydevik & Bjarnadóttir, 2007; 
Maxim & van der Sluijs, 2011; Refsgaard et al., 2013). It therefore seems that a deeper appreciation and 
awareness of the complexity and dynamics of project contexts would enable EAs to be more reactive to 
potential uncertainties and more effective in informing decisions. Approaching contextual uncertainties, 
just like those related to the EA process, is likely to improve the effectiveness of EA as a decision-making 
tool (Gazzola et al., 2011). Paying attention to context will reveal new information and may make the EA 
more relevant in addressing issues and uncertainties relevant to the project, the context, and the actors 
involved.  
 
Second, the current study found that information about uncertainty was not explicitly disclosed in the EA. 
Notwithstanding the presence of uncertainties throughout the assessment, our interviews with project 
proponents and practitioners revealed that the word ‘uncertainty’ is strategically avoided in the CSR. 
Avoidance behavior practice is evident here because it seems that proponents were aware of uncertainties 
but chose not to disclose them further, similar to the case reported by Duncan (2008). Although all 
participants acknowledged the presence of uncertainty to some extent, more than half of the practitioners 
interviewed and all the proponents expressed that disclosing uncertainties was not practical nor useful. 
The remaining interviewees were either expecting uncertainties to be reported, as good practice, while 
others were aware and displeased with the current practice of avoidance occurring amongst the 
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practitioners and proponents. In line with Mackenzie’s ‘certainty trough’, Duncan (2008) argued that the 
distance from the location of knowledge production can make knowledge claims appear more reliable 
than they actually are. We found that the greater the distance actually made claims appear less reliable 
from an actors’ perspective. For example, those alienated from the knowledge production, such as 
affected interests, felt high levels of uncertainty compared to those producing the knowledge, like internal 
practitioners. Internal practitioners had a tendency to attribute high levels of certainty and confidence to 
their work. According to Mackenzie’s ‘certainty trough’, those directly involved, and in this case 
particularly proponents and internal practitioners, should present high levels of uncertainty—which was 
not the case here. However, our findings are in parallel when it comes to those at a medium distance; the 
knowledge users (e.g. decision makers) attributed low levels of uncertainty and seemed to place a great 
deal of trust into the work performed by the proponents. As previously mentioned, we do not reject the 
idea that increasing distance relative to where the knowledge originates can conceal contingencies of the 
knowledge claims, but that on the basis of uncertainty perception it may not be applicable. It would 
appear that those directly involved in the product of knowledge perceive uncertainty to be controllable 
and reducible, and that perceptions of uncertainty increase as we increase the distance to where the 
knowledge originates.  
 
Looking back at Tversky and Kahneman’s (1979) Prospect Theory which argues that individuals tend to 
be risk averse when stakes of losses are high, and risk seeking if the stakes of losses are low, we can see 
evidence that individuals have a tendency to prefer situations with less uncertainty. For example, we 
noted that proponents preferred to keep the uncertainty discourse to issues of relevance and did not want 
to overwhelm the public and other stakeholders with too much uncertainty information because of fears 
that the information would be misused. Practitioners, because they are tasked with compiling much of the 
information within the reports and have much control over privileged information with regards to 
measuring, predicting, evaluating, and reporting, whilst meeting the bare requirements of the relevant 
policy and legislation, are well-placed to influence proponents to include environmental and social 
considerations early in the process (Beattie, 1995). Therefore, we recommend that better tools, such as a 
typology for uncertainty, be made available for practitioners to report and assess uncertainties more 
consistently throughout the process.  
 
Third, project proponents were afforded the opportunity to provide uncertainty information to decision-
makers and the public. However, they appeared to not have taken full advantage of this opportunity 
because they feared that the public might perceive this information as a deficit in the work, and that 
information about uncertainties would not be useful to decision-makers in reaching a final decision. We 
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found that a very limited amount of uncertainty information was provided and made available to the 
audiences, and it was made available only when it was asked to do so, e.g. during public consultations or 
by decision-makers requesting additional information. It would appear that the importance placed upon an 
uncertainty depended on individual perceptions. This once again can be linked back to prospect theory 
wherein decisions that are more uncertain are riskier and therefore we expect that the communication of 
uncertainty will be affected. On the basis of our research, proponents do not encourage practitioners to 
disclose uncertainties explicitly, and practitioners are inclined to under-report uncertainties because they 
do not want to lose their credibility or reputation. This can lead to situations where uncertainties are 
presented as certainties and lends into the phenomenon called the certainty effect which describes the 
tendency to overweigh certain outcomes relative to outcomes that are merely ‘possible’. As a result, it 
was not widely disseminated to other experts, the public, or decision-maker. Thus, we find it necessary to 
encourage proponents and decision-makers to push practitioners and experts to disclose and make known 
the uncertainties that they come across, rather than using professional judgment to ‘hide’ or minimize 
uncertainty. 
 
Our contextual study identified perception as a constraining factor to uncertainty communication— 
encouraging selective communication under the assumptions that uncertainty information is too difficult 
for the public to understand, susceptible to misinterpretation, likely to cause delays, and therefor avoided 
(Wynne, 2006). Also, different parties will perceive uncertainty differently. The ambiguity around the 
social dimensions of uncertainty comes from the contested perspectives, justifications, and wider 
meanings that are tied with a particular issue (Stirling, 1998). Looking at uncertainty as an inherent 
characteristic of actor interaction follows actor-network theory wherein Latour (1987) suggested that 
scientist and powerful players may be able to close down uncertainties by creating facts through 
assumptions. In our current study we saw that decision-making processes do not occur in a vacuum but 
are actually influenced by several factors including actor networks. Therefore, borrowing from actor-
network theory, Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) discuss strategies that can be used to the help manage 
uncertainties via a network approach. This approach implies a strategy that maps the distance between the 
perceptions of the different parties involved to help reduce the distance and achieve better consensus. The 
authors argue that uncertainty management is about reaching a ‘common ground’, “a minimal basis for 
communication that enables further interaction and common learning” (p. 245). This requires that 
proponents and practitioners disclose information about uncertainties and encourage mutual, coordinated 
learning, establish links between groups, actors, and organizations, and strengthen the process integrity. 
The 407 East case would have benefited from such an approach to uncertainty management. 
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Although uncertainties were not disclosed in the CSR, it was still assumed that everyone would be more 
or less aware of them as an inherent part of the process, e.g. assumptions, prediction errors, model 
uncertainties, etc. This perspective can be detrimental for uncertainty communication and consideration 
because it hinders transparency. Our analysis shows that uncertainty is not only inherent to EA and 
decision making but that it is also a dynamic variable, influenced by context, perception, and actor 
interactions. For example, several respondents indicated how they perceived the public as being unable to 
conceptualize uncertainties and felt that providing them with information about uncertainty would only 
generate confusion and distrust. Mackenzie’s ‘certainty trough’ argues that those directly involved in the 
production of knowledge and those further alienated from it will have high levels of uncertainty, and we 
found that those directly involved in the production attributed lower levels than those alienated from it. 
Being more transparent and open about uncertainties may reduce the high levels of perceived uncertainty 
of those alienated from the production of knowledge. Transparency and uncertainty disclosure would 
likely increase trust as well as stimulate the effort to resolve and handle uncertainty (Bijlsma, Bots, 
Wolters, & Hoekstra, 2011). We observed how many practitioners and proponents take ultimate control 
of the dissemination of information to the general public, and many of which discussed the need to 
simplify information (e.g. minimize, avoid, or remove information about uncertainties) in order for lay 
people to understand (Frewer, Hunt, et al., 2003). Additionally, according to prospect theory the choices 
adopted by decision-makers are controlled by past experiences, by information availability, and partly by 
norms, values and personal characteristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The dissemination of 
uncertainty information to decision-makers and authorities may also experience these transformations. 
We see this as avoidance behavior practice. Our case showed that decision makers expressed that they 
knew there would always be uncertainties in the work that is being given to them, to some extent, even if 
these uncertainties are not explicitly identified. Without established uncertainty reporting tools, or 
requirements for explicit disclosure, uncertainties can easily go unnoticed and projects may be ill 
equipped to deal with unanticipated impacts. And, without suitable mention or explanation, it is unlikely 
that decision-makers are made adequately aware of the implications that the uncertainties can have on the 
decision outcomes, including the efforts in place to address them.    
 
Fourth, as we have briefly touched upon above, our research showed how context influenced the way 
uncertainty was not only communicated but also considered. We find that stakeholder involvement 
broadened the frame to include additional options and stakeholder criteria. For example, efforts to resolve 
uncertainties from the public and communities were prioritized in the hopes of reducing opposition, 
resistance, and dissatisfaction. For the most part, it was not clear from the CSR to what extent 
uncertainties were considered, and our empirical study found that when uncertainties were considered it 
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was not always in line with expectations of stakeholders such as authorities, practitioners, or First Nation 
representatives. For example, the procedures for excavating First Nation burial sites was one uncertainty 
discussed by both First Nation representatives. Even after voicing their concerns federally and receiving 
participant funding, their input was not given due consideration and the uncertainties about excavation 
methods remained because they are not permanently in Ontario. According to them, having a member of 
the First Nation group present during these activities would have ensured proper consideration and 
improved their confidence in the EA. This was an example of an uncertainty that was considered but not 
to a level that met with the expectations of the affected interest. Overall, our results and analysis provided 
indicative evidence of how the regulatory, organizational, and social context influences the way 
uncertainties were considered.  
 
Finally, this study importantly illuminated the many influences of context on uncertainty communication 
and consideration in mega transportation project development. Mega projects involve planners and 
governments worldwide but our research shows there these actors need to be skilled in handling 
uncertainties that are brought about by dynamic changes in political regime, legislation, environmental 
issues, and the substantive uncertainties from dynamic actor networks and interactions. EA for 
megaprojects should proceed by enhancing participatory approaches that encourage multi-stakeholder 
dialogue through the development of open institutional frameworks. Considerable improvements in 
uncertainty identification and analysis is also needed at various stages of the environmental process. 
Adopting an uncertainty typology and uncertainty reporting tool would certainly encourage better 
uncertainty communication and consideration. It would also promote a shared understanding of 
uncertainty and help manage strategic uncertainties, improve trust, and facilitate transparency. Because 
mega projects are often subject to public opposition (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Vidal & Marle, 2008), we strongly 
recommend stakeholder and public participatory approaches that is both receptive and reactive to 
knowledge inputs and concerns. For fear of damaging their reputation and to address the pressure from 
regulatory agencies and the public, proponents and professionals will likely enter the debate especially 
when there is a need to communicate uncertainties, risks, and limitations involved (Harding, 2002). The 
negative perception of the proponent, the project, and the EA was driven by some mistrust that could be 
due to the previous transportation projects failures, the proponent’s reputation, or other. Sandman (2012) 
stated that concerns can arise when the risk is man-made, novel, when there is uncertainty, when there is 
memory of prior mistakes, and when information is withheld.  
 
This current study has provided a valuable point after which more detailed empirical research can be 
undertaken in an attempt to improve uncertainty communication and consideration in EA and decision-
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making. As there will always be uncertainties in impact predictions and assessments, more attention 
should be given to developing approaches that better manage uncertainties such as precautionary 
approaches, adaptive management, conservative estimates, or sensitivity analyses. Guidance is needed for 
both practitioners and decision-makers to better consider uncertainties in EA as well. It should also be 
known that EA is a rapidly evolving field and perceptions of uncertainty are hardly stagnant. We hope 
that the appreciation for uncertainty in EA improves and we propose the development of a Canadian 
uncertainty typology that encourages a mutual understanding of uncertainty for all those involved in EA, 
especially the future EA community. In addition to a shared uncertainty perspective, we propose that 
practitioners, experts, and proponents involved in the dissemination of information and EA report writing 
actively participate in a practice that explicitly discloses uncertainties. However, this study shows that 
uncertainties are not adequately communicated throughout the EA, and that much of the responsibility to 
do so lies with project proponents. Therefore, guidance for proponents as well so that they could 
encourage the disclosure of uncertainty is needed. Uncertainties could be better managed and recognized 
through the use of classifications. We feel like there should be a separate section in the EIS or EA where 
uncertainties, including sources and types are discussed, the linkages between each uncertainty and 
decision making illustrated, and there should be justification for the ways in which these are being 
managed. We understand that identifying uncertainties and attempting to classify them is not easy. These 
recommendations would most likely benefit from more flexibility, and more importantly from reforms in 
the legal realm. In particular, we find that practitioners are concerned with appeasing proponents, and that 
proponents are concerned with appeasing regulatory and agency demands. If uncertainty disclosure was 
legally mandated by regulatory agencies and legal prescriptions, proponents would more likely be willing 
to be explicit about information about uncertainties and also encourage their practitioners to disclose 
uncertainties. EA frameworks that take into consideration the influence of context would also be much 
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Chapter 6: Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview schedule used for the case study research  
Interview schedule used for the case study research 
Theme and Questions Explanations and probing 
Introduction 
 What was your involvement or role in the 
407 East Project EA? Follow-Up: How were you involved either in the provincial EA process or the federal EA process? 
Theme 1: Uncertainty in the Assessment  
1. Can you recall some of the main uncertainties related to the project 
development?  Probe: For example, in relation to the project’s design, baseline studies, impact predictions, management of the impacts and 
alternatives, etc.? 
2. In your view, what factors contributed most to the creation of uncertainties that you’ve mentioned? Probe: For example, environmental, social, technological, economic, political, scientific, or others? 
3. Did the uncertainties in the assessment 
affect your confidence in the EA process that 
took place (i.e. approval/recommendations)? 
 
Theme 2: Communication of Uncertainty 
1. What were some of the things that were done during the EA process (from the 
Provincial through to the Federal CSR), if anything, to identify and or 
communicate uncertainty? 
 
Follow-Up: How were uncertainties identified and 
communicated? By whom? To whom? Did you initiate 
any of these activities?  
 
Probe: Do you recall uncertainty being brought up in the 
preliminary stages (i.e. collection of data) or during the 
evaluation of impacts? 
2. Was enough information about uncertainty shared, and were the right people 
involved? Follow-Up: If not, what would have been a better way? 
3. During the EA process did you ever feel that you (or others involved) couldn’t 
communicate openly about uncertainty for fear of some consequence? Probe: Is there a particular example that you can share?  
4. Do you recall of any information about uncertainty being used in the EA 
process? 
 
Explanation: In other words, did this information 
influence the way impacts were predicted, management 
measures, the projects decisions, etc.?  
 
Probe: Can you think of an example? 
5. What would you have done differently to communicate about uncertainty, and 
with whom, if you had the opportunity? Probe: Why? Can you explain? 
Theme 3: Perception of Uncertainty 
1. What information about uncertainty is important to you? Explanation: In other words, are there certain instances or issues, 
in general, where knowing about any uncertainties is of particular 
importance? 
2. Might you have responded differently or viewed the project or decision 
differently if you had more (or less) information about uncertainty? Probe: Why? Can you explain? 
3. Looking back on this project, what would you identify as the benefits to 
disclosing (or not disclosing) information about uncertainties to the affected 
interests (e.g. proponent, decision-maker, NGOs, public) 
 
Follow-Up: Were there any negative outcomes or risks created 
because uncertainties were or were not reported? 
 
Follow-Up: More generally speaking, beyond this particular 
project, what are the benefits of disclosing or not disclosing 
uncertainties? The risks? 
4. As a stakeholder, you are involved in the communication about uncertainty 
during the EA process. How do you think other stakeholders view your approach 
to handling uncertainty? 
Follow- Up: How do you think other stakeholders view 
uncertainty in EA, or would use the information about 
uncertainty? 
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5. How did the decision-makers, or other stakeholders react to or address any 
uncertainties that may have been presented in the preliminary design, in the IEA, 
or in the CSR? 
Follow-Up: Was the response appropriate in your view? 
 
Theme 4: Gauging Uncertainty 
1. Were you satisfied with the way uncertainties were dealt with (i.e. 
communicated and considered throughout project management and decisions)? Probe: Why or why not?  
Follow-Up: Do you think other stakeholders were aware of and 
satisfied with how uncertainties were communicated? 
2. Would you say that there is a gap between the potential range of the project’s 
effect that may occur in the long term, in combination with other projects, and the 
range of our knowledge or in the responsibility taken to 
manage these effects? 
Follow-Up: How important is uncertainty communication to 
closing or at least understanding this gap? 
Theme 5: Suggestions for Improved Practice 
1. What were/are the main challenges to communicating uncertainty in the 407 
East Project? Follow-Up: Are there any aspects of uncertainty communication you think are done well? 
2. Who is (or should be) ethically responsible for disclosing uncertainty? Follow-Up: Are there or should there be legal obligations to do 
so? 
3. What could, or should, decision-makers do with information about uncertainty 
in an EA when they receive it? Probe: What approaches, concepts, or principle are being used? 
4. Is there a need to improve uncertainty communication in EA? Why or why not? Probe: How is it best communicated (i.e. visually, graphically, 
verbally, etc.)? 
5. What are your suggestions (if any) for how we can improve uncertainty 
communication and consideration in EA to improve decision-making?  
Theme 6: Context Dynamics of Uncertainty Communication and Consideration  
1. Were there any factors related to the project environment or stakeholder 
dynamics that contributed to uncertainty or influenced the way uncertainties were 
communicated and considered by individual actors? (e.g. situational, 
environmental, sociopolitical context)  
 
Follow-up: Did the location or extent of the undertaking 
have any influence on the evaluation of the impacts? 
 
Follow-up: Did the socio-political or economic context have any 
influence on project decisions?  
2. What uncertainties regarding ecological road effects were identified or 
communicated during the assessment that you are aware of? This includes indirect 
and cumulative effects. 
Probe: Was anything done to reduce the uncertainties 
(e.g. collection of more baseline information, quantification of 
uncertainty, etc.)? 
 
Probe: Were you satisfied with all that was done to 
address indirect and cumulative impacts? 
 
Follow-up: Do you recall any discussion related to mitigation of 
the potential ecological effects of the road such as fencing or 
passages?  
3. What uncertainties do you face during the preliminary assessment, the detailed 
assessment and post-EA stages? Follow-up: How did the 407 East process react to address the uncertainties in the relevant stages?  
 
Probe: How does the project compare with others you have 
worked on?  
4. Do you recall any information on uncertainty being considered or 
communicated as part of the post-EA plans such as Follow-up or other impact 
management proposals? 
Follow-Up: Do you think the presence of uncertainty in the VECs 
or any other issues influence the extent to which it will be covered 
in the post-EA management plans (i.e. CSR follow-up, 
monitoring, auditing, etc.)? How? Do you have an example?  
 
Probe: What is factored in when determining what goes into 
follow-up? (i.e. regulatory backing, bias, practicality, etc) 
5. Do you feel that enough consideration to 
the uncertainties about species at risk, groundwater, and wetland impacts were 
given when making the final decisions and recommendations? 
Probe: Can you give me a particular example of a 
mitigation measure or recommendation related to wildlife, species 
at risk, wetlands, or salt management? 
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6. Do you feel the 407 East EA was explicit in recognizing potential uncertainties 
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Appendix B: Introductory e-mail  
Introductory e-mail sent out to potential research participants 
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Appendix C: Participant consent form 
Research participant consent form  
p.1 of 3 
 
  113 
 




  114 




  115 
Appendix D: Code list (selection of the most important codes used) 
 
Process.uncertainty 
Environmental.uncertainty 
Social.uncertainty 
Economic.uncertainty 
Species.at.risk 
Regulatory.process 
Follow.up 
Federal 
Provincial 
Stakeholder.engagement 
Transparency 
Public.view 
Perception 
Timelines 
Wildlife 
MTO 
Fish.Fishhabitat 
Adaptive.management 
Regulatory.agency 
Review.process 
Uncertainty.terminology 
Communication.uncertainty 
Data.limitations 
Location.context 
Agricultural.impacts 
Governance 
Location.of.uncertainty 
 
